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Abstract 
The thesis is concerned with the exploration of the notion of ‘flow’ from 
both a psychological and dance analysis perspective in order to extend the 
meaning of flow and move beyond a partiality of understanding. The main 
aim of the thesis recognises the need to understand, identify and interpret 
an analysis of the moments of flow perceivable in a dancer’s body during 
improvisatory practice, through technologically innovative means. The 
research is undertaken via both philosophical and practical enquiry. It 
addresses phenomenology in order to resolve the mind/body debate and 
is applied to research in flow in psychology by Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, 
and flow in movement analysis by Rudolf Laban and Warren Lamb. The 
significance of this endeavour can be seen in the reconsideration of the 
relation between mind and body, and art and science which informs the 
methodology for the research (Part One). The three main outcomes of the 
research are related to each of the three subsequent parts. 
The first research outcome is the articulation of a transdisciplinary 
approach to understanding flow and was developed by expanding on the 
current definitions of flow through an innovative transdisciplinary 
methodology (Part Two). Research outcome two addresses the 
intersubjective nature of flow, which was identified within improvisation. 
From this two methods were constructed for the collection and 
interpretation of the experience of the dancer. Firstly, through reflective 
practice as defined by Donald Schön. And secondly, an argument was 
provided for the use of motion capture as an embodied tool which extends 
the dancers embodied cognitive capabilities in the moment of 
improvisation (Part Three). The final research outcome was thus theorised 
that such embodied empathic intersubjectivity does not require a direct 
identification of the other’s body but could be achieved through 
technologically mediated objects in the world (Part Four). 
Subsequently, the findings from the research could support further 
research within a number of fields including dance education, dance 
practice and dance therapy, psychology, neuroscience, gaming and 
interactive arts.  
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, research in the area of contemporary 
European performance has focused on a resurgence of interest in 
embodied practice through technological innovation. Many practitioners 
and theorists explore the convergence of technology and embodied 
practice, investigating the effect technology has on the body. Much 
research documents the various practices which experiment with 
technology in performance, and a pervasive quest for interrogating the 
relationship between body and technology is central to much of this work. 
This particular area of research, as a result, calls into question a set of 
oppositional structures including art/science and mind/body, and thus 
necessitates a reconsideration of those structures. Such practices and 
theoretical investigations can be considered to depart from dualist 
narratives around art and science and the mind and body, with creative 
practices increasingly imbued with technological artefacts and methods. 
From this perspective, the world is viewed as being negotiated by a 
technologically mediated body. 
However, it is argued in this thesis that this particular conceptualization of 
world, technology and body is only one way of interrogating the 
art/science, mind/body divide. A conceptualization which is largely missing 
from digital performance literature is that of the body negotiated by a 
technologically mediated world. This is, for example, a method prevalent in 
many of the sciences, including dance science, where technologies are 
used to translate the body for research, such as the x-ray machine or the 
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fMRI machine which isolate measurable phenomenon of the body in order 
that an understanding of the body be made available. What is 
encapsulated in this formulation is how the objectively defined body is 
interrogated and interpreted through a technological medium. 
The lack of articulation of this view within the creative arts is significant as 
it further enforces the art/science divide by privileging certain methods 
over others within both art and science. While the arts privilege the 
subjective and unknowable, the sciences typically privilege the objective 
and knowable. Therefore, this thesis proposes a third formulation in which 
a subjective embodied being is interrogated and interpreted through a 
technological medium; in this way, motion capture technologies will be 
used to translate embodied subjective responses for the purposes of 
human understanding.  
In order to address the broad problem outlined in this introduction, a 
response is articulated within the thesis which offers a specific example to 
develop an understanding of the uses of the scientific hermeneutic method 
with regards to technology in interpreting subjective phenomena within 
creative research. The study proposes to address the experience of ‘flow’ 
in contemporary dance improvisation in relation to both psychology and 
dance analysis. The main aims of this PhD study, therefore, are to 
understand, identify and interpret an analysis of the ‘moments of flow’ 
perceivable in a dancer’s body during improvisatory practice, through 
innovative technological means. 
Part One: Introducing Flow, in which this introduction is situated, provides 
the broader context of the problem central to this study. In order to 
demonstrate how this particular study can be used as an entry point to the 
broader art/science discussion three principle objectives have been 
formulated: 
1. To understand and critique the development of the debate 
surrounding flow by examining recent writing within philosophy, 
dance and performance studies, and psychology. 
Louise Douse Introduction 
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This thesis discusses the key concepts, issues and history of thought 
within writing about flow, as it has developed since the early twentieth 
Century, particularly within flow studies, in positive psychology and 
movement analysis in dance. Both areas address flow in terms of the 
holistic experience that people engage in through action in the world. Flow 
in psychology addresses the state of mind an individual enters when totally 
immersed in an activity; the purpose of positive psychology is to achieve a 
scientific understanding and implement effective interventions for 
improving life. Flow in movement analysis is the motional quality of an 
individual’s movement, however, this is considered to involve the whole 
being; mind and body. The second part of the thesis takes a 
phenomenological approach to understanding and elucidating the 
structures of flow. Phenomenology is concerned with conscious 
experience through perception; the main notion of this philosophy is to 
define a qualitative approach to the lived experience. Part Two: Finding 
Flow provides a comprehensive overview of the debate concerning flow in 
performance, which is explored in order to develop a synthesis of new and 
complex information which will map out the parameters for this present 
study. 
2. To identify particular moments of flow in dancing embodied 
experience through the use of reflection within dialogic processes 
between researcher-practitioner and participant-dancer in 
improvisation. 
This objective demonstrates further development of the methods and 
techniques linked to flow. Part Three: Capturing Flow details the proposed 
methods and tools appropriate for identifying experiences of flow in dance. 
Here the study addresses knowledge as produced through the 
intersubjective reflections on experiences of both the participant-dancer 
and researcher-practitioner. The study will identify whether flow can be 
recognized within improvisation in contemporary dance through the 
reciprocal reflexive processes inherent in choreographic practice. The 
research utilises both first person and third person perspectives; the first 
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person approach sees the researcher as creative practitioner. Within the 
improvisatory process, it is not essential for the practitioner and dancer to 
be involved in reflective practice, however, the use of the researcher as 
practitioner enables the intersubjective relationship between practitioner 
and dancer to be further examined. 
3. To interpret an analysis of flow using motion capture technologies, 
and assess the impacts, limitations and implications of the use of 
such technologies for analysing the improvisatory process. 
Part Four: Reading Flow draws on innovative approaches to technology in 
the application of motion capture as a tool for analysis of flow within the 
body. Due to the emerging nature of this area of research, the current 
technologies used for movement analysis come from biomechanics 
together with recent further developments within computer animation for 
gaming and film purposes. This study also proposes that the development 
of such an innovative methodology for the use of motion capture will 
provide the means by which findings concerning analysing flow will be 
evidenced. The research thus endeavours to develop an understanding of 
the best uses of the technologies for the acquisition and collation of 
information.  
This thesis develops a transdisciplinary approach to flow. While the terms 
multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary are often used 
interchangeably, is it important to note the conceptual distinctions between 
them. Multidisciplinary refers to research from more than one field which is 
considered in parallel or sequentially, but remain distinct within their field, 
for example, a dance work by Pina Bausch can be studied not only within 
dance history but also within European history and through a 
phenomenological approach. Interdisciplinary research is that which 
concerns the transfer of knowledge from one discipline to another, for 
example, when the methods of theatre practice are transferred to dance 
practice it leads to the appearance of a new practice, that of Dance 
Theatre, or Tanztheater within the context of Bausch’s work. 
Louise Douse Introduction 
15 
 
Transdisciplinary research however, “concerns that which is at once 
between the disciplines, across the different disciplines, and beyond all 
discipline.” (Nicolescu, 1999, p. 2). 
In the context of this study, the concept of flow can be considered an 
umbrella term under which multiple disciplines and methodologies are 
drawn on in order to develop a new “understanding of the present world, 
which cannot be accomplished in the framework of disciplinary research.” 
(Ibid, p. 3). Flow as defined in positive psychology and flow as defined in 
movement analysis “nourishes” the transdisciplinary research, and in turn 
“is clarified by transdisciplinary knowledge.” (Ibid, p. 3). In this type of 
research neither discipline nor method is privileged. The first person, 
subjective understanding of flow is approached through phenomenological 
methodology, and is utilised in conjunction with the third person, objective 
understanding of flow from the material data gathered from the motion 
capture technologies. The transdisciplinary approach to this study 
encourages and recognises the value of bringing together multiple 
research paradigms and thus aims to combine methods and techniques in 
a flexible and rigorous manner designed specifically for the study. 
Chapter One: Contextualising Flow opens by addressing the role of René 
Descartes at the start of the modern era, in polarising the fields of science 
and art. It looks at the shifting perspectives manifest in philosophy and 
dance at the start of the modern age and, in particular, addresses the work 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Rudolf Laban in relation to one another and 
their broader modernist frameworks. The aim is to address how these two 
areas of research can be aligned with current thinking. The section also 
addresses the technological implications of the postmodern era, identifying 
key thinkers Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jacques Derrida in relation to 
digital performance theory, before returning to the art/science debate. The 
chapter closes by drawing on current methodological practices within the 
field of practice-as-research in order to identify the key methodological 
concerns of this thesis. 
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Chapter Two Understanding Flow provides a review of the relevant 
literature within Part Two. It must be emphasised that the context of this 
thesis is Western contemporary theory and practice, though this does not 
necessarily exclude Eastern philosophies or practices as indeed many 
Eastern practices are drawn on within much contemporary Western 
research. For example, Buddhist notions of mindfulness, and Eastern 
practices such as yoga are integrated in many Western philosophies and 
dance practices, respectively. It is essential, however, to place some 
limitations on the thesis and to define clearly the parameters of the 
research, but it should be noted that the literature presented in this chapter 
should by no means be considered exhaustive. A certain amount of 
selectivity was essential as it would have been difficult, within this one 
chapter, to review all literature which explicitly or implicitly considers 
embodiment. 
Chapter Three: Phenomenological Flow begins with an analysis of the 
psychological study of flow by Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi. Flow as defined 
by Csikszentmihalyi is an optimal state of intrinsic motivation. The chapter 
draws on parallels between phenomenological notions of embodiment and 
the psychological concept of flow. It briefly reviews some dualist 
understandings of the body’s role in self-identity before going on to explore 
some of the limitations associated with this view, and how these problems 
can be overcome through a shift to the notion of embodiment. Merleau-
Ponty is largely discussed here in terms of his theory of the body as a 
means of being in the world. Merleau-Ponty’s habit body and Heidegger’s 
Dasein and notions of temporality are drawn upon in order to articulate an 
individual’s experience of flow. 
Further parallels are then drawn between Csikszentmihalyi’s and Rudolf 
Laban’s notions of flow within Chapter Four: Flow in the Dancing Body. 
Laban’s work in the area of flow sits within his studies of choreutics and 
eukinetics; two areas of dance research which address effort and shape in 
the dancing body. Both Csikszentmihalyi and Laban view flow as revealing 
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cognitive processes, however neither include reference to the other and 
indeed both define flow quite differently. Flow for Laban is the physical 
characteristic which is indicative of an individual’s ability to communicate 
and create relationships. Moving between free flow and bound flow, Laban 
articulates a preference for free flow as that which moves with freedom, 
ease and fluency. Drawing on Laban’s research, the work of Warren Lamb 
is also defined within the chapter in order to develop further links with 
Csikszentmihalyi’s notion of flow. 
The following chapter, Chapter Five Facilitating Flow, addresses dance 
practices which also explore the interrelationship between flow in 
psychology and flow in terms of movement quality. It draws on 
improvisational practices as well as image work and Eastern practices 
such as yoga and butoh. The purpose of this chapter is to identify those 
embodied practices which facilitate flow in order to develop a methodology 
for devising a workshop on flow. This workshop sets up the second 
objective to be explored in Part Three of this thesis which addresses the 
identification of flow in improvisation. In order to identify flow in 
improvisation, both the researcher and the participants must have an 
understanding of flow as developed throughout these chapters and be 
able to identify with the particular practices which enhance flow. 
Chapter Six Identifying Flow, the first chapter in Part Three provides the 
overall methodology that will be applied within this thesis for engaging with 
the dancer’s experience of flow. It draws on a theory of intersubjectivity, 
discussed with reference to Merleau-Ponty and his work The visible and 
the invisible (1964). This is then clarified with respect to the term 
kinaesthetic empathy, considered as an individual’s embodied 
engagement with others in the world, and is examined both within a dance 
context and a neurobiological context. Finally, the neurobiological 
research on empathy helps to support a theory of empathy for 
technologically mediated ‘others’.  
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Chapter Seven: Dialogic Flow begins with an analysis of hermeneutic 
phenomenology as a methodology for interpreting the experience of the 
other. The chapter then addresses the theory of reflective practice as a 
method for the dialogic processes apparent in the researcher-practitioner 
and participant-dancer relationship. The chapter provides a rationale for 
the methods used in the thesis drawing on key theorists such as Donald 
Schön and his notions of reflection in and on action. It develops an 
understanding of the relevance and applicability of reflective practice to 
phenomenology and flow, considering both their interrelationship and 
limits. The chapter articulates the methods utilised for collecting the 
subjective data including the use of journals, continuous writing exercises, 
and interviews. 
Digital performance is the theme of the next section: Chapter Eight: 
Technologically Embodied Flow. It provides a brief introduction to the 
practitioners and theorists within this field and explores the various types 
of performance and technologies including, visualization technology, 
avatar performance, telematics, and archival or e-science technologies. 
Chapter Eight addresses theories of embodiment in relation to technology, 
such as the Philosopher of technology, Don Ihde’s embodied technics 
which explores human/technology relations and considers the technology 
as transparent mediator of the world. The chapter also facilitates an 
understanding of embodied technologies from within the arts, such as 
those of digital artist Susan Kozel. It will explore whether the use and the 
extent of the motion capture system in the study can be considered 
embodied, reflecting on studies in neuroscience which suggest empathic 
responses to human initiated technological visualizations. 
Chapter Nine: Interpreting Flow looks at a hermeneutics of technology as 
a method for interpreting data. This chapter addresses the theory of 
hermeneutic technics, an extension of Don Ihde’s theories regarding 
human/technology relations, in which the technology is the immediate 
object of perception, and referent of the world. It also discusses other 
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theories addressing science’s visualism and the field of information 
visualization, with reference to artistic visualization in order to define the 
particular usage of visualization within this research. Here, methods are 
addressed for creating the visualization, drawing on Laban’s research, and 
the way in which it is being used in this study. 
The next chapter, Chapter Ten: Clarifying Flow, draws together the various 
stages of the practical research in order to identify the particular methods 
used at each phase. It addresses the methods by which problems were 
resolved or how results were clarified. Due to the innovative use of the 
motion capture technologies, for example, methods for reading flow 
needed to be constructed or elucidated from the researcher’s implicit 
knowledge. This chapter provides a rationale for the decisions made and 
evidences the innovative uses of the technologies. 
Finally, Chapter Eleven: Reflecting on Flow, articulates the results of the 
research, drawing on both the subjective dialogic data from the journals 
and interviews, as well as the objective data from the motion capture 
technology. The chapter will draw on hermeneutic phenomenology in 
addressing the cyclical process of understanding the data and the 
phenomenon of flow. Key implications and recommendations from the 
research findings are then outlined in the Conclusion. 
 20 
 
 
 
Chapter One: Contextualizing 
Flow 
This study sits in the area of practice-as-research within the context of 
higher education. Practice-as-research within the academy is a very recent 
development; in 1991 the Council for National Academic Awards in the UK 
outlined the regulations for higher degrees, stating that “[t]he written thesis 
may be supplemented by material in other than written form” (cited in 
Candy, 2006 p. 4). In 2005, a five year project titled Practice as Research 
in Performance (PARIP) was funded by the, then, Arts and Humanities 
Research Board (ARHB), (now, the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
(AHRC)), in order to “investigate creative-academic issues raised by 
practice as research, where performance is defined, in keeping with AHRB 
and RAE documentation, as performance media: theatre, dance, film, 
video and television.” (PARIP Website). A key objective of this project was 
to highlight the worthiness of performance practice within the academic 
domain, and establish new knowledge paradigms. 
Cited as being in one of the first cohorts of doctoral students in 
performance, Professor Sarah Rubidge, a digital choreographer and 
academic, received her doctorate in 2000 and defined two further 
categories of research in her keynote paper in 2005 at the conference 
Dance rebooted: initializing the grid. Rubidge defines these two areas as 
practice-based and practice-led research. Practice-based research leads 
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primarily to new understandings about the field of performance practice 
where, 
[in] projects such as these the research question/s tend to be 
clearly stated at the start of the project. Here practice is used as 
one mode of interrogating that question, and may play either a 
supporting or a dominant role in the research methodology. 
(2005, p. 5) 
Practice-led research, on the other hand sees the creative artefact as the 
basis of the contribution to knowledge; “in which the research is initiated 
by an artistic hunch, intuition, or question, or an artistic or technical 
concern generated by the researcher’s own practice which it has become 
important to pursue in order to continue that practice.” (Ibid, p. 6). 
This study is practice-based: the main aim of the research is to advance 
knowledge within the creative process and therefore it does not require the 
use of creative artefacts or works for assessment, although, 
supplementary footage is documented in the attached DVD. Though the 
form of submission may be aligned with traditional academic practice, the 
process of knowledge acquisition can be seen to challenge the academy. 
In particular, the study aims to challenge dominant art/science dualism, a 
result of modernist thinking. 
For the purpose of this chapter Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Laban will 
be the key theorists addressed, alongside Jacques Derrida and Jean-
Francois Lyotard, in order to contextualise the intersections in terms of 
existing academic ideas and literature, and to discuss the methods and 
methodological approaches which underpin this thesis. In each instance, 
the theorists tend to overcome dualist opposition within their writing, 
across a range of academic disciplines. Within philosophy, Merleau-Ponty 
and Heidegger explore dualisms such as mind/body and visible/invisible 
and within dance, Laban describes movement in terms of bound/free, 
growing/shrinking and challenges modernist dualisms of theory/practice 
and art/science within his work. Derrida and Lyotard, however, explore 
linguistic oppositions and notions of real/illusory and absence/presence. 
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In each context the theorists are grappling with modernist concerns. The 
purpose of reviewing the relevant literature in this chapter is to highlight 
the modernist dualisms brought to attention through their works and 
examine the commonalities in their writing regarding the re-integration of 
such binary opposition. Furthermore, the chapter aims to look at the 
relationships between the larger areas of research – philosophy, 
psychology, dance, science and technology – as each of these hold their 
own tensions toward one another. 
1.1 Binary opposition 
The Age of Enlightenment which began in the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth century is argued as the start of modernity: 
From the latter part of the seventeenth century, many of 
Europe’s greatest minds came to the conclusion that to 
understand the true history and destiny of the human race, 
neither unquestioning faith in the Bible, nor automatic reliance 
on the authority of the Greek and Roman thinkers (the 
‘Ancients’) would any longer suffice. Man’s nature was not 
properly known; it must become the subject of inquiry. And the 
proper engine of such an investigation must be that ‘scientific 
method’ which natural scientists (the ‘Moderns’) had pioneered 
so successfully in the fields of astronomy, physics and anatomy. 
(Porter, 2001, p. 15) 
This period was characterized by the decline of traditional social order and 
a religious world-view typical of traditional societies, and the rise of secular 
and materialistic culture characterized by new class formation and secular 
forms of political power and authority. Modernity is considered to be 
contrived from the revolt against tradition and faith with emphasis on 
reason and scientific thought. 
French philosopher, René Descartes, (1596-1650) is widely held as 
foundational to the Enlightenment. Descartes declared that he was 
introducing a new way of thinking about nature and the human mind, a 
way which required the abandonment of inherited and common sense 
convictions and the deployment of a new method of directing his readers 
towards a study of “a certain Method for the resolution of difficulties of 
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every kind in the Sciences” (Descartes 1641, p. 36). This would cover a 
general physics, human physiology, and a study of emotions and moral 
psychology. In 1641 he published his Meditations which was meant as a 
primer for his new principles. These principles contained his method of 
doubt, as Hatfield notes: 
Descartes uses sceptical arguments to call his previous 
knowledge into doubt. He does this with the aim of ridding 
himself (and his reader or co-meditator) of previous, often false, 
beliefs, so as to begin afresh. 
(2001, pp. 7-8) 
Descartes rejected any belief that is subject to doubt in order to question 
the sources of that belief. He began by doubting the senses, noting that “it 
is sometimes proved to me that the senses are deceptive, and it is wiser 
not to trust entirely to any thing by which we have once been deceived.” 
(Descartes, 1641, p. 46). By pursuing this, he argued that an individual’s 
sensory experience of the world could never be trusted; just as an 
individual could experience things which were not there in dreams, 
perhaps they could experience things which were not there in everyday 
perception. Descartes therefore rejected the idea that sensory data could 
have a foundation for knowledge and questioned how it was an individual 
could ‘know’ they exist. He concluded that the fact that an individual can 
doubt their existence proves that they exist; “this proposition: I am, I exist, 
is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive 
it” (Ibid, p. 51). 
The outcome of Cartesianism is to set up, on the one hand, a 
totally objective nature which is fully intelligible in itself – since it 
is but matter in motion whose laws are capable of being 
discovered by the objective sciences of nature – and, on the 
other hand, conscious subjects who are nothing but pure 
interiorities and who, because they are but gazes [regards] on 
nature existing nowhere in this nature which is fully intelligible in 
itself, cannot be intelligible for themselves of the objects of any 
objective science. 
(Madison, 1988, p. 58) 
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Descartes breaks with the past in his radical approach to the problem of 
knowledge, however, his philosophy is characterised by a dualism of mind 
and body. 
The thinkers of the Enlightenment drew on Descartes’ method of doubt 
and scepticism, however, they also looked back toward the philosophers 
of Ancient Greece; “the Enlightenment discerned the old powers in the 
Platonic and Aristotelian heritage of metaphysics and suppressed the 
universal categories’ claims to truth as superstition.” (Horkheimer and 
Adorno, 2002, p. 3). Since Plato, Western philosophy has embarked on a 
search for a fundamental truth or ‘logos’. Logocentrism postulates binary 
oppositions. The concept of binary opposition is one of the oldest surviving 
theories propounded by philosophers. Around 500BC Greek philosopher 
Pythagoras developed a list of ten principles also known as the table of 
opposites as presented by Aristotle in his work Metaphysics: 
limit   unlimited 
odd  even 
one  plurality 
right  left 
male  female 
at rest  moving 
straight  crooked 
light  darkness 
good  bad 
square  oblong 
(Guthrie, 1962, p. 245) 
In each case, the first term is perceived to be closer to the logos, and 
privileged over its counterpoint. Not only are the terms set against one 
another in opposition but also within a hierarchical relationship. Unity is 
thus privileged over plurality; “[f]or the Enlightenment, anything which 
cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one, is illusion; 
modern positivism consigns it to poetry. Unity remains the watchword from 
Parmenides to Russell.” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, p. 5). 
Within art, during the Age of Enlightenment, and into the nineteenth 
century a return to the classicist ideals of Greece was also evident. In the 
Greek period, classicist paintings and architecture developed with 
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symmetry being predominant, reflecting the philosophical values of unity. 
Around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, classicist literature and 
music was developed by writers such as Wordsworth, Shelley and 
Coleridge and composers such as Beethoven, Mozart, and Bach. Within 
dance and drama, classicist ideals became prominent around the 
nineteenth century, with notable choreographers such as Marius Petipa 
(1818-1910) who developed classical ballet which reflected ideals of order, 
balance and symmetry. 
A key cultural critic of this period is Matthew Arnold (1822-1888) who, in 
his work Culture and anarchy (1869), described culture as “the best that 
has been thought and said in the world” (p. 6), which is to be attained by 
“the disinterested and active use of reading, reflection, and observation, in 
the endeavour to know the best that can be known.” (Ibid, p. 179). This 
thinking reflected classicist concerns with the study of Ancient Greece as 
an example of the best in the world, but also reflected the privileging of 
one set of values over another as in the binary oppositions set out by the 
Ancient Greeks. For Arnold: 
The highly instructed few, and not the scantily instructed many, 
will ever be the organ to the human race of knowledge and 
truth. Knowledge and truth in the full sense of the words, are 
not attainable by the great mass of the human race at all. 
(1863, p. 43-44). 
Binary opposition in classicist culture denoted a hierarchical structuring of 
culture over nature, man over woman, rational over emotional, conscious 
over unconscious, and form over expression, amongst others. 
Modernism, as opposed to modernity, is used to describe certain trends in 
art, writing, criticism and philosophy within the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries following the classical resurgence. It is a complex movement 
which cannot be easily defined; there are disputes relating to when the 
movement started and whether it has ended, and thus can be considered 
both an ahistorical concept and a time bound, aesthetic technological 
concept. Although generally it is considered that the period lasted from 
1890 - 1930 (between wars): 
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Modernism can be taken as a response by artists and writers to 
several things, including industrialisation, urban society, war, 
technological change and new philosophical ideas. Because the 
nineteenth century experiences a spreading disillusionment with 
existing models of the individual and the social, the Western 
world was transformed and reinterpreted by Marx, Freud and 
Darwin, who respectively changed established notions of the 
social, the individual and the natural. 
(Childs, 2008 p. 21) 
Modernism can be thought of as maintaining an attitude toward modernity; 
a number of arguments and interventions made against modernity can be 
said to constitute an attitude referred to as modernism. Modernism 
consists of numerous artistic practices: symbolism, constructivism, 
expressionism and surrealism, to name a few. While these practices are 
often quite disparate and incompatible with one another, a common unity 
may be found in the idea that all of them respond to a shared set of social 
and ideological conditions. Modernism was a revolt against the traditions 
upheld in classicist thought and a response to the “increasingly 
dehumanising technological environment.” (Burgin, 1986, p. 30).  
Art critic, Victor Burgin, in his book The end of art theory: criticism and 
postmodernity (1986), defines a split in modern art from a formalistic, high 
modern, avant-garde to the rather dismissively termed ‘kitsch’. In high 
modernism “the function of art is to preserve and enhance its own special 
sphere of civilising human values.” (Ibid 1986, p. 30). Whereas ‘kitsch’ 
practices were seen as lower arts, as eschewed by critic Clement 
Greenberg:  
the new urban masses set up a pressure on society to provide 
them with a kind of culture fit for their own consumption… a new 
commodity was devised: ersatz culture, kitsch, destined for 
those… insensible to the values of genuine culture. 
 (cited in Burgin, 1986, p. 2) 
In an attempt to break free from its traditional thinking, modernism disrupts 
the classicist binary oppositions by attempting to unify them while 
maintaining the hierarchical preference in each instance. 
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1.2 Mind / body 
Within European dance, choreographers where concerned with expression 
over form and nature over culture. Rudolf Laban (1879-1958) is a notable 
figure in European dance modernism and movement analysis (Laban, 
1966, 1971, 1975a, 1975b, 1988; Davies, 2001; Davis, 1978). Laban was 
responsible for initiating a new form of expressive dance in the early part 
of the century, in Germany and then across Europe, known as 
Ausdrucktanz or Expressionist dance which “celebrated the living body 
and spirit at the same time as it abstracted and extended human 
experiences.” (Bradley, 2009, p. 30).  Laban’s modern dance was inspired 
by his studies in modern art and particularly the avant-garde practices of 
Wassily Kandinsky; Kandinsky’s treatise ‘Concerning the spirituality of art’ 
was a major influence in Laban’s artistic thinking (Foster, 1977). 
Laban’s theories are influenced by many of the great modern thinkers, 
artists and scientists of the time, such as, Emile Jaques-Dalcroze and her 
Eurythmics, which shared similarities with Laban’s work in relation to the 
natural rhythms of the body. Similarities in Laban’s thought can also be 
seen in the German modern philosophers; in Hegel, with his synthesis of 
antagonistic tendencies, and Fichte, who was concerned with self-
expression and truth (Foster, 1977, pp. 42-43). Polarity and dualism as 
seen in his effort charts, and discussed further in Chapter Four, are key to 
his theories on movement. He was also concerned with unity and ecstasy 
as can be seen in the works of Dadaism, but most significant is his interest 
in the essential qualities of movement as a reflection of man’s inner states: 
The shapes and rhythms which are formed by basic effort 
actions, movement sensations, incomplete effort, movement 
drives, give information about a person’s relation to his inner 
and outer world. His mental attitude and inner participations are 
reflected in his deliberate bodily actions as well as in the 
accompanying shadow movements. 
(Laban, 1988, p. 115). 
This concern of Laban’s reflects his passion to unite the mind and body 
duality present in the modern philosophy of Descartes. However, though 
Louise Douse Chapter One: Contextualizing Flow  
28 
 
the aim was to unite, the overarching hierarchical view of mind over body, 
from the classicists pervaded thinking at that time. Laban therefore saw 
the significance of the body in its capacity to represent the ‘inner’ attitudes 
of the mind, and the mind retained its primacy. This concern to unite was 
shared in phenomenological philosophy and most notably the philosophy 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). Whilst phenomenology and its key 
theorists are discussed further in Chapter Three, it is important to note 
here the modernist roots of phenomenology. Characterised by a search for 
the essence of being, and an understanding that the world can be 
revealed through close examination of universal properties, the 
phenomenologists sought to overcome this duality of mind and body within 
the philosophy of Descartes. 
The shared connections between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and 
Laban’s choreological studies are apparent in their theories concerning the 
body in perception and movement. Maureen Connolly and Anna Lathrop 
(1997), suggest an understanding of their works “side by side” can only be 
appreciated in retrospect, even though Merleau-Ponty would have been 
writing his Phenomenology of perception (1945) at the same time that 
Laban was articulating his life’s work in choreology in collaboration with his 
long-term partner Lisa Ullmann (1907-1985). Both Laban and Merleau-
Ponty developed their philosophies out of a lived experience, and both 
were concerned with a philosophy of the body. As with phenomenology, 
Laban’s method began with description and then moved to a vocabulary 
for explaining the relation between form and feeling. However, Laban’s 
method was through practice; Laban was not a traditional theorist or 
philosopher, or even a dancer, however it was always within the studio 
that he explored his ideas. 
Despite Laban’s apparent dualistic approach to movement in his 
oppositional descriptions of movement qualities (discussed further in 
Chapter Four), he considered movement as either in flux or in harmony 
between the polar ends. Both Laban and Merleau-Ponty sought to unite 
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the oppositions evident in Modernist thought and in particular between 
mind and body. 
The scientific age of industrial man has yet to find ways and 
means to enable us to penetrate into the mental side of effort 
and action so that the common threads of the two kinds of 
thinking can finally be re-integrated in a new form... We need an 
authentic symbol of the inner vision to effect contact with the 
audience, and this contact can be achieved only if we learn to 
think in terms of movement. 
(Laban, 1988, p. 19-20) 
In similar terms, Merleau-Ponty states: 
All my knowledge in the world, even my scientific knowledge, is 
gained from my own particular point of view, or from some 
experience of the world without which the symbols of science 
would be meaningless. The whole universe of science is built 
upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to 
subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise 
assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by 
reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science 
is the second-order of expression. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. ix) 
Both Laban and Merleau-Ponty are associated with modernism and yet 
phenomenology, in particular, can be seen to challenge modern thought 
and align with the project of postmodernism to some extent. In the latter 
half of the twentieth century, the term ‘postmodern’ came to take on the 
precise meaning that it is known for today, as a reaction against both 
modernism and modernity:  
Creative artists began to rebel against the strictures of the 
modernist style, which demanded, for example, abstraction in 
art and dissonant non-tonal composition in music… 
Philosophers and cultural theorists reacted against theories 
such as structuralism, which reduced the world to a series of 
interlinked systems with their own internal dynamic, or ‘deep 
structure’. 
(Sim, 2011, p. ix).  
 
Postmodernism challenges many modern values; whilst modernism was 
concerned with principles of subjectivity, identity and unity, postmodernism 
foregrounds difference and plurality. However, Victor Burgin acknowledges 
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the move to postmodernism had the same ambiguities as the move from 
classism to modernism; 
It seems likely that ‘conceptualism’ is destined, for the moment 
at least, to be represented as that ‘movement’ which, by 
undermining ‘modernism’, paved the way for ‘post-modernism’. 
None of the ‘isms’ here, however, were, or are, unitary 
phenomena; nor do such cultural phenomena simply give way 
to one another like television programmes in an evening’s 
viewing. Aesthetically, culturally, politically, conceptualism 
comprised both tendencies for change and conservative 
tendencies. The same is true of this present period of 
‘postmodernism’. 
(1986, p. 47) 
Consequently, phenomenology as a modernist framework associated 
primarily with its founder, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) became 
challenged among philosophers; this is elaborated on in Chapter Three. 
The question that therefore needs to be considered is what Merleau-
Ponty’s relationship was to modernism and postmodernism, and how, and 
indeed why it should be viewed now. Merleau-Ponty’s commitment to 
Cartesianism is highly ambivalent. In Phenomenology of perception, 
philosophy for Merleau-Ponty is in complete accord with the entire modern 
tradition set up by Descartes, as a ‘rigorous science’ and “study of 
essences; and according to it, all problems amount to finding definitions of 
essences.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. vii). Yet, on the other hand, he is best 
known for his attack on Cartesian dualism. 
I am thinking of the Cartesian cogito, wanting to finish this work, 
feeling the coolness of the paper under my hand, and 
perceiving the trees of the boulevard through the window. My 
life is constantly thrown headlong into transcendent things, and 
passes wholly outside me. The cogito is either this thought 
which took shape three centuries ago in the mind of Descartes, 
or the meaning of the books he has left for us, or else an 
eternal truth which emerges from them, but in any case is a 
cultural being of which it is true to say that my thought strains 
towards it rather than that it embraces it, as my body, in a 
familiar surrounding, finds its orientation and makes its way 
among objects without my needing to have them expressly in 
mind. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 429) 
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His thinking also went through a significant change in his final work, The 
visible and invisible (1964), with regard to the purpose of his philosophy: 
What we propose here, and oppose to the search for the 
essence, is not the return to the immediate, the coincidence, the 
effective fusion with the existent, the search for an original 
integrity, for a secret lost and to be rediscovered, which would 
nullify our questions and even reapprehend our language. If 
coincidence is lost, this is no accident; if Being is hidden, this is 
itself a characteristic of Being, and no disclosure will make us 
comprehend it. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 121-122) 
With regard to postmodernism, Merleau-Ponty was never noted, at the 
time to have this particular mode of thought which has flourished after his 
death, yet in retrospect, many contemporary philosophers have argued for 
his philosophy to be considered as ‘postmodern’ or at the very least as 
sharing a common critique of modern philosophy (Busch and Gallagher, 
1992). Jacques Derrida, in his critique of modernism, returns to the 
hierarchies of opposition as defined in both early modernity and 
modernism; he describes this as “a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms 
controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.) holds the superior position. 
To deconstruct the opposition is first… to overthrow [renverser] the 
hierarchy.” (1967, p. lxxvi-lxxvii). Here, Derrida argues for the reversal and 
displacement of the hierarchy. 
According to Derrida, the unison of the two oppositions as in modernist 
thought is not possible, however, there is always a ‘trace’ of one in the 
other. Thus the relation between the two terms is reflexive. This idea is 
relevant to Merleau-Ponty’s work, particularly in relation to his notion of the 
reversibility of touch: “I can feel myself touched as well and at the same 
time touching” (1964, p. 142), explored further in Chapter Three. Thus, it is 
surely from this postmodern perspective that phenomenology can be 
invested with a new meaning and continued relevance. However, not only 
can a relationship to postmodern thought be found in Merleau-Ponty but 
the fact that Merleau-Ponty is able to be reread in the differing ways that 
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he has been, is a reflection of the complexity of the approach in Merleau-
Ponty’s text. 
Surely, one thing it does is to confirm the fact that [Merleau-
Ponty’s] work has indeed become a “classic,” that is, something 
that can no longer be taken “literally,” that can properly be read 
in a number of different ways, precisely because there is more 
to the work than what the author himself thought he was putting 
in to it and because a text, to be a text, needs readers who can 
always see more in it. 
(Madison cited in Busch and Gallagher, 1992, p. 127) 
1.3 Science / art 
After identifying the broader mind/body divide apparent in modernist 
thought, it is pertinent to discuss what implications this divide had on the 
arts and sciences. David Bohm (1917-1992), renowned physicist and 
theorist, describes the purpose of both art and science as one concerned 
with mans “fundamental need to assimilate all his experience.” (2004, p. 
33). He saw it necessary to relate this shared goal to the goal of religion, 
“concerned centrally with the question of experiencing all life, all 
relationships, as one unbroken totality, not fragmented, but whole and 
undivided.” (Ibid, p. 35). The development of scientific reason within the 
modern age and the scepticism in God and myth reflects, for Bohm, a 
“fragmented and confused” (Ibid, p. 36) relationship between art and 
science: 
Science developed at an unparalleled pace in technical 
directions, but it seems to have parted almost completely from 
its role of aiding man to assimilate the universe psychologically, 
so that he could feel at home in a world that he understands 
and to the beauty of which he can respond inwardly and 
wholeheartedly. On the other hand, it seems that artists are not 
generally very concerned with the scientific interest in seeing 
the fact, whether one likes it or not. Indeed it seems that many 
artists (though, of course, not all) have rather widely tended to 
accept the current view, which regards human relationships, 
expressed in culture (including art, literature, music, drama, and 
so forth), as a field that can be manipulated at will in order to 
give pleasure, excitement, entertainment, and satisfaction, quite 
apart from questions of fact, logic, and coherence that are of 
central importance to the scientist. 
(Ibid, p. 36) 
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This view of the modern arts and sciences as concerning two opposing 
stances toward man and universe, has been further propounded in a 
lecture titled ‘The two cultures.’ Over fifty years ago, scientist and novelist 
C. P. Snow described how “the intellectual life of the whole of western 
society is increasingly being split into two polar groups… Literary 
intellectuals at one pole - at the other scientists” (Snow, 1998, pp. 3-4). 
Increasingly, academics aligned with one methodology over another, and 
further, became characterised by the hierarchical nature of the binary 
opposite, and thus, the privileging of science over art. Science was 
necessarily seen as concerning truth while the arts were: 
often interwoven with religion, with the purpose of backing up 
the illusory aspects of religion by giving these aspects a false 
air of reality and concreteness, in the form of beautiful and 
skilfully made images and symbols of gods and supernatural 
forces. 
(Bohm, 2004, p. 35). 
Thus, within academia, scientific method is given precedence over artistic 
enquiry.  
Postmodern thought, however, juxtaposes art with science and questions 
the validity of science as concerning truth. Karl Popper (1902-1994), a 
philosopher of science, criticised the scientific method of induction in which 
the scepticism of Descartes was employed to assert that nothing can be 
known with certainty except that which is actually observed, and thus that 
which is observed is regarded as a verifiable truth. However, as Popper 
argued, “[w]e cannot identify science with truth, for we think that both 
Newton’s and Einstein’s theories belong to science, but they cannot both 
be true, and they may well both be false.” (Popper cited in Magee, 1973, 
p. 28). From here it is necessary to address the role technology has 
played in bridging the modern divide between mind/body and art/science. 
1.4 Technology 
As Paul Forman writes, “[t]his postmodern primacy of ends is a principle 
reason for the striking reversal since about 1980 of relative rank and role 
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between science and technology, to the advantage of technology and the 
great disadvantage of science.” (2007, pp. 3-4). Forman’s thesis “is that 
modernity is when ‘science’ denotes technology too; postmodernity, when 
‘technology’ denotes science too.” (Ibid, p. 4) This idea of the primacy of 
science reveals a commitment to method; that the means sanctify the 
ends and can only be attained through them. This view is reflected in 
modern philosophy, and with regard to the earlier commentaries of 
phenomenology as a science, however Forman notes that another key 
phenomenologist, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), discussed further in 
Chapter Three, recognized the importance of technology as prior to 
science: 
Chronologically speaking, modern physical science begins in 
the seventeenth century. In contrast, machine powered 
technology develops only in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. But modern technology, which for chronological 
reckoning is the later, is, from the point of view of the essence 
holding sway within it, historically earlier. 
(Heidegger, 1954b, p. 108) 
Heidegger, however, regarded modern technology as a great danger for 
humanity and a problem for philosophy. He argued that “[e]verywhere we 
remain unfree and chained to technology,” (Ibid, p. 100), as “[t]he will to 
mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to 
slip from human control.” (Ibid, p. 101). This discontent toward technology 
is reflected in the early postmodernist views of Lyotard and Derrida. For 
Forman, this reflects how “the primacy of science to and for technology 
was a firm fixture in nearly everyone’s thought, regardless of their 
philosophical commitments or social interests.” (2007, p. 2).  
Many of the early postmodernists saw technology as having a role in 
splitting subjectivity. Jacques Derrida, for example, had a vehement dislike 
of media and performance; “[i]t is normal that he who has taken up 
representation as a profession should have a taste for external and 
artificial signifiers, and for the pervasive use of signs.” (1967, p. 305). For 
Lyotard, postmodernism saw a fragmentation and specialisation of 
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knowledge aggravated by the rejection of ‘grand narratives,’ and 
expansion in technological progress: 
Signs of which have been accumulating since the end of the 
nineteenth century, is not born of a chance proliferation of 
sciences, itself an effect of progress in technology and the 
expansion of capitalism. It represents, rather, an internal 
erosion of the legitimacy principle of knowledge. There is 
erosion at work inside the speculative game, and by loosening 
the weave of the encyclopedic net in which each science was to 
find its place, it eventually sets them free. 
(Lyotard cited in Smart, 1992, p. 172) 
This view of the fragmentation and specialisation of knowledge saw the 
emergence of competing narratives, particularly within the arts and 
sciences; as a consequence Lyotard and Derrida were among those who 
stressed the postmodern condition was that of fragmentation, split 
subjectivity and the rejection of meta-narratives. Thus, the early 
postmodernists viewed technology as the destruction of the self. 
Both Paul Forman and Steve Dixon, (notable theorist with the digital arts), 
note that it is only since the end of the twentieth century that technology 
has been liberated from such negative views: 
Since the mid-1990’s, critical readings of the intimate 
interrelationship between postmodernism/poststructuralism and 
new technologies have grown rather than abated. Ironically, 
these critiques commonly celebrate the properties and 
potentials of these technologies enthusiastically, seemingly 
unaware of the dark scepticism and even nihilism with which 
technology is viewed by the very writers they cite. 
(Dixon, 2007, p. 139). 
Heidegger, ironically, despite his ultimately negative view of technology, 
argues for a ‘poetic reading’ of technology, in which art holds a power to 
reveal the truth and thus enter into a ‘free’ relationship with technology that 
is constantly making new incursions into contemporary lives: 
Could it be that the fine arts are called to poetic reading? Could 
it be that revealing lays claim to the arts most primally, so that 
they for their part may expressly foster the growth of the saving 
power, may awaken and found anew our vision of that which 
grants and our trust in it? 
(Heidegger, 1954b, p. 113). 
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Many digital performance artists view the fragmentary nature of technology 
as merely a different manifestation of the holistic self. 
The split subject suggests the wholly divided self, like the 
medical schizophrenic who lacks control over warring personas 
with opposing motivations. This is not the case for the 
posthuman performer, who is typically a control freak, with 
acute awareness of the double as both an embodied 
representation and performed index of the self, not a separate, 
differentiated subject, nor far less some uncontrollable chimera. 
(Dixon, 2007, p. 154). 
The role of technology within postmodern practices can, therefore, be 
seen as transdisciplinary in its application to both the arts and the sciences 
for advancing knowledge. However, science can still be differentiated in its 
ability to be objectively falsified, as in Popper’s account. Thus although the 
distinction between the ‘rigorous’ knowledge allegedly produced by 
science, and the more creative insights of the arts is less firm, as Robin 
Nelson writes, “[p]ractice-as-research is not characteristically data based 
and the organic nature of creative process means that the laying out of 
methodologies in advance seems to beg the question of methodical 
process more than it does in scientific research models.” (2009, p. 113). 
1.5 Practice-as-research 
Within practice-as-research, the problem therefore remains with the rigour 
of the methodological approaches used in assimilating knowledge. The 
model presented below is a development of the model outlined by Robin 
Nelson in his chapter titled ‘Practice-as-research: knowledge and their 
place in the academy’ in the book Practice-as-research: in performance 
and screen (2009), which he then expanded on in a presentation in 2010 
to the Working Group for International Benchmarking of Research 
Degrees. 
Nelson draws on the work of Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) and Michael Polanyi 
(1891-1976), two philosophers concerned with knowledge acquisition. It is 
Ryle in his key work The concept of mind (1990) who first distinguishes 
between knowledge which is tacit and gained through practice, and 
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knowledge which is propositional. Polanyi, on the other hand, in his works 
Personal knowledge (1958) and The tacit dimension (1966) also deals with 
tacit knowledge while employing a rigorous model that directly addresses 
how they come to ‘know what’ they know. 
 
Figure 1: Performance-as-research model adapted from Nelson (2009) 
In respect to Nelson’s model, ‘know that’ reflects knowledge gained 
through theoretical contextualization and academic critique, as evidenced 
in this opening chapter and the subsequent chapters within this thesis. 
However, while this thesis could stand on its own within the academic 
tradition, it is not the totality of knowledge gained through this study. ‘Know 
how’ for example is evidenced in the embodied knowledge of the dancers 
and researcher drawn upon in this study; their unique understandings of 
‘flow’ within dance and their empathic responses to movement. Finally, 
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‘know what’ are the various dialogic practices utilised in explicating that 
embodied knowledge. 
Within this study, visualization technologies are drawn upon to question 
whether science can lead to developments in understanding creativity. 
Science itself can be argued as creative; Bohm, for example describes the 
creative processes at play in constructing new paradigms within science, 
and conversely, he argues “that art has, and always has had, a certain 
factual aspect, in the sense that a good work of art must be coherent in 
itself, as well as with the basic natural laws of space, colour, form, light, 
and of how they must be perceived.” (2004, p. 47). 
Within this chapter, therefore, a transdisciplinary approach to the body has 
been identified, drawing on a chronology of thought in philosophy, art and 
science. It has both acknowledged and overcome the modernist dualisms 
toward mind and body, first propounded by the Ancient Greeks, and 
revived in the philosophy of René Descartes. The chapter addresses 
areas of connection between art and philosophy, as with Laban and 
Merleau-Ponty, and areas of contention as with their respective alignment 
with modernism and post-modernism. Finally, it draws on the role of 
technology as a transcendental bridge between the arts and the sciences 
in advancing knowledge, and its particular role in this study as a method 
for explicating that knowledge. 
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Chapter Two: Understanding Flow 
This chapter addresses the key theorists and concepts underpinning Part 
Two, opening with a discussion of Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi’s interest in 
flow before moving to a discussion on embodiment particular to 
phenomenological studies. From here, the chapter addresses those 
practices within dance which look at somatic experience in the body as 
well as discussing dance theorist Rudolf Laban in regard to the analysis of 
movement. Finally, the chapter closes with an exploration of 
phenomenology in dance by addressing two key theorists: Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone and Sondra Fraleigh. 
2.1 Flow theory 
Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi (b.1934) was the founder of flow studies. He 
began his career in America after moving there from Hungary to study 
philosophy. Disillusioned by the course, he then embarked on a design 
course inspired by Bauhaus type designs. However, this course still did 
not fulfil his desire to study human happiness after his experience of World 
War II and seeing the effects of it on his family and friends. He finally 
found a psychology course at the University of Chicago and went on to a 
doctoral degree exploring creativity which led him to encounter flow in the 
artists he observed. After securing an academic position at Chicago, he 
was later awarded funding for his research into flow. 
Csikszentmihalyi’s work on flow has spanned nearly forty years beginning 
with his seminal work Beyond boredom and anxiety: experiencing flow in 
work and play (1975). The work addresses the key concepts of flow theory 
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in order to seek ways of applying this experience in work contexts. His 
later work Flow: the psychology of optimal experience (1990) was a 
concise summary of his findings designed for a wider readership. Some of 
his later works (c.1996 2000, 2004) address issues of finding flow and help 
the reader to learn techniques for enhancing their everyday experiences 
both at work and at home. As stated in the preface to the 25th anniversary 
edition of Beyond boredom, Csikszentmihalyi’s theories have been applied 
to “improving schools, designing automobiles and museums, coaching 
professional football teams, rethinking organisations and therapeutic 
practices.” (2000, p. ix). 
In dance the application of Csikszentmihalyi’s flow theory is an emerging 
area of study, with one article by positive psychologist Kate Hefferon and 
Stuart Ollis in 2006, and a number of recent conference papers by dance 
scientist Elsa Urmston and dance practitioner and lecturer in dance, 
James Hewison (Bradley and Hewison, 2010; Urmston and Hewison, 
2012, 2013). Hefferon and Ollis’ article addresses nine professional 
dancers, specializing in ballet, contemporary, jazz, Irish and Canadian 
dance. The dancers were interviewed with a focus on elucidating which 
characteristics of flow as defined by Csikszentmihalyi were of most 
importance within dance. The article also addressed environmental factors 
particular to dance (music, choreography, stage space and unfamiliar 
locations) in order to address particular influences of flow. Urmston and 
Hewison’s research addresses flow and risk in the context of contact 
improvisation and pedagogy. Their aims were: 
[T]o examine the phenomenon of risk-taking within the learning 
context and how flow-friendly environments can enhance the 
reciprocal pedagogical experience of students and staff alike 
and, in turn, how this can optimise performance in the learning 
journey and skill acquisition of Contact Improvisation. 
(Urmston, 2013) 
Whilst Hefferon and Ollis, and, Urmston and Hewison’s research focus 
was practical with regards to the specific dance practices referenced, 
neither they, nor Csikszentmihalyi, explicitly deal with the body in flow and 
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the experience of flow through the body. That said, Csikszentmihalyi does 
address the body in Flow: the psychology of optimal experience, where he 
regards the body as vital for experiencing flow.  However his chapter ‘The 
body in flow’ largely addresses the types of activity which produce flow 
experiences rather than elucidating the role of the body within such 
experiences. 
2.2 Embodiment 
Phenomenology seeks to describe an individual’s lived experience, 
focussing on how bodies are experienced at a subjective and 
intersubjective level. The key phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl (1931, 
1990), Martin Heidegger (1927, 1954a, 1954b) and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1945, 1964, 1973) will all be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Three. However, it is important to note their contribution to research on 
embodiment and its subsequent discourse. 
There is much literature on the philosophy of phenomenology and its key 
proponents (Hammond, Howarth and Keat, 1991; Moran, 2000; Moran 
and Mooney, 2002; Shultz, 1975; Sokolowski, 2000). The focus of this 
thesis explores Merleau-Ponty and the literature surrounding his work 
(Langer, 1989; Macann, 1993; Romdenh-Romluc, 2011) as well as 
Heidegger (Mulhall, 1996). There are also many new studies which 
address the concerns of these phenomenologists in relation to 
embodiment within a philosophy of mind though addressing cognitive 
science (Gallese, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2011). In this research the 
aim is to complement these fields of study through the application of 
phenomenology to flow. 
Phenomenology often compares itself with the sciences, as in Merleau-
Ponty’s description of phenomenology as a “rigorous science.” (1945, p. 
vii). Merleau-Ponty in particular addressed psychological and empiricist 
accounts of the mind and body in order to challenge the position of 
science in elucidating ‘truth;’ 
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I cannot conceive myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a 
mere object of biological, psychological or sociological 
investigation…Scientific points of view, according to which my 
existence is a moment of the world’s, are always both naïve and 
at the same time dishonest, because they take for granted, 
without explicitly mentioning, it, the other point of view, namely 
that of consciousness through which from the outset a world 
forms itself round me and begins to exist for me. 
(Ibid, 1945, p. ix) 
However, within the key phenomenologist’s works, as cited above, there is 
a lesser connection with the arts. Whilst all of the four phenomenologists 
draw on examples from music, dance and art, only Heidegger aims at 
providing a phenomenology of art. In his essay ‘The origin of the work of 
art,’ Heidegger claims that works of art not only manifest the style of a 
culture, but articulate it, and produce a shared meaning. Heidegger 
addresses art through the appreciation of it and its ability to communicate; 
however, it is the creation of artwork through embodied subjects which this 
research is most interested in. 
2.3 Moving experience 
It is from this perspective, of the embodied creation of art, that the 
research approaches improvisation in dance. Within the field of dance, 
improvisation is considered one of the key elements of creative practice. 
Many dance practitioners have provided improvisation techniques and 
practices for use in the creative process (Minton, 2007; Blom and Chaplin, 
2000, Morgenroth, 1987). The cited authors offer comprehensive guides 
and ideas for improvisation tasks within dance, often to create movement 
for dance rather than as a practice of its own. 
However, there are many practitioners who write about dance 
improvisation as a way of theorising practice and in so doing consider 
notions of embodied knowledge (Albright, Cooper and Gere, 2003; 
Lycouris, 1996; Tufnell and Crickmay, 2007; Bannerman, Sofaer and Watt, 
2006). In this research, a focus is placed on understanding improvisation 
as a skill which relies on a practical knowledge in the body for creating 
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new movement in the moment of performance. This draws on the 
practices of post-modern practitioners such as Steve Paxton, Simone Forti 
and Anna Halprin among others, and these are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Five. Often the research into improvisation addresses the ‘flowing’ 
nature of the experience, for example in terms of flow of thought or flow of 
motion, but does not explicitly address flow in terms of the positive state 
an individual can enter. 
In Chapter Five, certain practices are addressed which explore embodied 
ways of moving and bring awareness to the body in order to affect positive 
change. Imagery is a technique which utilises improvisation; Eric Franklin 
(1996, 2003, 2006, 2012) explores somatic imagery within dance to 
enable optimal alignment and movement practice as well as inspire new 
movement from an embodied perspective. The Franklin Method uses 
dynamic imagery and anatomical embodiment to enable lasting positive 
change in body and mind. While the Franklin Method draws on 
improvisational practice, it is less of a creative or choreographic tool, 
though it can be applied in a performance context. 
In contrast, butoh is a dance specific practice that utilises imagery as a 
choreographic tool to enable the dancers to experience other states of 
being. Butoh was developed by two Japanese practitioners, Tatsumi 
Hijikata and Kazuo Ohno, and is discussed further in Chapter Five. Butoh 
has been practiced and theorised by many Western practitioners (Barbe, 
2002, 2003, 2011; Barber, 2005; Barber and Rotie, 2005; Fraleigh, 1999, 
2010; Fraleigh and Nakamura, 2006; Rotie, 1996,). The theorisation of this 
practice focusses on butoh as a way of training the Western dancer in 
embodied practices which enhance individual exploration and emphasise 
kinaesthetic ‘listening’ and response. 
2.4 Understanding experience 
The final area of research this dissertation addresses in regards to 
embodied dance is the research of Laban (1966, 1971, 1975a, 1975b, and 
1988). Specifically it discusses his research regarding movement analysis 
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as a method for describing the flow experience in dance. Laban’s research 
has been developed by many practitioners (Davies, 2001; Davis, 1978; 
Longstaff, 2008; Maletic, 1987, McCaw, 2006). Their research explores 
Laban’s method of movement analysis as a means through which to 
enhance the assessment of creative movements. However it is Lamb, 
Laban’s student, who develops this technique further as a way for 
analysing the movement of workers to enhance efficiency (Lamb, 1965; 
Lamb, 2012; Lamb and Turner, 1969; Lamb and Watson, 1979). Lamb’s 
research, explored further in Chapter Four, addresses how, in order to 
make judgements on an individual’s decision-making processes, Laban’s 
research can be used to analyse nonverbal movement behaviour.  
Other studies which address personality assessment through movement 
analysis include Michael Argyle’s Bodily communication (1988), Carol-
Lynne Moore and Kaoru Yamamoto’s Beyond words: movement for 
observation and analysis (1988) and E. T. Hall’s research, including The 
silent language (1990). Argyle’s work addresses the primary functions of 
nonverbal bodily behaviour. His research suggests that individuals differ in 
their ability to make use of these functions and invented the concept of 
social skill. Moore and Yamamoto draw on Laban’s work to present a 
range of approaches for examining the everyday social interactions. Hall’s 
research was the first to address space proxemics in understanding social 
interaction but also addressed cultural differences in body language. 
2.5 Dance and phenomenology 
One area which has not yet been addressed is a phenomenology of 
dance. A phenomenological perspective of dance rests in the subjective 
experience of the moving body. It requires a holistic rather than 
mechanistic understanding of the body. The two most notable theorists 
and practitioners in the area of dance and phenomenology are Maxine 
Sheets-Johnstone (b. 1930) with her key work The phenomenology of 
dance (1966) and Sondra Fraleigh (b. 1939) with her work Dance and the 
lived body (1987). They are interested in the experience of dance, and the 
Louise Douse Chapter Two: Understanding Flow  
46 
 
structures of that experience, drawing on the notion of the lived body and 
its appropriateness to understanding the experience of dance. 
2.5.1  Pre-reflective experience 
While neither Fraleigh nor Sheets-Johnstone explore the concept of ‘flow’, 
both touch on the quality of the experience when elucidating the 
experience of dance in the lived body. For both theorists the ways they 
describe dancing aligns most closely with flow experiences in dance which 
is when an individual loses a sense of self and is totally engaged in the 
activity. The ‘lived experience’ of dance can be explained as when dance 
is “there for us” and “we are totally engaged in our experience of that 
happening.” (Sheets-Johnstone, 1966, p. 3). Both Sheets-Johnstone and 
Fraleigh describe an experience of dance which is enjoyable and optimal. 
In Sheets-Johnstone’s account of dance, she states that she aspires to a 
‘pre-reflective’ consciousness of dance which is immediate to an individual 
in their engagement of dance. For Sheets-Johnstone this ‘direct intuition’ 
can be “apart from any prejudice, expectation or reflection.” (Ibid, p. 12): 
It is only when we reflect upon the experience of the work as it 
is being created and presented, when we remove ourselves 
from our immediate encounter with it, that we interrupt the flow 
and fragmentize its inherent totality. Such reflection ends by 
obscuring the meaning of the dance, for the meaning emerges 
only as there is lived experience of it; only in apprehending the 
dance in its totality do we discover its unique significance. 
(Ibid, p. 6) 
Sheets-Johnstone further states: 
She cannot reflect upon her body in movement as an object 
and make it exist apart from the form she is creating, without 
immediately breaking the spatial unity and temporal continuity 
of the dance into discrete points and instants… If the audience 
reflects upon the dance as it is being presented, it destroys the 
illusion of force by dividing it into discrete moments and points 
and ascribing values which are non-existent within the world of 
illusion. 
(Ibid, p. 45-46) 
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She suggests therefore, that dance is embodied in the lived body of the 
dancer and is directly intuited by both dancer and audience. However, this 
is dependent on dancer and audience being able to become pre-
reflectively aware of the dance, rather than reflecting on the dance as an 
object of consciousness. 
While Sheets-Johnstone makes reference to pre-reflective and reflective 
states, she does not however describe in detail what she means by these 
terms. Sondra Fraleigh, categorises the same two states, however, unlike 
Sheets-Johnstone, she presents clear definitions of those states. For 
Fraleigh the reflective state “refers either to the body when it becomes the 
object of attention or to an objective attitude toward the body.” (Fraleigh, 
1987, p. 141). The reflective state can be considered as an objectification 
of the body but also a ‘known’ state, while the pre-reflective state is 
entirely subjective and is when the dancer is “living the present centred 
moment in her dance” (Ibid, p. 14); it is entirely lived and not known. It is 
Fraleigh who suggests that dancers perform most effectively when they 
are in a state of pre-reflective consciousness; “the dancer is at her best… 
when she becomes present centred” (Ibid, p. 23). 
While Fraleigh does provide some insight into the nature of flow in dance 
through distinguishing between the two states, along with Sheets-
Johnstone, she does not ascertain how a dancer might actually access 
and/or control the pre-reflective states that she regards as preferable for 
dance. There is little distinction between the process of making dance and 
of the performance of dance with regard to these states. There is also a 
paucity of description of dance that does not fit this pre-reflective state. In 
turn, this raises the problematic issue as to just what it is that is 
experienced while ‘dancing’ in the reflective state, and this is a matter that 
neither Fraleigh nor Sheets-Johnstone attend to. 
2.5.2  Embodied knowledge 
Through an understanding of pre-reflective/reflective consciousness, 
Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh address a theory of embodiment. Both 
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draw particularly on Merleau-Ponty’s anti-dualist stance and the uniting of 
mind and body in his conception of embodiment, and they do so in order 
to develop an understanding of knowledge in the body. “Embodiment is 
not passive, it is articulate,” (Fraleigh, 1987, p. 13), therefore dance is an 
embodied way of knowing. Sheets-Johnstone presents her understanding 
of bodily knowledge through a discussion of improvisatory practice (2011), 
while Fraleigh was the first to discuss this and develop this idea from a 
critique of Sheets-Johnstone. 
Sheets-Johnstone felt that dance improvisation presented thinking in 
movement because thought is motional: 
To say that the dancer is thinking in movement does not mean 
that the dancer is thinking by means of movement or that 
her/his thoughts are being transcribed into movement. To think 
is first of all to be caught up in a dynamic flow; thinking is itself, 
by its very nature, kinetic. It moves forward, backward, 
digressively, quickly, slowly, narrowly, suddenly, hesitantly, 
blindly, confusedly, penetratingly. What is distinctive about 
thinking in movement is not that the flow of thought is kinetic, 
but that the thought itself is. It is motional through and through; 
at once spatial, temporal, dynamic. 
(Sheets-Johnstone, 2011, p. 421) 
Sheets-Johnstone goes on to criticise the assumption that thinking is tied 
to language, as for her this represents a dualistic understanding of human 
experience. However, she also goes on to describe language as ‘post-
kinetic’, separating movement and language and thus reinforcing the 
dualism she aims to resolve. 
For Fraleigh, “thinking in movement and thinking in language may vary in 
their forms and bodily manifestations, but both of them are nevertheless 
ways of thinking; as such they exist on a bodymind continuum.” (Fraleigh, 
2002, p. 124). Fraleigh argues however, that dance knowledge involves 
more than bodily skills or knowing how to do movements. 
Indeed we commonly speak of skill in dance as a form of 
knowledge and also speak of kinesthetic intelligence as an 
aspect of skilful dancing. But dance involves more than just 
knowing how to do a movement. It also involves knowing how to 
express the aesthetic intent of the movement and how to create 
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aesthetic movement imagery. All of these forms of knowing how 
are forms of bodily lived (experiential) knowledge. As such, they 
are avenues for self-knowledge. 
(Fraleigh, 1987, p. 26) 
Fraleigh is interested in explicating not what dancers know, but how they 
know, through an understanding of implicit bodily knowledge. 
This conception however, renders problems with her earlier statement that 
only the reflective, body-object can be known, and in this sense the body 
itself can become the object of an individual’s attention. She does, 
however, attempt to address these problems by drawing on Ulric Neisser’s 
five different kinds of knowledge (Neisser, U. 1988). Sheets-Johnstone 
argues that dancing relies on intent, and thus an individual can know 
themself through dance dependent on the fulfilment of the individual’s 
intentions in movement. It is also important to note that Sheets-
Johnstone’s earlier criticisms of thinking in movement come from her 
criticism of Merleau-Ponty. She claims Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 
‘habit’ (discussed further in Chapter Three) is without kinaesthesia. 
However, this is a view critiqued by others (Gallagher, 2005; Fraleigh, 
2002) as being misguided, and more of a terminological rather than 
conceptual criticism: 
She needs to discredit his attachment to the terms “lived body” 
and “embodiment” in order to substitute the more general term 
“animate form” as more expressive of the body’s 
interconnection with all life. But I see no reason to parse this 
way. Animate forms are embodied forms, and they are lived 
forms, lived through in the present tense. 
(Fraleigh, 2002, p. 121) 
2.5.3  Descriptive experience 
Both Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh use a phenomenological method for 
looking at dance; as a descriptive method, a phenomenology of dance 
seeks to explain how dance appears to consciousness. Both claim that 
dance cannot be understood through objective analysis but subjective 
description. For them, a phenomenology of dance validates the personal 
and shared experiences of dance, “[phenomenology] provides a first-
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person voice for the dancer, the choreographer and the teacher/therapist.” 
(Fraleigh, 2000, p. 54). Phenomenology, as a method, draws on the notion 
of the lived body and aims to describe the structures of that experience. 
Along with Sheets-Johnstone’s criticisms of Merleau-Ponty’s terminology, 
Sheets-Johnstone also criticises the out-dated descriptive examples from 
his psychology case studies, and his method for elucidating essential 
knowledge. Here, she draws on Husserl’s transcendental reduction, 
arguing that the process of bringing to light the essential nature of 
experience should be left to those undertaking philosophical enquiry. For 
Sheets-Johnstone, Husserl offers a ‘foundational insight’ into the ambiguity 
that is the “essential character of human existence.” (Sheets-Johnstone, 
1984, p. 140). Sheets-Johnstone divides the task of phenomenology 
between intuitive description and reflexive logical argument. However, the 
question arises as to the legitimacy of applying Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology to a critique of Merleau-Ponty. 
Sondra Fraleigh, therefore, distances herself from Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of 
Husserl’s emphasis on the detached observer, preferring to highlight the 
impossibility of the observer’s separation from the world. Fraleigh’s 
process of reflecting backwards reveals the assumptions contained in 
perception, rather than to directly intuit the dance experience. Her writing 
often draws on quotations from other dancers about what it feels like to 
dance and Fraleigh often reconstructs the dance through poetic prose, 
using the kinaesthetic feeling of the experience as a guide. 
However, in Fraleigh’s actual accounts of dance performances, rather than 
reflecting back to reveal assumptions, her poetic interpretations are 
presented as almost ‘pure’ description. While she acknowledges alternate 
interpretations and does not present these descriptions as rigorous 
phenomenological descriptions, there is still a lack of methodology, in both 
Fraleigh and Sheets-Johnstone, with regards to providing a reflective 
phenomenological interpretation of experience. 
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This chapter has set out to evidence the multitude of work which has been 
conducted since the areas of flow and phenomenology were first 
articulated. In particular it has addressed the key academics whose aim it 
was to apply such theories to the field of dance, providing a critique of 
such theories in response to the aims of the research. In doing so, the 
chapter has addressed the need to return to the works of both the key 
proponents in flow in psychology and phenomenology in philosophy in 
order to elucidate the structures of those theories in their application for 
dance and in particular for an understanding of the embodied experience 
of the dancer. 
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Chapter Three: Phenomenological 
Flow 
This chapter examines the concept of flow from a philosophical stand 
point. It aims to understand what the experience of flow is from the 
perspective of the embodied subject, addressing phenomenological 
philosophy to develop an embodied, immersive understanding of 
experience. The chapter begins by detailing Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi’s 
understanding of flow, addressing the various characteristics of flow. An 
understanding of the main tenets of the philosophy of phenomenology is 
then discussed, briefly identifying some of the key phenomenologists such 
as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty  and 
their contribution to the field. (Hammond, Howarth and Keat, 1991; 
Macann, 1993; Moran, 2000; Moran and Mooney, 2002; Sokolowski, 
2000). 
Phenomenology as a methodology investigates the lived experience, 
relying on a description of phenomena as they are perceived by an 
embodied consciousness. The chapter in particular will address Merleau-
Ponty’s conceptualisation of the body as a site for knowing the world. 
Drawing on his theory of the habit body, the chapter will explore an 
understanding of self through the inextricable link of the mind and body. It 
will also examine Heidegger’s theory of temporality in order to develop an 
understanding of the experience of time in flow. Finally, the chapter will 
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address what implications this has for individual agency and the ability to 
act on the world. 
3.1 Csikszentmihalyi’s flow 
Flow is an area of research that explores optimal experience from a 
psychological perspective. Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, a positive 
psychologist, is considered to be the founder of flow in the context of 
psychology. His research addresses the state of mind an individual enters 
when totally immersed in an activity; one of the purposes of positive 
psychology is to achieve a scientific understanding and implement 
effective interventions for improving life. Csikszentmihalyi’s interest in flow 
began with decades of research on the positive aspects of human 
experience. 
Within psychology this ‘positive’ branch compliments traditional areas of 
psychology by bringing attention to the possibility that focussing only on 
disorders might result in a partial and limited understanding of a person’s 
condition. Positive psychology adds an important emphasis on scientific 
method and has seen various practical applications in psychotherapy.  
Moran and Nemec, experts in the field of psychiatric rehabilitation, stated 
that their work “suggests a positive psychology framework to strengthen 
and broaden psychiatric rehabilitation and recovery thought and practice.” 
(2013, p. 202). In education practices flow has also been applied, for 
example, in a school in Indianapolis. A ‘Flow Activities Room’ based on 
Csikszentmihalyi’s principles, was set up for students, in order that school 
could be considered enjoyable as well as rigorous (Whalen and 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1991). More recently Csikszentmihalyi has also 
identified flow as a key concept for business (Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi 
and Damon, 2001; Csikszentmihalyi, 2004). 
According to Csikszentmihalyi the term ‘flow’ itself, “is what 
anthropologists call a native category – a word frequently used by the 
informants themselves to describe their experience.” (1975, p. 36). Within 
his research, Csikszentmihalyi initially interviewed participants who 
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typically experienced such flow phenomena including chess players, rock 
climbers, musicians, social dancers and basketball players to name a few. 
Flow, as defined by Csikszentmihalyi, is when: 
Action follows upon action according to an internal logic that 
seems to need no conscious intervention by the actor. He 
experiences it as a unified flowing from one moment to the next, 
in which he is in control of his actions, and in which there is little 
distinction between self and environment, between stimulus and 
response, or between past, present, and future. 
(Ibid, p. 36) 
Csikszentmihalyi is credited with identifying around six to nine 
characteristics of flow, through his observations and interviews with 
respondents. The following sub-sections address the eight characteristics 
as detailed in Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow: the psychology of optimal 
experience (1990). 
3.1.1  Challenge/skill balance 
Csikszentmihalyi identified a common characteristic of flow; every activity 
where flow is reported must have an element of challenge requiring a 
particular set of skills. He noted that this challenge does not need to be 
physical, as, for example, in appreciating art, a skilled art critic takes 
enjoyment from analysing a conceptually challenging artwork. However, 
the skill needs to match the challenge in a delicate interplay, where the 
activity is never too difficult to accomplish, nor too easy that the individual 
loses interest: 
In all the activities people in our study reported engaging in, 
enjoyment comes at a very specific point: whenever the 
opportunities for action perceived by the individual are equal to 
his or her capabilities. Playing tennis, for instance, is not 
enjoyable if the two opponents are mismatched. The less skilled 
player will feel anxious, and the better player will feel bored…. 
Enjoyment appears at the boundary between boredom and 
anxiety, when the challenges are just balanced with the 
person’s capacity to act. 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 52) 
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3.1.2  Merging of action and awareness 
The second characteristic of flow identified by Csikszentmihalyi addresses 
the moment when an individual is no longer aware of the actions required 
to complete the task; it is the period when those actions become automatic 
and spontaneous. It is not the case that the individual is no longer 
engaged in the challenge of the task, but the application of skill is 
automatic, innate; it does not require any conscious reflection, only 
immediate and reflexive action. Within Flow: the psychology of optimal 
experience, Csikszentmihalyi cites a dancer’s experience of this 
characteristic: 
Your concentration is very complete. Your mind isn’t wandering, 
you are not thinking of something else; you are totally involved 
in what you are doing…. Your energy is flowing very smoothly. 
You feel relaxed, comfortable, energetic. 
(Ibid, p. 53) 
3.1.3  Clear goals and feedback 
In many instances of flow, Csikszentmihalyi cites a third characteristic, that 
of clear goals and feedback, such as in mountain climbing. The goal is 
obvious; to reach the top, and the feedback simple; “I am not falling.” 
However, often it is more complex than this, particularly in creative 
pursuits, for example within dance improvisation there is often not a clear 
goal or feedback, or at least not one that is perhaps articulated. In this 
sense, “the rules governing an activity are invented, or negotiated on the 
spot…. The goal of such sessions emerges by trial and error, and is rarely 
made explicit; often it remains below the participants’ level of awareness.” 
(Ibid, p. 56). There is for example, a fundamental type of feedback within 
dance improvisation as it “demands a reflexive awareness of when the 
known is becoming a stereotype.” (Foster, 2003, p. 7). The dancer must 
have a clear idea of what constitutes improvised movement in order to 
avoid habitual movement patterns. 
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3.1.4  Concentration on the task at hand 
The fourth characteristic of flow as defined by Csikszentmihalyi links with 
the second characteristic of action and awareness merging. In order for an 
individual’s action to become automatic, there needs to be a complete 
focus on the task. This is often described as a lack of unwanted 
disturbances such as personal issues, doubts and insecurities, and 
reflects the positive component of flow, as in reference to psychic 
negentropy in positive psychology. However, not only is there a focussing 
on the content of consciousness but also a temporal focus in which 
attention is focussed on the present moment: 
One of the most frequently mentioned dimensions of the flow 
experience is that, while it lasts, one is able to forget all the 
unpleasant aspects of life. This feature of flow is an important 
by-product of the fact that enjoyable activities require a 
complete focusing of attention on the task at hand – thus 
leaving no room in the mind for irrelevant information. 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 58) 
3.1.5  Loss of self-consciousness 
For Csikszentmihalyi, this encompassing focus, which leaves little room for 
irrelevant stimuli, can also create a loss of an individual’s own self-
consciousness. “One item that disappears from awareness deserves 
special mention, because in normal life we spend so much time thinking 
about it: our own self.” (Ibid, p. 62). Yet this loss of self-consciousness is 
not a loss of self or a loss of consciousness, as particularly in dance, an 
awareness of individual’s body, breathing and the feel of the dance is very 
important. However, it seems that the loss of self-consciousness in the 
flow experience often builds a stronger sense of self for the person 
afterwards. 
What slips below the threshold of awareness is the concept of 
self, the information we use to represent to ourselves who we 
are. And being able to forget temporarily who we are seems to 
be very enjoyable. When not preoccupied with our selves, we 
actually have a chance to expand the concept of who we are. 
Loss of self-consciousness can lead to self-transcendence, to a 
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feeling that the boundaries of our being have been pushed 
forward. 
(Ibid, p. 64) 
For Csikszentmihalyi then, self refers in some respects to an individual’s 
own objectified representation of their being. A loss of self-consciousness 
refers to the focussing of an individual toward the subjective experience of 
the activity, thus enabling an individual to develop new ways of being in 
the world. 
3.1.6  The paradox of control 
The sixth characteristic of flow experience, as defined by Csikszentmihalyi, 
typically involves a sense of control, which could be linked to the challenge 
and skill balance characteristic. Csikszentmihalyi describes it as a 
confidence in an individual’s abilities. However, it is not necessarily about 
exerting control but is more concerned with the possibility of control. For 
example, the challenge of the task is part of the flow experience, so it is 
not about having absolute control, because that could make the individual 
lose interest, but instead is concerned with the feeling of confidence in an 
individual’s abilities and their lacking the sense of worry about losing 
control. Csikszentmihalyi describes the “possibility, rather than the 
actuality, of control” (Ibid, pg. 60) in the example of a dancer and chess 
player: 
The ballet dancer may fall, break her leg, and never make the 
perfect turn, and the chess player may be defeated and never 
become a champion. But at least in principle, in the world of 
flow perfection is attainable. 
(Ibid, p. 60) 
3.1.7  The transformation of time 
As commented earlier, flow experiences tend to focus the mind temporally, 
to the present moment, however, there is often an altered sense of that 
moment. Time can appear to move really quickly or alternatively a few 
seconds can feel like a few minutes. This altered sense of time can be 
considered a by-product of the complete focussing of attention and lack of 
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awareness of external factors. In this sense an individual’s sense of time 
bears little relation to the conventional clock but to an internal time 
consciousness: 
Although it seems likely that losing track of the clock is not one 
of the major elements of enjoyment, freedom from the tyranny 
of the time does add to the exhilaration we feel during a state of 
complete involvement. 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 67) 
3.1.8  The autotelic experience 
Flow experiences are fundamentally intrinsically rewarding, that is that 
they provide pleasure and enjoyment in and of themselves. The term 
autotelic can be broken into “auto meaning self, and telos meaning goal.” 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 67). In autotelic activities the reward is a 
subjective one, through the completion of a personal goal. This is unlike 
activities which have an external reward, such as dancing for money, or 
recognition for an award. In this instance, an external reward would be 
second to the feeling of dancing for the dancer. For Csikszentmihalyi, this 
is evident in the way in which flow enriches an individual’s life: 
The autotelic experience, or flow, lifts the course of life to a 
different level. Alienation gives way to involvement, enjoyment 
replaces boredom, helplessness turns into a feeling of control, 
and psychic energy works to reinforce the sense of self, instead 
of being lost in the service of external goals. When experience 
is intrinsically rewarding life is justified in the present, instead of 
being hostage to hypothetical future gain. 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 69) 
3.2 Phenomenology 
Csikszentmihalyi cites phenomenology as the source of his method (2000, 
p. xiii). He describes a ‘systematic phenomenology’ drawing on a 
description of the stream of consciousness that he had been influenced by 
when reading the key texts of the early phenomenologists, and in 
particular, the work of Husserl. Csikszentmihalyi does not, however, 
provide a complete phenomenological analysis of flow, and thus it is the 
purpose of this section to explore the ways in which a phenomenological 
analysis of flow can enhance an understanding of that experience.  
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In the twentieth century Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), in response to 
Descartes and his method of doubt, developed his own method for 
philosophy: phenomenology.  Husserl claimed that his phenomenology 
was a science of the essential structures of pure consciousness, and his 
key work Logical investigations written in two volumes (1900-01) is 
considered the starting point for phenomenology (Hammond, Howarth and 
Keat, 1991; Macann, 1993; Moran, 2000; Moran and Mooney, 2002; 
Sokolowski, 2000). Although the later phenomenologists, such as Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), criticised 
some of Husserl’s philosophy, much of their work developed out of 
Husserl’s writing. 
The first Husserlian doctrine which therefore needs to be considered is 
that of the Lebenswelt or life-world. Husserl insisted on the priority of the 
Lebenswelt as the world revealed in our everyday engagement with it. 
Husserl defined phenomenology as distinct from the empirical sciences, in 
that it does not concern itself with facts but with first-person subjective 
experience. 
In 1900–01 my Logical Investigations appeared as the result of 
ten-year long efforts for a clarification (Klärung) of the pure idea 
of logic by a return to the bestowing of sense  (Sinngebung) or 
the performance of cognition (Erkenntnisleistung) which occurs 
in the nexus of lived experiences of logical thinking. More 
accurately speaking, the single investigations of the second 
volume [i.e. the Six Investigations themselves] involved a 
turning of intuition back towards the logical lived experiences 
which take place in us whenever we think but which we do not 
see just then, which we do not have in our noticing view 
whenever we carry out thought activity in a naturally original 
manner. The thinker knows nothing of his lived experiences of 
thinking (Denkerlebnissen) but only of the thoughts (Gedankeh) 
which his thinking engenders continuously. The point was to 
bring this obscurely occurring life of thinking into one’s grip by 
subsequent reflection and to fix it in faithful descriptive concepts 
(in getreuen deskriptiven Begriffen zu fixieren); further, to solve 
the newly arising problem, namely, to make intelligible how the 
forming of all those mentally produced formations takes place in 
the performance of this internal logical lived experiencing, 
formations which appear in assertively judicative thinking as 
multiply formed concepts, judgments, inferences, etc., and 
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which find their generic expression, their universally objective 
mental stamp in the fundamental concepts and axioms of logic. 
(Husserl cited in Moran, 2000, pp. 93-94) 
Husserl, in his later work goes on to define the Lebenswelt as “the world in 
which we are always already living and which furnishes the ground for all 
cognitive performance and all scientific determination.” (Husserl, 1938, p. 
41). He does not deny the importance of the empirical sciences; rather, he 
asserts that science is no more, and no less, than an effective way of 
conceptually organising and negotiating the world as it appears to the 
subject. Husserl argued that the great mistake is to assume that the 
scientific interpretation is the actual reality of the world, and not a 
secondary interpretation of a more fundamental perceptual experience of 
the world. (Moran, 2000).  
The second doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology lies in his doctrine of 
intentionality. Intentionality refers to the way consciousness is always 
directed towards objects, not only to internal processes. For Husserl, 
intentionality includes a wide range of phenomena, from perceptions, 
judgments, and memories to the experience of other conscious subjects 
as subjects (inter-subjective experience) and aesthetic experience. 
Husserl analyses intentionality in terms of three central ideas: the 
intentional act (mode of thought), the intentional object (the topic, thing or 
state of affairs), and intentional content (characterisation of the object). 
Husserl’s doctrine of intentionality can be understood in terms of his 
critique of the Cartesian cogito. For Husserl, intentionality is missing in 
Descartes understanding of the cogito, Husserl rejected the dualism of 
objects of consciousness and objects-in-themselves, however he accepted 
the notion of a methodological suspension of belief in the world in order to 
achieve the transcendental reduction or epoché. Husserl’s epoché sets 
out to produce a purified consciousness, cleansed of any assumptions 
about the existence of the nature of things beyond what is immanent to 
that consciousness. (Moran, 2000). So for Husserl, phenomenology is not 
concerned with empirical facts but with essences: 
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This phenomenology must bring to pure expression, must 
describe in terms of their essential concepts and their governing 
formulae of essence, the essences which directly make 
themselves known in intuition, and the connections which have 
their roots purely in such essences. Each such statement of 
essence is an a priori statement in the highest sense of the 
word. 
(1900-01, p. 249) 
To attain essential intuition Husserl identifies a bracketing of the ‘natural 
standpoint’ including the scientist’s account of the world, and any beliefs in 
the existence of an outside world. Once this is done Husserl argues that 
an autonomous realm of consciousness, whose principle feature is to 
intend or direct itself towards objects, can be focussed on. 
For Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Husserl’s epoché contradicts the 
notion of intentionality. For Husserl, the transcendental ego must exist 
outside of the empirical world, and yet no sense can be made of 
consciousness except in terms of its engagement with the world. 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty both agreed that it is not possible to 
abstract oneself from involvement in the world. Both were concerned in 
somewhat different ways with the individual’s being in the world as the 
experience of an existing self. 
Heidegger (1927, 1954a, 1954b) played a key role in examining the 
question of ‘being-in-the-world’. Dasein (being there), is an existence 
which understands that it exists, and what is more the being of Dasein is, 
in part, shaped by that understanding. 
Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other 
entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its 
very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is 
a constitutive state of Dasein’s Being, and this implies that 
Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being – a 
relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further 
that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its 
Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is 
peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, the Being 
is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite 
characteristic of Dasein’s Being.  
(Heidegger, 1927, p. 32) 
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‘Being-in-the-world’ underscores the fact that in Heidegger's philosophy, 
'Being' (the Being of Dasein) and 'the world' are not separate entities but 
must be grasped together. In this sense, there is no subject and object, 
nor is there any division between internal and external. 
Merleau-Ponty (1945, 1964, 1973) argued that “we are condemned to 
meaning” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. xxii) and developed further the idea of 
being in the world to emphasize the centrality of the role of the human 
body on human experience: “[t]he body is our general medium for having a 
world.” (Ibid, p. 169). Merleau-Ponty in his phenomenology of perception, 
stressed the vitality of human experience and particularly an individual’s 
embodied existence as lived. “Whether a system of motor or perceptual 
powers, our body is not an object for an ‘I think’, it is a grouping of lived-
through meanings which moves towards its equilibrium.” (Ibid, p. 177). He 
suggests that in understanding human experience, perception brings 
together an individual’s various senses as the body tends towards 
expression. 
Now the body is essentially an expressive space…. But our 
body is not merely one expressive space among the rest, for 
that is simply the constituted body. It is the origin of the rest, 
expressive movement itself, that which causes them to begin to 
exist as things, under our hands and eyes. 
(Ibid, p. 169) 
As a dance practitioner, an interest in Merleau-Ponty and his body-centric 
way of thinking, is central to the research. The key tenets of Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of perception (1945) will be drawn upon, 
including his intimate relation of body and world; his experience of other; 
and the nature of time. Merleau-Ponty’s theories will be drawn on to 
provide a phenomenological analysis of flow. His appropriateness is 
evident in his use of psychological behavioural disorders to further his 
understanding of experience, as in his example of Schneider, a war 
veteran who suffered brain damage, impairing his bodily movements but 
not his motor abilities. However, while he draws on psychological 
examples he often rejects both psychological and intellectual conclusions 
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of such examples, and as he concludes in the case of Schneider, “it 
becomes clear that the facts are ambiguous, that no experiment is 
decisive and no explanation final.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 134). In the 
following sections, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the body as a spatio-
temporal ‘anchor’ in the world will be addressed in order to further 
Csikszentmihalyi’s definition of flow. 
Heidegger, on the other hand can also be linked to flow with regards to 
positive psychology, through his understanding of authenticity, mind and 
being. The next section will draw on Heidegger’s understanding of 
temporality and address his theories on freedom and choice as a positive 
experience. “Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with 
our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in 
this possibility.” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 358). It is this potential for joy which 
is the most profound similarity between Heidegger and positive psychology 
(Crow, 2009). 
3.3 The habit body 
Merleau-Ponty, in his Phenomenology of perception, begins with a 
consideration of the contribution of the body to an individual’s interactions 
with the world. He argued that an individual’s primary relation to the world 
is not a matter of a priori thought, as in Descartes cogito but rather of 
practical involvement and mastery. Merleau-Ponty united the mind and 
body philosophically by invoking the notion of being in the world. “The 
union of soul and body is not an amalgamation between two mutually 
external terms, subject and object, brought about by arbitrary decree. It is 
enacted at every instant in the movement of existence.” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945, p. 102). He maintained that bodily consciousness is manifest in 
sensory engagement and underpins mental processes. 
Furthermore, he developed the concept of the body schema or ‘bodily 
spatiality’ as the very condition for the coming into being of a meaningful 
world. The body is immediately present, in that an individual knows where 
their limbs are without having to look for them: they possess a body 
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schema. For Merleau-Ponty, this ‘body schema’ provides an individual with 
a pre-reflective knowledge of the location of their limbs, however, only 
insofar as an individual’s awareness of their body is inseparable from the 
world of that individual’s perception: 
A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that 
is, when it has incorporated it into ‘world’, and to move one’s 
body is to aim at things through it… 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945, pp. 160-161) 
As Merleau-Ponty points out, to learn to type, or play a musical instrument 
“is to be transplanted into them, or conversely, to incorporate them into a 
bulk of one’s own body.” (Ibid, p. 66) Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s typing 
example, an individual often does not ‘know’ where the keys are in a 
reflective sense, the form of knowledge an individual has is practical, 
embodied knowledge. It is ‘know how’ in Robin Nelson’s sense; there is a 
dependence on the individual’s ‘knowledgeable hands’ for its practical 
meaning. The body schema is thus an implicit procedural knowledge 
encoded in the body. 
In relation to Csikszentmihalyi’s theory of flow, this understanding of 
embodied knowledge or ‘know how’ can be linked to the characteristic of 
clear goals and feedback. The goal is characterised as an individual’s 
intention toward the world; “To understand is to experience the harmony 
between what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the 
performance – and the body is our anchorage in a world.” (Ibid, p. 167). 
Thus the feedback relies on an individual’s tacit knowledge-in-action. Flow 
is tacitly anchored in bodily modes of action and reflection.1 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of body schema informs his work on habit and the 
habitual body. The habit to which Merleau-Ponty refers is far from being a 
mechanistic or behaviourist tendency to respond to fixed stimuli in a fixed 
way, implying passivity, but rather it permits new ways of acting and 
                                            
1
 ‘Reflection-in-action’ a term develop by Donald Schön (1930-1997) will be explored 
further in Chapter Seven: Dialogic Flow, in relation to the act of making this ‘know how’ 
explicit. 
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understanding. Merleau-Ponty uses the example of the musician who is at 
once familiar with a new musical instrument. It becomes a question of the 
bodily comprehension of a motor significance, which enables musicians to 
lend themselves completely to expressing the music without having to 
think about the position of their fingers: 
Between the musical essence of the piece as it is shown in the 
score and the notes which actually sound round the organ, so 
direct a relation is established that the organist’s body and his 
instrument are merely the medium of this relationship… in 
giving himself entirely to the music, the organist reaches for 
precisely those stops and pedals which are to bring it into 
being. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945, pp. 168-169) 
This draws a parallel to the characteristic of action and awareness 
merging within Csikszentmihalyi’s theory of flow. In this sense, habit is not 
prescriptive but “endow[s] the instantaneous expressions of spontaneity 
with ‘a little renewable action and independent existence’.” (Ibid, p. 169). 
For Csikszentmihalyi, while in flow consciousness works smoothly and 
action follows seamlessly; an individual is aware of their actions but not of 
the awareness itself. However, whilst Csikszentmihalyi addresses body 
and mind as a two way concept, the mind is still elevated in his conception 
on flow. Merleau-Ponty’s writing thus helps to identify embodiment as a 
condition of flow experience. 
3.4 Temporality 
The habit body as well as being spatial and embodied has a temporal 
structure which is not of the order of objective time or ‘clock time’. Here, it 
is important to first address Heidegger’s notion of temporality in relation to 
Dasein, from his Being and time (1927). Heidegger based his theory of 
temporality on what he called the ‘care structure;’ that Dasein’s Being is 
orientated toward the future, while acknowledging itself as past with an 
openness to the present: 
Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a 
‘succession’. The future is not later than having been, and 
having been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality 
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temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the 
process of having been. 
(Heidegger, 1927, p. 401) 
This ecstatic quality shows the human capacity to be at once ahead, 
behind and alongside the individual; it is a self-generating, self-defining 
process. 
Where Heidegger insisted upon the unity of the three ecstasies, it is 
Merleau-Ponty who clarifies their relation to temporality as experienced by 
the individual. Merleau-Ponty’s conception of temporality has its roots in 
both Heidegger’s Being and time (1927) and Husserl’s Cartesian 
meditations: an introduction to phenomenology (1931). There are three 
levels of temporality according to Merleau-Ponty: The first level or world, 
where transcendental time is public and measured time which is located in 
the world. Second level or internal, immanent time is private, it is the 
sequences of experience that occur before, after or concurrent with 
another yet is not measurable in the same way a clock measures time. 
Finally, the third level addresses the consciousness of internal time which 
accounts for the experience on the second level. Internal time 
consciousness is more immanent than the individual’s subjective temporal 
processes and underlies both the subjective flow of internal time and the 
objective flow of world time. 
Internal time consciousness retains its own preceding living presents and 
builds up its own continuous identity. The living present is the full and 
immediate experience of temporality that an individual has at any instant 
and is composed of: ‘primal impression’, the immediate impression of a 
temporal object; ‘retention’, the retained living present that has just 
relapsed; and ‘protention’, the first sense of ‘something coming’. (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945). The notion of ‘being in the moment’ links to the conscious 
experience of the fleeting living present, and thus to an individual’s 
perception of time with regards its transformation in flow experience: 
[M]ost flow experiences do not depend on clock time; like 
baseball, they have their own pace, their own sequences of 
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events marking transitions from one state to another without 
regard to equal intervals of duration. 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 66-67) 
3.5 Freedom and agency 
For Merleau-Ponty, temporality is a constituting structure for an embodied 
agent. 
The fusion of soul and body in the act, the sublimation of 
biological into personal existence, and of the natural into the 
cultural world is made both possible and precarious by the 
temporal structure of our experience. Every present grasps, by 
stages, through its horizon of immediate past and near future, 
the totality of possible time; thus does it overcome the dispersal 
of instants, and manage to endow our past itself with its 
definitive meaning, re-integrating into personal existence even 
that past which the stereotypes patterns of our organic 
behaviour seem to suggest as being at the origin of our 
volitional being. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945, pp. 97-98) 
Thus while arising from the spatio-temporal history of an individual’s 
actions in particular situations, habits develop which enable them to act on 
the world. Habits are therefore the basis of individual’s agency. While 
Merleau-Ponty did not use the term agency, he did utilise a Sartrean 
vocabulary for discussing ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’. 
The world is already constituted, but also never completely 
constituted; in the first place we are acted upon, in the second 
we are open to an infinite number of possibilities. But this 
analysis is still abstract, for we exist in both ways at once. 
(Ibid, p. 527) 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of choice, therefore, is that it cannot be 
absolute; habits root an individual in the world that makes choice possible. 
Agents have knowledge about their situation and their knowledge is 
integral to the successful accomplishment or ‘doing’ of that situation which 
links to the control component of flow and where there is a balance 
between challenge and skill: 
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[M]y habitual being in the world is at each moment equally 
precarious, and the complexes which I have allowed to develop 
over the years always remain equally soothing, and the free act 
can with no difficulty blow them sky-high. 
(Ibid, p. 513) 
The challenge of the action is enjoyable to the agent, as with the prospect 
of control. However, as Csikszentmihalyi states, this is only in retrospect:  
He has no active awareness of control but is simply not worried 
by the possibility of lack of control. Later, in thinking back on the 
experience, he will usually conclude that, for the duration of the 
flow episode, his skills were adequate for meeting 
environmental demands; and this reflection might become an 
important component of a positive self-concept. 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, p. 44). 
This links with Heidegger’s notion of Dasein’s Being as an issue for itself. 
Heidegger described three particular characteristics of Dasein; firstly, that 
it relates itself to its own Being, that “Dasein is in each case essentially its 
own possibility, it can, in its very Being, ‘choose’ itself” (Heidegger, 1927, 
p. 68). Secondly, that it has an implicit understanding of this relationship; 
“[i]n determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a 
possibility which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow 
understands.” (Ibid, p. 69). Finally, Heidegger explicates a third priority, “as 
providing the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any 
ontologies” (Ibid, p. 34), thus defining the capacity for understanding the 
Being of all entities. 
The idea that Being is an issue for itself is inherent within the characteristic 
loss of self-consciousness within the flow experience for which a 
conscious acknowledgement of the human relation to Being emerges 
stronger afterward.  
The self emerges when consciousness comes into existence 
and becomes aware of itself as information about the body, 
subjective states, past memories, and the personal future. 
Mead… distinguishes between two aspects of the self, the 
knower (the ‘I’) and the known (the ‘me’). In our terms, these 
two aspects of the self reflect (a) the sum of one’s conscious 
processes and (b) the information about oneself that enters 
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awareness when one becomes the object of one’s own 
attention. The self becomes organized around goals…. 
(Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi cited in Snyder and Lopez, 
2002, p. 91) 
Heidegger then distinguishes between these two modes of existence 
distinct from one another “[a]s modes of Being, authenticity and 
inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a 
strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is 
characterized by mineness.” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 68). The inauthentic 
reflects the everydayness of Being, a mode in which an individual exists 
most of the time and refers to the way in which the individual is not always 
caught up in things, when they are no different than others. Authenticity on 
the other hand is when Being is revealed in a first person way, when the 
individual is most ‘at home’ with their self, and is characterised by a 
‘moment of vision’ in which we have the “authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-
whole” (Ibid, p. 277). 
[R]esoluteness is our name for authentic existence, the 
existence of the Dasein in which the Dasein is itself in and from 
its own most peculiar possibility, a possibility that has been 
seized on and chosen by the Dasein. 
(Heidegger, 1954a, p. 287) 
Since Being is an issue for Dasein, only a life in which a conscious 
acknowledgement of the human relation to Being, such as in authentic 
experiences, can be understood as a ‘good’ life. Thus a further shared 
characteristic of Heidegger’s Dasein and Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow can be 
seen in their quest for moments of ‘authenticity’ and references the final 
characteristic of flow, that of the Autotelic experience, as an intrinsically 
rewarding experience: 
The autotelic experience, or flow, lifts the course of life to a 
different level. Alienation gives way to involvement, enjoyment 
replaces boredom, helplessness turns into a feeling of control, 
and psychic energy works to reinforce the sense of self, instead 
of being lost in the service of external goals. When experience 
is intrinsically rewarding life is justified in the present, instead of 
being held hostage to a hypothetical future gain. 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 69). 
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In conclusion, an individual’s experience of flow is only available through 
their embodied intention towards the world. An individual’s sense of both 
the world and embodied being is revealed through their bodily spatiality, 
an inherently dynamic and expressive condition. The embodied being is 
then both constituted by, and freed from, its habitual body through the ever 
ecstatic quality of time. This experience of freedom however, is a 
conscious intention to act on the world and reveals an individual’s potential 
for being in that world as an issue for itself. It is thus only in those 
moments when an individual’s embodied being is brought into question 
and revealed through action that they experience this ‘potential-to-be-
whole’ or ‘flow’ phenomenon; a fundamentally positive experience. 
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Chapter Four: Flow in the Dancing 
Body 
This chapter discusses the notable theorist and dance practitioner Rudolf 
Laban’s contribution to dance theory, particularly in relation to his studies 
of movement analysis. The chapter begins by addressing his shared 
philosophical connections with phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty before 
expanding on Laban’s own theories of the body. Laban developed two 
fields of research in relation to movement: eukinetics, the study of effort 
and choreutics the study of shape. Both will be discussed in greater detail 
and then expanded on with an analysis of Warren Lamb’s work, a key 
proponent of Laban’s work. Lamb developed his own complementary 
theory of analysis through practice, and developed his Movement Pattern 
Analysis (MPA). MPA is a tool for analysis of the movement of others in 
order to understand their movement potential as well as motivational 
potential with regard to decision-making. The final part of this chapter 
discusses the links between flow as defined in the previous chapter and 
flow within the theory of movement analysis as defined by Rudolf Laban 
and Warren Lamb. 
4.1 Shared connections 
In Chapter One, the modernist connections between Merleau-Ponty and 
Laban were discussed. In this chapter, further exegesis of the connections 
between Merleau-Ponty and Laban will be developed in relation to 
Csikszentmihalyi’s theory of flow. The shared philosophical connections 
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between Merleau-Ponty and Laban, though widely referenced in many 
dance texts, often remain implicit. This section draws on, dance theorist 
Vera Maletic’s, Body – space – expression (1987). Maletic provides a 
detailed analysis of the main phenomenological tenets that underlie 
Laban’s ideas and concepts. 
Maletic begins by drawing on Merleau-Ponty and Laban’s shared interest 
in the body, in which they both develop theories out of lived experience. 
Laban states that: 
Each phase of movement, every small transference of weight, 
every single gesture of any part of the body reveals some 
feature of our inner life. Each movement originates from an 
inner excitement of the nerves, caused either by an immediate 
sense impression, or by a complicated chain of formerly 
experienced sense impressions stored in the memory. This 
excitement results in the voluntary or involuntary inner effort or 
impulse to move. 
(1971, p. 22) 
While Laban’s language does not consistently reflect mind-body 
inseparability, by referring to the ‘inner’ and subsequently ‘outer’ lives of a 
being, such references can be reconciled though a conscious 
phenomenological stance. 
Laban’s method reflects that of the phenomenologists, in drawing on a 
descriptive analysis of the lived body. Indeed, Laban’s notation system is 
one of the most in-depth systems for describing human movement and it 
has been used in many contexts, most notably for the notation of dance 
works, but it has also been adapted in the analysis of human movement in 
work places. Laban’s descriptions were based on elucidating the 
structures of experience rather than providing an empirical study: 
Let us now proceed with studying the factors of bodily actions 
as distinct from those of bodily functions or mechanics. It is 
hoped that through such an approach, appreciation and 
understanding of the significance of human movement can be 
increased and deepened. 
(Ibid, p. 28) 
Louise Douse Chapter Four: Flow in the Dancing Body  
73 
 
Laban’s analysis of movement consists of a description of profiles and 
perspectives in much the same way that phenomenological analysis does. 
Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception provides an example of 
the phenomenological method through an analysis of the perception of 
objects: 
The object-horizon structure, or the perspective, is no obstacle 
to me when I want to see the object: for just as it is the means 
whereby objects are distinguished from each other, it is also the 
means whereby they are disclosed….In other words: to look at 
an object is to inhabit it, and from this habitation to grasp all 
things in terms of the aspect which they present to it. 
Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 79) 
An analysis of the object, Merleau-Ponty suggests, can only be obtained 
through an individual’s embodied relation to it, and their ability to take up 
the various perspectives available. Laban further suggests that: 
One perceives this whole interwoven complex [of man and the 
world] as I, as a thing, as a phenomenon. The stirring or 
excitation of the I is timed by the densities which we experience 
as matter, body, the touchable. The unifying basis is the 
eternally changing power of gesture. 
(Laban cited in Maletic, 1987, p. 191) 
Here, Laban reiterates the importance of the body and movement in 
experiencing the world, but much more than that, Laban sees the body as 
expressive: “The body is our instrument of expression through movement.” 
(Laban, 1988 p. 37). Here, there are parallels with Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of the body both in spontaneous action and in symbolic 
gestures: 
[T]he body is essentially an expressive space… [b]ut our body 
is not merely one expressive space among the rest… [t]he body 
is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is 
restricted to the actions necessary for the conservation of life, 
and accordingly it posits around us a biological world; at other 
times, elaborating upon these primary actions and moving from 
their literal to a figurative meaning, it manifests through them a 
core of significance: this is true of motor habits such as dancing. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 169) 
Louise Douse Chapter Four: Flow in the Dancing Body  
74 
 
Drawing again on Merleau-Ponty’s definition of the habit body and its 
propensity for action, it is possible to find links to Laban’s view of habit as 
a basic indication of character and temperament. Habit for Laban was also 
much more than a static and passive tendency, and instead it offered the 
possibility of greater insight into an individual’s own capacity for action and 
he states that: 
It is the task of an artist in creating a fine and lucid 
characterisation not only to bring out typical movement habits, 
but also the latent capacities from which a definite development 
of personality can originate. The artist must realise that his own 
movement make-up is the ground on which he has to build. The 
control and development of his personal movement habits will 
provide him with the key to the mystery of the significance of 
movement. 
(Laban, 1971, p. 98) 
Laban and Merleau-Ponty shared further insights in relation to the 
condition of the habit body. One of Laban’s key areas of research 
addresses effort, which will be explored below in more detail. He believed 
that, “[e]very human movement is indissolubly linked with effort, which is, 
indeed its origin and inner aspect.” (Laban cited in Maletic, 1987, p. 24). In 
turn, this can be linked to Merleau-Ponty’s habit body: 
If habit is neither a form of knowledge nor an involuntary action, 
what then is it? It is knowledge in the hands, which is 
forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and cannot be 
formulated in detachment from that effort. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 166) 
The synthesis of both space and time is key to Laban’s movement 
analysis in terms of effort and action. For Laban, “space and time 
structures, as well as time and energy phenomena, are for the dancer 
concrete unities, which are constantly renewed through the power of 
gesture.” (Laban cited in Maletic, 1987, pp. 191-192). The temporal 
structure of movement is constituted in space.  
4.2 Eukinetics 
Eukinetics is the study of effort; it is the study Laban spent most of his later 
career developing, and is also the most widely applied area of his 
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research. As mentioned above, for Laban the eukinetic quality of an 
individual’s movement is indicative of their underlying unconscious 
personality. For Laban, effort referred to “[t]he sequence of Inner Attitudes 
and Externalised Drives which activate an Action.” (cited in McCaw, 2011, 
p. 352). Effort was perceived to be something both physical and mental 
and deployed in the pursuit of a particular task. Laban sought to develop a 
method for describing and analysing an individual’s effort qualities which 
he identified as four basic qualities: space; weight; time; and flow. 
For Laban, each of the four qualities had a scale moving between two 
polarities. Space refers to the total space of an individual’s kinesphere, 
and space effort can therefore be considered the quality of movement an 
individual uses to explore that space and can be described as either a 
direct or indirect quality. Weight, addresses the type of pressure put into 
individual’s movement, and can either be described as a light weight 
quality or a strong weight quality. Time is the pacing of the movement and 
goes between a sustained pacing to a quick pacing. Laban’s final effort 
quality, flow, addresses the dynamic quality of the movement moving from 
free flow to bound flow (Laban, 1988, p. 21). 
Flow in this narrow context, appears to have little resemblance to the flow 
as defined by Csikszentmihalyi. However, flow for Laban retains a different 
association to those of the other effort qualities, and consequently a more 
complex definition. Laban developed eight basic effort actions composed 
of a combination of the space, weight and time effort qualities neglecting 
the quality of flow, as detailed in the table below (Figure 2). The eight 
basic effort actions are punch, slash, clap, flick, press, wring, glide and 
float. These are described by Laban as being built up on two main mental 
attitudes: function and sensation. Laban considered the eight effort actions 
as like eight notes of music which may be composed in numerous ways. 
For Laban, what was interesting in terms of movement analysis was the 
individual composition of these actions which he felt were expressive of an 
individual’s personality. 
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Effort Actions Space Weight Time 
Punch Direct Strong Quick 
Slash Indirect Strong Quick 
Dab Direct Light Quick 
Flick Indirect Light Quick 
Press Direct Strong Sustained 
Wring Indirect Strong Sustained 
Glide Direct Light Sustained 
Float Indirect Light Sustained 
Figure 2: Eight basic effort qualities constructed from Laban (1988) 
Laban then replaces one of the three other effort qualities with the flow 
quality to describe what he referred to as Action Drives. When flow with 
either bound or free quality replaces the weight quality, the drive becomes 
‘vision-like.’ When flow replaces time it becomes ‘spell-like,’ and when flow 
replaces space it becomes a ‘passion drive.’ For Laban, Vision Drive was 
of the sensation of weightlessness, other worldly and non-physical. The 
Spell Drive encouraged a timeless, trance-like, hypnotic state and the 
Passion Drive reflected a spaceless absence of focus with no logical 
reason. These Action Drives represent individual psychological types for 
Laban (Laban, 1988). 
Flow for Laban “plays an important part in all movement expression, as 
through its inward and outward streaming it establishes relationship and 
communication.” (Laban, 1971, p. 83). In his work titled Modern 
educational dance (1975a), Laban describes the importance of the 
awareness of flow for the dancer teacher: 
In watching a child we see his movements change from one 
effort to another, sometimes gradually in a harmonious way, 
sometimes abruptly and with no apparent connection with the 
previous movement. These changes, or mutations, are 
important, as they indicate the presence or absence of flow 
from one action, or state of mind, to the next…. 
It cannot be stressed too strongly that the movements the child 
experiences have a marked reaction on his mind, so that 
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varying emotions can be induced through his actions, the 
intensity of the emotion varying with the intensity of the action.  
(Laban, 1975a, pp. 102-103) 
He suggests that in observing abrupt movement, the child should be 
“guided in such a way that he learns to make use of harmonious 
transitions from one effort to another.” (Ibid, p. 102). Ultimately, he argues 
that teachers, in learning to understand the effort qualities, “will then be 
better equipped to educate children to become happy in themselves and in 
their relationship with others…” (Ibid, p. 103). In ‘The harmony of 
movement’ cited in McCaw’s The Laban sourcebook (2011, pp. 320-331), 
Laban also refers to ‘harmony’ in the context flow: 
When meeting a person who in his whole behaviour and actions 
has the capacity to balance the opposites, we may be inclined 
to say that he is really harmonious. How will this be shown in 
his movement, not only as a whole but also in details? First one 
should be clear as to what the opposites are for which we have 
to look….These two characteristics are very well known to the 
student of movement as ‘free flow’ and bound ‘flow’. 
(Laban in McCaw, 2011, p. 323) 
It is this reference to happiness and harmony which enables a connection 
to Csikszentmihalyi’s flow, and can be explored further in relation to 
Laban’s choreutics. 
4.3 Choreutics 
Alongside Laban’s eukinetic research, Laban developed another area of 
research in shape called choreutics. Choreutics deals with the sculptural 
qualities of movement. Laban’s successor Warren Lamb (who will be 
discussed in more detail below) explored choreutics using an analogy of 
the vapour trails from an aeroplane. 
[W]e need to put ourselves in a position similar to that of a 
commentator reporting on an aircraft giving a stunt display. He 
would report that the aircraft was looping the loop, diving, 
gaining altitude, veering to the right or left, and so on… if the 
aeroplane’s engine was leaving a vapour trail, we should see 
the shapes transcribed in the sky. 
 (Lamb, 1965, pp. 16-17) 
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Laban catalogued the different ways the body can move and explained 
these in terms of three dimensional planes; horizontal, vertical and sagittal. 
As with the effort qualities, the three dimensions above also exist on a 
continuum between two opposites. The horizontal plane can move from 
side to side, and can be best thought about as if a table were to cut 
through the body at the stomach, enabling an individual to reach out to the 
sides of the table to their left and right. The vertical plane moves between 
the extreme upper to lower limits of the body and can be thought of as a 
door frame in which the body moves up to the top and down to the floor. 
The final sagittal plane can be thought of as a wheel plane, and cuts 
through the body front to back, this creates movement which moves 
forwards and backwards. 
Laban became interested in polyhedral forms in order to develop a scale 
of movement pathways. Laban’s scales were based on the icosahedron, a 
form of twenty equilateral triangles, and he began teaching these scales in 
1946 to his students of the Art of Movement Studio in England (Davies, 
2001). As scales enlarge spatial awareness and at the same time balance 
the body spatially they were performed as a discipline but one that 
explored the harmony of space. Laban’s scales followed regular 
sequential patterns, always forming a complete ring of movement and 
constructed with three dimensional symmetry (Davies, 2001). 
Laban’s choreutics draws on the golden ratio, as defined in the arts, and 
sciences as well as with respect to Fibonnaci’s mathematical sequence. It 
is the idea that perception naturally compares height with width in any 
given ratio and has been used throughout history to produce attractive 
form and strength. Laban’s scales were informed by his interests in 
architecture: 
Movement is, so to speak, living architecture – living in the 
sense of changing emplacements as well as changing 
cohesion. This architecture is created by human movements 
and is made up of pathways tracing shapes in space, and these 
we may call ‘trace-forms’. A building can hold together only if its 
parts have definite proportions which provide a certain balance 
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in the material of which it is constructed.… The living building of 
trace-forms which a moving body creates is bound to certain 
spatial relationships. Such relationships exist between the 
single parts of the sequence. Without a natural order within the 
sequence, movement becomes unreal and dream like. 
(Laban cited in Foster, 1977, p. 65) 
Laban’s research in choreutics reflected his interest in harmony, and the 
balancing of two opposites. In developing his scales, he describes a 
harmonious combination of directions balancing between stable and labile, 
and in particular, as present in his diagonal scale. 
If we present these relationships in a cube we find that both the 
labile and the stable characteristics are provoked by one 
diagonal other than that of the inclination, and that the pulling 
and pushing of the two directions of an inclination are caused 
by that one diagonal, thus establishing an interrelationship 
between the two diagonals. 
(Laban, 1966, p. 207) 
In his classes, Laban often taught the diagonal scale with ‘affinities’ of 
effort actions (Maletic, 1987), though Laban considered the two areas of 
his research; eukinetics and choreutics, separately. 
4.4 Lamb’s developments 
Warren Lamb, as briefly mentioned earlier, was a student of Laban’s at the 
Art of Movement Studio in 1945. He showed particular ability with regards 
to the observation and analysis of movement that Laban had developed. 
He began to work very closely with Laban within industry and working in 
factories and offices to assess an individual’s way of working, with the idea 
that some people were better suited to particular jobs. These perceptions 
were originally based on Laban’s observations and his capacity as a 
‘healer’ in “his penetrating recognition of the essence of an individual’s 
personality.” (Davies, 2001, 37). Laban’s work in industry was devised 
using an analysis of the movement required for a specific task and an 
analysis of the workers performing said task, “[s]pecial exercises were 
then devised to strengthen their bodies for the operations, and more fluent 
and rhythmic ways of performing the tasks were suggested.” (Ibid, p. 40). 
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After Laban’s death in 1958, Lamb developed some of Laban’s ideas 
further, in particular, in relation to flow and the combining of Laban’s 
eukinetics and choreutics. 
Lamb also developed some of the terminology used by Laban, as it 
became clear to him that while Laban supported an analysis of movement 
in flux his language supported a more positional approach. With regards to 
the effort qualities, Lamb found it easier when talking to clients to describe 
the qualities as ‘focus’ instead of ‘space’, and ‘pressure’ instead of 
‘weight’, alongside the original qualities of ‘time’ and ‘flow’. He then 
described the polarities of the effort in terms of process; 
indirecting/directing, decreasing/increasing, decelerating/accelerating, 
freeing/binding. Within shape, he redefined the polarities as 
spreading/enclosing, rising/descending and advancing/retiring. Finally, 
“[h]e added the terms Assertion to Effort and Perspective to Shape 
because they are synonymous and [he] found they were more readily 
understood in clarifying the decision-making concept, by the non-
movement people with whom [he has] worked.” (Lamb, 2012, p. 32). For 
the purposes of this thesis, it is Lamb’s terms which will be referred to from 
this point onwards. 
Lamb developed the concept of flow in shape as well as flow in effort, 
moving from growing to shrinking and freeing to binding, respectively. For 
Lamb, although these qualities of flow are considered as equal within 
effort and shape observation, he argued for the transcendence of flow in 
relation to the other effort and shape qualities and stated that “Flow links 
all other components of movement to give them balance, flexibility and 
grace.” (Ibid, p. 46). For Lamb, flow was also a characteristic linked to 
child development. In his work with child psychoanalyst Dr. Judith 
Kestenberg (Kesternberg, 1978; Lewis and Lowman, 1990), it was 
suggested that an individual is born with mainly flow qualities and it is only 
as a child develops through to adulthood that they develop effort and 
shape qualities. In developing these qualities, however, it is also 
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suggested that the individual may lose some their ‘child-like’ flow qualities, 
discussed in greater detail below. 
Lamb drew on all these concepts of effort, shape and flow to develop what 
is now called Movement Pattern Analysis (MPA) within the field of 
management consulting (Lamb, 2012). He developed a system for 
observing the movement of others which would indicate an individual’s 
preferred movement patterns, which in turn relates to that individual’s 
preferred behaviour when going through decision-making processes. 
Though MPA is almost solely employed in business, Lamb is an advocate 
of a wider application of MPA within education and in the study of 
movement which he sought to develop beyond the confines of dance, 
sport and other forms of non-verbal communication. 
I have been a knight in shining armour all my career crusading 
for recognition of Movement Analysis in the hope that it will 
become recognised as a valid discipline in its own right. 
(Lamb, 2003a, p. 4) 
Lamb’s Movement Pattern Analysis begins with an analysis of posture and 
gesture. Lamb found it necessary to identify which part or parts of the body 
movement was being observed in. This further allowed him to define two 
categories of movement, posture and gesture. Posture indicates a whole 
body movement, in which “all parts of body involved in movement – each 
part observed actually to move and not merely to respond to movement of 
other parts – associated with postural adjustment.” (Lamb, 1965, p. 15). 
Gesture relates to movement confined to part of the body, “applicable 
even though there may be locomotion of the whole body if some parts are 
carried by other parts – associated with gesture.” (Ibid, p. 15) Lamb also 
addressed movement where gesture merges into a movement of the body 
as a whole, or where postural movement supports and is consistent with a 
gestural movement. This movement he termed posture-gesture merged or 
integrated movement. It was in these movements that Lamb argued an 
expressive relationship could be denoted: 
The manner of the merger of posture and gesture in a person’s 
movement is essential to the DNA of their behaviour. It is 
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unique to the individual, it is what distinguishes one person from 
another. Furthermore, analysis of it reveals the preferred nature 
of their decision making. In using their posture-gesture merger 
the individual feels comfortable and at ease. 
(Lamb, 2012, p. 21, my italics) 
It was therefore only this posture-gesture merged movement which 
became the focus of the MPA profile. (Figure 3, p. 83). The MPA profile is 
normally compiled after a two hour interview with an MPA consultant. 
Within these interviews notations and sketches will be made of the 
movement. In relation to the notation of effort and shape qualities, they 
can be tracked using diagrams which extend from one moving polarity to 
the other, these are then traced using a system of linking lines to indicate 
movement between the extremities, (Figure 4, p. 84). When this is 
completed for all effort and shape qualities, the collection of lines can be 
reduced to just a single line (Figure 5, p. 84) indicating the predominant 
range of qualities. This analysis is conducted for both postural and 
gestural movement. 
Once the initial analysis of effort and shape is completed, the simple line 
diagrams are compared between posture and gesture. The following 
diagram (Figure 6, p. 85) indicates the extent to which posture and gesture 
ranges overlap. There is evidence to show that the way in which these 
overlap is consistent for each individual over separate occasions when 
behaviour has been different. These can then be reduced to a further set 
of lines indicating the range only. Figure 7 (p. 85) indicates the range of 
posture-gesture merged movement, and the arrows indicate the realm of 
posture beyond the range of over-lapping. This becomes an important 
aspect with regard to training for the individual, as sequences are 
developed which encompass the end of the spectrum where their postural 
range diminishes. 
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Figure 3: Tabular Presentation of an Action Profile (Davies, 2001) 
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Figure 4: Effort and Shape Ranges (Lamb, 1979) 
 
Figure 5: Effort and Shape Reduced Range (Lamb, 1979) 
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Figure 6: Posture/Gesture Overlap (Lamb, 1965) 
  
Figure 7: Extract of Posture/Gesture Overlapping Ranges (Lamb, 1965) 
These new range diagrams are used to indicate an individual’s ‘motivation 
to act’, a framework for the description of managerial behaviour (Davies, 
2001). Lamb felt that the six effort/shape qualities were connected to one 
another in three stages of decision-making. The three stages consist of: 
stage one; attention, relating focus with the horizontal plane; stage two, 
intention, relating pressure with the vertical plane; and stage three, 
commitment, relating time with the sagittal plane. The longer the lines in 
any one part of the action-motivation analysis, the greater the preference 
the individual has for the corresponding stage of decision-making. 
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Stage one, the attention stage, addresses how a situation must be given 
attention first and describes the different ways in which an individual may 
attend to the situation. Lamb makes further definitions of attention in 
relation to effort (investigation) and shape (exploring). If an individual were 
to have an effort range that sat nearer the directing end of the scale it 
could be said that they would attend to the situation by probing for 
information and making distinctions. If they sat in the indirecting end they 
would begin by making connections and grouping data. In terms of shape, 
if they were on the enclosing end of the spectrum an individual may begin 
by gathering possibilities from different angles and encompassing diverse 
possibilities. Whereas someone on the spreading end of the spectrum may 
generate alternatives and expand the scope for action (Davies, 2001). 
The second stage which addressed intention can be divided into 
determining in the effort range and evaluating in the shape range. 
Intention is related with what an individual’s feelings are towards the 
information gathered in the first stage. If the individual showed 
predominance in this range it might be with regard to an increasing 
pressure, in which they would proceed to build a firm case and either apply 
or resist pressure. With regards to a preference for decreasing pressure 
the individual may proceed gently and persistently, bending without giving 
way. Alternatively, within the shaping qualities, an individual may show 
preference towards the descending scale in which they may proceed by 
establishing the relevant issues and rank those issues in order of 
importance. A rising preference may result in the comparing of options and 
weighing of pro’s and con’s (Davies, 2001). 
The final stage, addressing commitment, refers to the way in which an 
individual takes action given the situation. Lamb related effort in this stage 
to timing and shape to anticipating. Within the effort ranges, having a 
preference for accelerating may mean an individual will speed up the pace 
of the activity and seize opportunities or, given a decelerating preference, 
they may take time to choose when to allow for developments and focus 
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on choosing the right time to act. Within the shape range, an individual 
with a preference for retreating may proceed by planning the stages of 
action and measuring progress. Having a preference for advancing might 
enable the individual to set goals and foresee outcomes, implications and 
trends. It is important to note, however, that each individual will have a 
varying degree of preference and predominance, and defining people as 
‘types’ has no real benefit. 
The next section of the MPA profile addresses an individual’s preference 
in regards to interaction and it profiles their personal ‘interaction-
motivation.’ An individual’s interaction-motivation profile is also divided into 
three sections which reflect an individual’s preferences towards 
communicating, presenting and operating which is matched to the three 
action stages. The profile examines an individual’s preference towards 
interaction in terms of their ability to share and work as a team, or work on 
their own with a need for privacy. Lamb argued an individual’s ability to 
interact and share is related to their effort/shape affinity, detailed below. 
Effort/shape affinity was first recognised by Laban in his identification of 
‘natural’ movement and was also evident in his diagonal scale addressing 
space harmony. It is Lamb, however, who defined these connections and 
linked them to the three types of interactive environments they create; 
communication, presentation and operation. In the first stage; 
communication, the affinities exist between the directing effort of focus and 
the enclosing perspective of horizontal shaping, as well as the indirecting 
effort quality and the spreading shape quality. This affinity thus reflects “a 
willingness to contribute ideas and information and a receptiveness to 
others’ suggestions, making colleagues feel valued.” (Davies, 2001, p. 
112). Disaffinity in this stage; directing/spreading and indirecting/enclosing, 
reflects independence in researching. 
Within the second stage, presentation, affinities exist between increasing 
pressure and descending shape and decreasing pressure and rising 
shape. For example, it is more ‘natural’ to press onto the floor than press 
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onto the ceiling. Affinity in this stage reflects someone who “will involve 
colleagues in his/her pursuit of information and try to influence them as to 
priorities. Will be open but persuasive.” (Ibid, p. 112). Someone, however, 
showing a disaffinity in this stage, increasing/rising and 
decreasing/descending, would be more inclined to work alone and 
perhaps be reluctant to change their stance. 
The final stage, operation, sees affinities between accelerating in the time 
effort and retiring in the sagittal shaping, as well as decelerating effort with 
advancing shape. Lamb describes a crouching athlete in a retiring shape 
ready for a quick start who then begins to decelerate on straightening out. 
Affinity in this stage suggests a person “very concerned with timing and 
objectives, and will try to instil the same concern in colleagues. May be 
more concerned with the speed of the task than how it is done. Can create 
a lovely working environment but can also put subordinates under stress.” 
(Ibid, p. 113). Affinity provides a ‘come on’ or ‘let’s get ready’ message, 
whereas disaffinity, that is accelerating/advancing and 
decelerating/retiring, suggest a ‘count me out’ attitude and may make 
colleagues of an individual with these attributes feel as if they may go 
behind their backs. 
4.5 Flow and Movement Pattern Analysis 
This whole process of Movement Pattern Analysis directed at posture-
gesture merged movement reveals an individual’s preferred ways of 
moving, but more than that it also attempts to define their particular 
motivation through the decision-making process. This can therefore be 
seen in relation to the theory of flow developed in the previous chapter, in 
that in both flow research and MPA, there is an interest in optimal 
experience, and recognising behaviours which facilitate this experience. 
With regards to Csikszentmihalyi’s research, this concern for optimal 
experience is for the individual and in relation to everyday life. However, 
with regards to Lamb’s work, the concern is largely for the business or 
company in relation to worker efficiency. 
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There is, however, another connection in regards to the agency of the 
individual; in both flow as defined by Csikszentmihalyi and MPA, the 
process of achieving optimal experience enables the individual to act in 
the world as an effective agent. Where flow describes the sensations of 
optimal experience, MPA describes an individual’s preferred patterns of 
movement in order to achieve optimal experience. It could therefore be 
suggested that flow, in relation to Laban and Lamb, signifies the physical 
characteristics, while flow in relation to Csikszentmihalyi describes the 
psychological characteristics, of optimal experience for an individual 
involved in agentic action in the world. 
Both Csikszentmihalyi’s flow and Laban and Lamb’s MPA illustrate the 
importance of continuity. In Csikszentmihalyi’s flow activities, this 
continuity is experienced through a smooth flowing consciousness and 
relational timing. In MPA, continuity is described through the process of 
posture-gesture merging: 
The merging between Posture and Gesture processes, to 
qualify as a merging within one definition, has to be consistent 
in the Shape and Effort process. For example, if the hand 
begins a process of increasing pressure, a merging into Posture 
can only happen if the whole body consistently “backs up” the 
hand action by means of a similar increase in pressure.” 
(Lamb, 1971, pp. 32-33) 
Continuity exists when posture consistently merges into gesture and vice 
versa. 
There is also a link regarding relaxation; while Csikszentmihalyi’s flow may 
involve a challenging activity, when an individual’s skill is matched in just 
the right proportions, that moment of flow provides a relaxing, easy and 
accomplished feeling. Within MPA, relaxation facilitates posture-gesture 
merging. Lamb discusses the observation of two people doing a physically 
demanding task; one relaxed and one tense: 
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1. The relaxed person has succeeded in merging most of his 
Gesture striving and strainings into Posture adjustments, and 
the tense person has not. 
2. The relaxed person is able to keep up a variety of postural 
adjustment while doing the task, whereas the tense person 
remains more or less fixed. 
(Ibid, pp. 37-38) 
Relaxation in this sense does not mean lack of activity but a loss of rigidity 
and incorporation of whole body. 
In the previous chapter it was argued that habit enables automatic 
movement and facilitates action, rather than drawing on the mechanistic 
explanation of habit. In MPA, Lamb explains that relaxation in a task and 
posture-gesture merged movement can also overcome this mechanistic 
habit when performing repetitive tasks: 
Relaxation in performance, as distinct from the relaxation 
achieved by stopping a task and having a rest, invariably needs 
the overcoming of any temptation towards postural sameness 
and the introduction of compensatory Posture adjustment 
consistent with the principle of Shape/Effort matching. 
(Ibid, p. 39) 
He goes on to describe the repetitive nature of housework and how 
relaxed movement incorporating postural variation creates ease in work. 
Other links between Csikszentmihalyi’s flow and MPA exist in relation to 
Lamb’s theories of flow, relating to Judith Kestenberg’s research, and the 
Autotelic personality within Csikszentmihalyi’s research. Within Lamb’s 
Movement Pattern Analysis, flow is addressed in relation to the final row of 
the Action Profile; identifying (as in Figure 3, p. 83). Within the decision-
making process identifying indicates an individual’s willingness to wholly 
participate in the activity and, as discussed earlier, is dependent on their 
experience as a child in being able to retain flow qualities in both effort and 
shape. This will be discussed in more detail in regards to 
Csikszentmihalyi’s research on the Autotelic personality, which addresses 
an individual’s capacity to experience flow, despite engagement in an 
essentially Autotelic activity. 
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Within MPA, it is suggested that flow (of effort and shape) diminishes 
during childhood growth and that parents, teachers and friends all impact 
on the final ratio of flow retention to effort/shape gain indicating an 
interplay of environmental factors with innate tendency or disposition. 
Lamb and Kestenberg argue that the early years are critically important in 
the formation of personality and that the results are demonstrated in an 
individual’s physical behaviour. This is mirrored to some degree in 
Csikszentmihalyi’s research on the Autotelic personality. He believes that 
it is likely that there are ways in which parents behave with children which 
will predispose them to find enjoyment either with ease or with difficulty, 
and that “[e]arly childhood influences are also very likely factors in 
determining whether a person will or will not easily experience flow.” 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 88). 
Both Csikszentmihalyi and Lamb and Kestenberg also argue that this 
experience when growing up could affect an individual’s attention and 
personality. In Movement Pattern Analysis, people who showed low 
retention of flow were considered to be somewhat aloof, when combined 
with high effort/shape gain; or awkward, if combined with low effort/shape 
gain (Davies, 2001, Lamb, 2012). This reflects Csikszentmihalyi’s research 
which suggests: 
Attentional disorders and stimulus over inclusion prevent flow 
because psychic energy is too fluid and erratic. Excessive self-
consciousness and self-centredness prevent it for the opposite 
reason: attention is too rigid and tight. 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 85) 
On the other hand high flow retention in MPA, and high autotelic tendency 
within Csikszentmihalyi’s flow research both produce highly motivated 
individuals with an ability to experience flow more easily (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1990; Lamb, 2012). Within MPA, those with high flow retention are 
considered to be confident, spontaneous and competent, when coupled 
with high effort/shape gain, or child-like, with low effort/shape gain. 
Csikszentmihalyi found those who experienced more intrinsic motivation in 
daily life were often able to overcome the bleakest of situations. 
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Eva Zeisel, the ceramic designer who was imprisoned in 
Moscow’s Lubyanka prison for over a year by Stalin’s police, 
kept her sanity by figuring out how she would make a bra out of 
materials at hand, playing chess against herself in her head, 
holding imaginary conversations in French, doing gymnastics, 
and memorizing poems she composed. 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 91) 
In conclusion, whilst Laban and Lamb’s theory of flow cannot be directly 
mapped onto that of Csikszentmihalyi, there are some cross-overs. First, 
in Warren Lamb’s development of Laban’s theories in Movement Pattern 
Analysis and his work on posture-gesture merging; it is reasonable to 
suggest that posture-gesture merged movement is evidence in the body of 
moments of optimal experience in which the movement represents an 
individuals preferred patterns of movement and “is the result of sincere 
and not contrived behaviour.” (Lamb, 2012). In contrast Csikszentmihalyi’s 
flow is the psychological indication of these same experiences, in which 
“an activity involves the person completely with its demands for action, 
[that] “self-ish” considerations become irrelevant.” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 
p. 42). 
Secondly, Laban and Lamb’s work on flow (in effort and shape) can be 
seen in relation to the autotelic personality in relation to Csikszentmihalyi’s 
work, and an individual’s capacity for experiencing these moments of 
optimal performance. It could be considered that a new definition of the 
term flow could be constructed in which both physical and mental 
characteristics can be described in relation to the concept of optimal 
experience. This is further supported through the interdisciplinary 
application to phenomenology to both fields, reflecting the philosophical 
importance of the body. Both Laban and Merleau-Ponty developed 
theories which situated the body at the core of meaning making and felt 
that action was constituent of the self as expressive. Thus it is essential 
that the role of the body is considered in such experiences of flow. 
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Chapter Five: Facilitating Flow 
The last two chapters developed a comprehensive understanding of flow 
as an embodied experience, available to an individual through their 
actions in the world. This chapter aims to address what kinds of activity 
might facilitate flow in dance. The research draws on a phase of 
workshops in order to inform the final method to be used for data 
collection. To begin, the chapter addresses Csikszentmihalyi’s conditions 
for flow, drawing on his interest in French social theorist, Roger Callois 
(1913-1978) and his work on play (1958). After defining some of these key 
conditions, the chapter discusses those activities which are considered to 
facilitate such conditions. This will include improvisation in dance creation, 
drawing on the practices of butoh and yoga, for which a rationale is 
provided below. 
Habit is then reconsidered in relation to flow and the above activities. 
While Merleau-Ponty saw habit as action enabling reflecting 
Csikszentmihalyi’s flow characteristic of ‘automatic’ behaviour and Lamb’s 
identification of it with regard to decision-making, it could be argued that 
both improvisation and dance practices often refer to habit negatively. 
Here, the chapter draws parallel’s with Merleau-Ponty’s example of the 
phantom limb as an ultimately negative affect of habit, and aims to resolve 
the problem by addressing the Japanese term ‘ma’ or ‘in-between,’ in 
connection with social anthropologist Victor Turner’s ‘liminoid.’ The chapter 
then returns to the key movement practices in order to address the 
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principles drawn from Movement Pattern Analysis, before detailing the 
workshops used and the final method for the practice. 
5.1 Conditions for flow 
After identifying the key characteristics of flow, Csikszentmihalyi 
considered the various conditions for facilitating flow (1990). He began by 
addressing Roger Callois’ classification of autotelic activities in his study of 
social structure. Callois described four types of activity within his research 
on play (1958): agôn, alea, mimicry and ilinx. Agôn refers to games of a 
competitive nature in which rules are applied to enable equality between 
the participants, as in sports and chess. Alea addresses games of chance, 
in which the participant attempts to exert control and ‘beat the odds.’ In 
this type of play risk is a high factor. Mimicry, however, refers to those 
types of activities which rely on pretence and fantasy, such as in theatre, 
where actors take on the characteristics of another. The final activity, ilinx, 
refers to activities in which there is an altered state of consciousness 
induced by dangerous ‘vertigo’ producing activities such as rock climbing 
and intoxication. 
Csikszentmihalyi, however, contended that these four types of activity 
need not be exclusive in flow. For example in competitive skiing, an 
individual is both in a state of ilinx and agôn. He also argued that while 
Callois’ definitions were of importance, they did not adequately describe all 
the types of autotelic activity within flow. Csikszentmihalyi went on to 
develop five categories, which while similar, extended those of Callois: 
friendship and relaxation; risk and chance; problem solving; competition; 
and creativity. The first factor contained elements which Callois might 
describe as mimicry, such as, watching a movie, but were extended 
through their interpersonal connection. The second factor, risk and 
chance, combines Callois’ alea and ilinx categories. Problem solving 
addresses goal oriented activities, and competition draws on Callois’ agôn 
criteria. The final factor, creativity was considered to be a unique 
experience in comparison to the other categories (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). 
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The five factors consisted of eighteen items and were considered by 
respondents of six different types of activity. Csikszentmihalyi had the 
respondents match the items depending on their likeness to their activity. 
See table (Figure 8). One of the six categories of activities included dance, 
although it is not clear what kind of dancers (social, ballet, contemporary 
etc.) Csikszentmihalyi interviewed. It is suggested by Csikszentmihalyi, 
however, that the highest three ranking items for the dancers were: 
‘designing or discovering something new,’ in the creativity section; 
‘listening to good music,’ in the friendship and relaxation section; and 
‘exploring a strange place,’ in the problem solving section. Overall, the 
creativity section, of which there was only the one item, was ranked highly 
in all activities except basketball. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). 
 
Figure 8: Ranking of Similarity of Experience Items Within Each Autotelic Activity (Based on Mean 
Rank Scores) (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975) 
Considering these indications for dance, as well as the characteristics of 
flow discussed in the previous chapters, it is important to consider what 
types of dance or dance related activities support and facilitate flow in 
contemporary dance. The activities would need to be creative, problem 
solving and with an element of relaxation or interaction. They would need 
to involve some kind of challenge, some potential for control and clear 
goals and feedback. They would also need to enable an individual’s 
preferred patterns of movement, according to Laban and Lamb. 
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5.2 Improvisation 
Sandra Cerny Minton (2007), former director of dance at the University of 
Northern Colorado, defines the various stages of the creative process 
within dance in four parts; exploring and improvising movement, designing 
and shaping the dance, identifying choreographic form, and staging the 
performance. It is the first generative stage of creation looking at 
improvisation which is central to this research. Improvisation as a 
perceptual activity relies on the, “hyperawareness of the relation between 
immediate action and overall shape, between that which is about to take 
place or is taking place and that which has and will take place.” (Foster 
cited in Cooper Albright and Gere, 2003, p. 7). 
Improvisation largely focuses on task based activity in order to foster 
creativity and invent original movement material. Within performance, 
improvisation has been inherent as a method for process since the Ancient 
Greek period; “All art forms have begun with improvisation, and the early 
narrative epics like The Odyssey and The Iliad began as improvised 
storytelling. Song and dance and early dramatic ritual took more formal 
shape after long periods of improvisation.” (Hodgson and Richards, 1977, 
p. 2). Improvisation, however, is a transdisciplinary concept which informs 
numerous fields: “[q]uestions about improvisation reside at the nebulous 
boundaries between sociology and psychology, between the study of 
collective action and individual agency.” (Sawyer, 2000, p. 185). Sawyer’s 
article addressed interactions between jazz, improvisational theatre and 
everyday social life and was published as part of a special edition of Mind, 
Culture and Activity, “with representatives of several disciplines 
commenting on improvisation.” (Ibid. p. 185). 
In dance it was popularised in the 1960s by American Postmodern 
dancers who began to create wholly improvised performances. For 
example, the Judson Church collective (consisting of Steve Paxton, 
Yvonne Rainer, Trisha Brown, Anna Halprin, Nancy Stark-Smith and 
Simone Forti, among others) moved away from the codified Modernist 
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movement practices situated in form and expression, and began to 
question what dance was. Improvisation became foregrounded as a 
product for political reasons; practitioners created works that commented 
on practices of dancing and art making as a means of challenging 
hierarchy and establishing creative autonomy. Many were interested in 
blurring the line between artist and everyday person, and in that context 
improvisation became a tool for exploring self as artist. 
However, for some, improvisation was much more than just a tool, for 
Steve Paxton “there was no longer a clear dividing line between his 
everyday life and his improvising.” (de Spain cited in Cooper Albright and 
Gere, 2003, p. 27). Paxton was the founding practitioner of Contact 
Improvisation, a form evolved from his interests in martial arts, 
improvisation and dance. Contact Improvisation has shifted away from an 
experimental dance phenomenon and towards a physical practice allied 
with a number of body and mind studies. Improvisation in this context 
requires one to think, move and create in the moment of performance, it is 
a, “form which lives and breathes in the moving flow of its creation, a flow 
experience as on going present and unbroken now.” (Sheets-Johnstone, 
2011, p. 421). 
Improvisation is often enabled through the use of tasks in order to 
stimulate movement responses. The tasks can be formed of many varying 
stimuli, for example, on a task based on the senses an individual may 
explore the different sensations of touch or use sound to illicit movement. 
Tasks can also explore the elements of movement; space, time energy 
and other movement qualities. Improvisation could be inspired by some 
kind of artefact or even a single movement. These can be explored 
internally, by relating to the internal structures, or externally, by exploring 
an external spatiality. In every instance the task is meant to inspire but not 
to set or conform, there is no right or wrong response as long as the 
individual engages in the task to explore its movement potential. 
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The above stimuli could further be explored through the use of imagery. 
Imagery is the use of images in the mind in order to alter the behaviour of 
the body, and relies on the implicit interaction of the mind and body. The 
development of imagery in dance is associated with Joan Skinner, Glena 
Batson, Martha Eddy and Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen (Franklin, 1996). 
Imagery in improvisation can enhance discoveries of new movement 
qualities and choreographic ideas. The use of imagery in dance requires 
total concentration as Zaphorah notes: 
If my mind isn’t quiet, I can’t believe my experience. I’m so busy 
listening to and believing in my mental chatter (always tied to 
the past and future) that I am unable to focus on my present 
experience, let alone believe in it. 
(cited in Franklin, 1996, p. 4) 
One particular dance practice which utilises imagery is that of butoh, a 
Japanese art form developed by Kazuo Ohno and Tatsumi Hijikata. Butoh 
grew out of a rebellion against both codified Japanese performance 
traditions and the influences of Western dance forms in Japan following 
World War Two (Barbe, 2003); discussed in further detail later. Butoh often 
works in the area of the absurd, or the grotesque, looking at two images 
simultaneously: the dark with the light, the old with the young. Hijikata also 
developed butoh-fu, a form of butoh which explores streams of images 
moving the body through states of being or feeling; “it is not a form of 
madness, where one believes oneself to be a cat, or an old woman, but 
rather to find the architecture of a cat, and live in that form.” (Barbe, 2003, 
23). Butoh has influenced the on-going development of improvisation 
within current Western dance practices in its focus on the ‘inner’ 
representation of the image rather than external aesthetic (Fraleigh, 1999, 
p. 38). 
All types of improvisation are characterised by a reflexive awareness and 
instantaneous responsiveness to the moment, and enhance bodily 
mindfulness. Improvisation is fundamentally creative, drawing on the 
primary condition of flow within dance (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). 
Improvisation is both an articulation of mind and body, “Improvisation does 
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not, therefore, entail a silencing of the mind in order for the body “to 
speak.” Rather, improvisation pivots both mind and body into a new 
apprehension of relationalities.” (Foster cited in Cooper Albright and Gere, 
2003, p. 7). Imagery in improvisation can aid in the reflexive, relational 
creation of mind and body by uniting and translating the different activities 
of consciousness. 
Susan Leigh Foster describes this experience as a moving back and forth 
between the ‘known’ and the ‘unknown’. Where the known is considered 
an individual’s predisposition to certain movement patterns or habits, “it 
demands a reflexive awareness of the known becoming a stereotype.” 
(cited in Cooper Albright and Gere, 2003, p. 7). In this sense, the known 
and habit are considered challenges to improvisation. Improvisation 
requires the individual to generate an instant flow of movement, where it is 
considered they must avoid habitual movement patterns in order to invent 
original material. However, Foster acknowledges that “we could never 
accomplish this encounter with the unknown without engaging in the 
known.” (Ibid, p. 4). 
5.3 Somatic practices 
Improvisation within dance relies on many somatic principles. Somatics in 
this context being referred to as a portmanteau term for those practices 
which draw on the anti-dualist approaches to knowledge, addressing the 
mind and body holistically. Somatics comes from the Greek word for 
‘soma’ meaning the body in its wholeness. Somatics, “involves ‘listening to 
the body’ and responding to these sensations by consciously altering 
movement habits and movement choices.” (Eddy, 2009, p. 9). It is a way 
of understanding the mind and body as an interconnected system; 
learning how they communicate is key to improved health and 
understanding. 
Although only a recently defined area of practice, with new studies and 
journals proliferating in the last decade (Ibid, p. 6), somatic practices are 
an approach to bodily care and education which have developed largely 
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unconnected to one another for the past fifty years2. The term somatics 
was introduced in the 1970s by Thomas Hanna (Ibid, p. 7), in an attempt 
to unify the processes under one rubric. A variety of skills and techniques 
are used within the myriad of somatic practices including qualities of touch, 
empathetic verbal exchange and complex movement experiences. The 
goal of somatic movement practices is to facilitate a student’s own self-
awareness and understanding of self through holistic and therapeutic 
methods. 
Within the context of this study the practices of yoga and Eric Franklin’s 
work in somatic imagery will be discussed. The particular characteristics of 
somatic practice which are most relevant to these practices are the 
attention to relaxation and release of holding patterns. Many somatic 
techniques begin by “quieting the mind-body ‘chatter’” (IADMS, 2009, p. 
2). They emphasise sensory awareness over motor action the how over 
the what, by addressing inner sensations and increased kinaesthetic 
awareness. Somatic practices are typified by the use of meditation or rest, 
with a higher rest-to-activity ratio; as in much physical recovery work. Rest 
is also a key component in motor programming, and within dance, 
somatics is used as a way of re-educating the body, focussing on process 
over product. This is indicative of a very recent shift in dance practice 
which embraces self-awareness, but also references the second condition 
for flow in dance: friendship and relaxation. It should be noted, however, 
that both yoga and Franklin’s work are not indicative of all somatic 
practices and it is not within the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed 
exegesis of the field of somatics. See the footnote below for further 
references to such research. 
                                            
2
 The International Somatic Movement Education and Therapy Association (ISMETA) 
aims to unite many of the different types of somatic practice by providing a professional 
scope of practice and facilitating training and education and regulation over the practices. 
The many training practices within ISMETA include; yoga (Devereaux, 1998; Kent, 1999; 
Pegrum, 2001), Authentic Movement (Adler, 2002; Johnson, 1987, 2007; Samuels, 2004; 
Weiss, 1999), Alexander Technique (Dimon, 1999; Jones, 1975), Feldenkrais, Bartenieff 
Fundamentals (Bartenieff, Davis and Paulay, 1970; Bartenieff and Lewis, 1980) and 
Body-Mind Centering (Bainbridge Cohen, 1993), and Shin-Somatics (Fraleigh, 2009) 
amongst others. 
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The Franklin Method consists of ‘basic movement images’ repeatedly 
practiced in order to facilitate an awareness that pervades the whole body. 
In his book Dance imagery: for technique and performance, Franklin 
describes an experience akin to flow which he aims to cultivate; “effortless 
motion, kinetic flow, physicality, total body awareness, wholeness, 
oneness, connectedness, inspiration, a feeling of beauty, fluid breath, 
luminosity, clarity, joy in motion, or total freedom.” (Franklin, 1996, p. 4). 
Franklin’s method not only aims to cultivate creativity in dance but also to 
more generally address habitual holding patterns and release tension. 
This is also stressed in yoga practices where yogi practice physical 
exercises asanas, to provide gentle stretching that acts to lubricate the 
joints, muscles, ligaments, tendons, and other parts of the body. Asanas 
are considered to be “much more than physical exercises; they are a 
holistic practice that works on many different levels.” (Pegrum, 2001, p. 
17). In recent years scientists have tested many of the claims of yoga, but 
concluded that “yoga showed much promise for treating anxiety and 
depression” (Broad, 2012, p. 100). Yoga utilises relaxation as a way of 
enabling peace of mind, “[t]he yogic scriptures state that pure relaxation is 
experienced when not only the body, but also the mind and spirit, are 
entirely relaxed.” (Pegrum, 2001, p. 30). Asanas are considered to 
promote relaxation of the muscles while meditative or visualization 
techniques are utilised in “imaging the body filled with divine bliss or nectar 
[for example], but there are many positive images that you can evoke.” 
(Ibid, p. 30). 
In terms of habit, both yoga and the Franklin Method are seen as a way of 
releasing negative holding patterns and instigating and embodying new 
positive habits. Habit in this instance is often considered to be both a 
physical and mental state and these practices attempt simply to draw 
attention to these habitual patterns in order to facilitate engagement and 
action. Below, Franklin describes the difficulties with maintaining new 
positive habitual movement patterns: 
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For a correction to become part of your new way of moving, it 
needs to be incorporated into your body image. Your body 
image is your physical identity, the way you feel, visualize, and 
experience your body. Alignment, tension level, breath, and 
movement patterns are all part of your body image, of what 
feels natural or “at home” to you, even if from a biomechanical 
point of view your alignment is not ideal and is straining your 
musculature and joints. If, for example, you habitually tilt your 
head to the left when speaking to someone, this feels normal to 
you. If someone put your head in proper vertical alignment, you 
would feel strange, even though you would now be in a more 
efficient alignment. You might feel as though “this is not me” 
because your whole identity is connected to a certain posture. 
This poses a major problem in improving your movement and 
alignment. What is better from the point of view of alignment 
and movement efficiency often feels wrong. 
(Franklin, 1996, p. 74) 
5.4 Habit as both problem and problem solver 
In both improvisation and dance practices, habit is often referred to as a 
negative; something to either avoid or correct. Even in Merleau-Ponty and 
Heidegger’s discussions of habit there were negative effects in the case of 
the phantom limb, and in inauthentic moments. While Heidegger makes it 
clear that “the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify a “lesser” being or 
a “lower” degree of being” (1927, p. 43), he still implies that there is a 
stronger sense of self in the authentic existence. How then can this 
negative side of habit be reconciled with the positive, action enabling side 
of informing that flow state? 
As discussed in Chapter Three, habit for Merleau-Ponty, despite informing 
the phantom limb experience, is still an example of an individual’s being in 
the world and taking action in that world. Merleau-Ponty explains that the 
subject with the phantom limb does not engage in deliberate action-
making but rather through a habitual body. Merleau-Ponty distinguishes 
between two layers of the body, the habit body and the present body, thus 
re-affirming the temporal structure of the body and the individual’s 
experience of it in the world. Merleau-Ponty suggested that it was through 
repression of a past trauma in which the subject remains emotionally 
involved in a particular past experience to such a degree that it imposes 
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itself on the actual present. It is therefore only through the act of decision-
making that an individual is able to be fully present, yet this act is founded 
on their habitual body. “By taking up a present, I draw together and 
transform my past, altering its significance, freeing and detaching myself 
from it.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 528). 
In practices such as The Franklin Method there is also a focus on re-
educating the body in order to support self-regulation. However, it is only 
through an active engagement that an individual will experience change. It 
is not through the passive reception of a movement educator’s touch but 
the active and direct attention of the student through the entire learning 
process. Students must focus their attention and recognise their habitual 
movement patterns in interaction with their environment in order to 
develop improved perceptual movement integration. 
The discomfort referred to earlier while re-educating the body can also be 
linked to the butoh concept of ‘ma’. Ma is a Japanese word which can 
roughly be translated as ‘interval’ and is often referred to as a negative 
space. It also has a temporal meaning thus representing space, time and 
space-time. Ma can be experienced as both a static and a dynamic state 
and is a “way of sensing the moment of movement.” (Isozaki cited in 
Pilgrim, 1995, p. 69). In butoh, Hijikata developed the term ma-gusare 
(rotting space) operating at the interstices of being and non-being in a 
dangerous territory of dark unknowing. 
This concept of ‘ma’ can also be related to Victor Turner’s concepts of 
liminality and liminoid; “literally “being-on-a-threshold” means a state or 
process which is betwixt-and-between the normal, day-to-day…” (Turner, 
1979, p. 465). Turner links the liminal to Csikszentmihalyi’s theory of flow 
through performance practices. He notes that liminality only takes place 
within highly structured societies. Turner then describes the liminoid as 
events or behaviours which are simply undertaken for pleasure. For Turner 
then, liminoid experiences always have a flow quality which is produced by 
their highly structured organisation. 
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This therefore relates to the goal characteristic within flow, but also to 
challenge/skill balance. For example, flow, as defined by Csikszentmihalyi 
exists within a balance of skill and challenge, in which the skill of the 
individual must not match the challenge exactly or else it may become too 
easy and boring and yet the challenge should not be so hard that the 
individual is unable to meet the demands through a lack of skill. The role of 
habit, therefore, in relation to skill is both enabling and disabling. As 
iterated previously, “[improvisation] demands a reflexive awareness of the 
known becoming a stereotype.” (cited in Cooper Albright and Gere, 2003, 
p. 7).  It could be argued that ‘ma’ or the liminoid, is this in-between state 
in which habit is both constituted and creative.  
In this moment it could be said that action and awareness merge; 
awareness of an individual’s habitual movement and actions coming forth 
from that awareness is combined. Drawing on Csikszentmihalyi’s theory of 
flow, it is this characteristic which results in a moment of clarity; where the 
self emerges stronger and the individual experiences this authentic way of 
being in which they have the, “authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole.” 
(Heidegger, 1927, p. 277). This experience is also alluded to in both butoh 
and in yogic practices. In butoh it relates to this experience of ‘no-mind’ 
summarised by Eastern philosopher Yasuo Yuasa: 
[No-mind] is a state of body-mind oneness where the movement 
of mind and body become indistinguishable. It is a state of self-
forgetfulness, in which consciousness of oneself as the subject 
of bodily movement disappears and becomes the movement 
itself that is dancing. 
(1993, p. 27) 
The idea of ‘no-mind’ suggests a loss of self-consciousness and merging 
of action and awareness, similar to that of Samadhi in yogic meditation. 
Samadhi is considered the highest level of consciousness. “In Samadhi a 
person transcends dualism, is fully present moment by moment, and 
enjoys life to the utmost.” (Sayama, 1986, p. vii). 
Samadhi is the eighth level of yoga meditative practice. The first two steps, 
yama and niyama address a kind of ethical preparation, yama requires 
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restraint from acts of harm, while miyama involves obedience and 
surrender of the ego. The next two stages involve physical preparation; 
asanas are various ways of ‘sitting’ or holding postures, held for long 
periods without succumbing to strain or fatigue, while pranayama 
addresses breath control. The fifth stage, pratyahara involves a withdrawal 
of attention from the outside world, and the final three stages are all 
stages of mental control. Dhrana is the ability to concentrate for long 
periods in a single stimulus, dhyana is intense meditation in which the 
individual experiences uninterrupted concentration and as discussed, 
Samadhi is the final state and most enjoyable (Pegrum, 2001). 
The links to flow are numerous; the eight steps could be considered skills 
to be acquired. All address a sense of control and concentration and all 
require clear goals and feedback. Action and awareness merging can be 
experienced in the practice of asanas as well as pratyahara and a loss of 
self-consciousness is experienced in the final stage, as well as being 
fundamentally autotelic. A transformation of time is also experienced in 
many of the stages where an individual is able to concentrate for long 
periods yet experience only minutes. 
The yoga practices can also be linked to Laban and Lamb’s theories of 
movement practice and observation. For example, while asanas are 
characterised by a held position, they are experienced as dynamic and not 
static in which small imperceptible adjustments of posture are performed 
and there is a feeling of continuous energy moving in all directions. It also 
works to free the body from negative holding patterns to enable positive 
patterns of habit. Within yoga there is also the possibility of exploring all 
ranges of effort and shape as it facilitates individual movement patterns. 
It is also possible to relate Laban and Lamb’s work to butoh and their 
notions of imagery in improvisation. As mentioned earlier butoh was 
inspired by Western practices, in particular it was inspired by the German 
expressionist movement. In the expressionist work of Wigman, Laban and 
Jooss, the aesthetic depends upon presenting an outer expression of an 
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inner emotion. Expressionism has a tendency to distort reality for 
emotional effect. It is believed both Ohno and Hijikata studied in German 
expressive dance before developing butoh, which also addresses 
expression through the grotesque and absurd. 
Butoh further links to Movement Pattern Analysis with regard to this 
interest in opposites. Hijikata and Ohno are characterised as polar 
opposites (Fraleigh and Nakamura, 2006, p. 31), with Hijikata’s interest in 
the negative, death and ugly beauty, and Ohno interested in the spiritual 
and organic. Butoh addresses the whole spectrum of experience in the 
same way that Laban’s analysis allows for a full spectrum of movement. 
Despite their similarities their approach remains quite different: 
Butoh dancers also explore these metaphysical elements, but 
they find the psychological shape of these in a way that Laban’s 
work does not. The way toward metaphysics in butoh is 
imagistic, often meditative, and sometimes wild. 
(Fraleigh, 2010, p. 51) 
 
5.5 Workshop phase 
Within the practical component of the work, it is therefore important to 
develop tasks which will facilitate flow for the dancers. In the workshop 
phase of this process the tasks were defined and refined with two different 
dancers to those used in the data collection phase. With these two 
dancers, numerous tasks and techniques were used in engaging the 
dancers. In the first workshop several tasks were used over varying time 
periods. For example some tasks were open ended allowing the dancers 
to explore the tasks in their own time, while some where limited to only 
three or five minute improvisations. 
It became clear, however, that the more time structured improvisations 
were better in facilitating flow, as often the dancers had explored all 
movement possibilities but were not sure if it was appropriate to stop 
dancing. It also became clear that the dancers had a preference for 
particular tasks however, these were often not the same tasks and, while 
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they commented that they were able to improvise longer on these tasks it 
would mean while one dancer was finished the other was still exploring. It 
therefore became apparent that some time was needed to allow the 
dancers to explore any particular task for a longer period of time. The final 
workshop therefore gave each dancer a selection of various tasks to 
improvise within a three minute time limit and then a final task encouraged 
the dancers to choose one of those tasks, which they found most 
intrinsically motivating, to explore for an unlimited amount of time (though 
this was usually under ten minutes). 
The tasks used varied in terms of focus. For example, some used imagery, 
drawing on butoh, while others addressed more conceptual, spatial or 
sensational tasks (see Appendix A: Movement Tasks). Task three is an 
image task from Eric Franklin, which is also often used in butoh, in which 
the dancer is asked to imagine themselves as a puff of smoke dissipating 
into space. Task four, on the other hand, from Blom and Chaplin’s The 
moment of movement (2000), asks dancers to explore the three planes in 
space. Task six, however, simply asks the dancer to explore the different 
kinds of touch. 
As a warm-up, a yoga style exercise was composed based on the Surya 
Namaskara A and B sequences (sun salutations) from Ashtanga yoga 
practice. Ashtanga yoga is quite a dynamic practice which is good for a 
warm-up, enabling increased circulation. Ashtanga yoga builds heat 
internally enabling an individual to soften tight muscles and increase 
flexibility. It is also a good way of focussing the mind in preparation for the 
improvisation. Through encouraging postural alignment, yoga is also 
useful in breaking negative holding patterns. 
Drawing on Csikszentmihalyi’s conditions for flow in dance, it could be 
argued that improvisation practices, which draw on imagery satisfy the first 
condition for creativity, while practices such as yoga satisfy the second 
condition that of friendship and relaxation. The third condition; problem 
solving is addressed within both practices through the forming and 
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breaking of habit which enables action. It is through the challenge of 
identifying when habit becomes negative, and the resulting action taken, 
that new habit patterns emerge. Neither activities insist on a particular 
style of movement, enabling an individual to develop a sense of their own 
body and preferred movement patterns. 
Consequently, a workshop was devised for the study which draws on yoga 
practices as a warm-up, to stimulate both mind and body and centre the 
dancer as well as improvisatory tasks, utilising numerous different 
techniques for creation, including that of imagery in practices such as 
butoh. While the two workshop phase dancers both drew on image tasks 
for their final free task, all tasks, including the conceptual, perceptual and 
spatial tasks, remained, in order to enable variety and discussion during 
the data collection phase. While this chapter provides the rationale for the 
practical components, Chapter Ten provides the outcomes of the 
workshops, and the practical results of each stage in terms of clarifying 
structure and process. Part Three, however, provides a method for the 
practice. 
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Chapter Six: Identifying Flow 
This chapter explores Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intersubjectivity in order to 
reach an understanding of the role of the body in empathic relations. The 
chapter lays the groundwork for the method of identifying flow in the body 
of the other, and further, within the digital body of the other. The research 
draws on neurobiological studies in mirror-neuron activation to support the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, and makes reference to recent 
research in dance concerning audience engagement with, and 
kinaesthetic response to the dancing body. 
6.1 Intersubjectivity 
In Part Two of Phenomenology of perception (1945), titled ‘The world as 
perceived’, Merleau-Ponty’s opening chapter title explains ‘The theory of 
the body is already a theory of perception’ (p. 235). Merleau-Ponty’s aim is 
to show that consciousness and the world are mutually dependent. He 
writes, “[t]he world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject 
which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable 
from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects.” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 499-500). There must therefore be both a subject 
and world, which interact through perception. However, there is a further 
dimension to an individual’s existence in the world; each individual inhabits 
a world that is shared with other people. Merleau-Ponty developed his 
thinking on intersubjectivity at the end of Part Two in ‘Other selves and the 
human world’; however it was not explicitly formulated until his final 
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writings, particularly in the unfinished work, The visible and the invisible 
published after his death in 1964. 
In Phenomenology of perception, Merleau-Ponty deals with this 
awareness an individual has of others as subjects: 
Whether it be a question of vestiges or the body of another 
person, we need to know how an object in space can become 
the eloquent relic of an existence; how, conversely, an 
intention, a thought or a project can detach themselves from the 
personal subject and become visible outside him in the shape 
of his body, and in the environment which he builds for himself. 
(Ibid, p. 406) 
Merleau-Ponty begins his discussion by considering the experience of 
others to be symmetrical; an individual’s experience of their self and their 
awareness of others must in some sense, be the same. Their awareness 
of another’s bodily self, for example, is much the same as their experience 
of their own body. The individual is also aware that they are agents and 
that therefore the world is shared. 
However, an individual does not simply watch others, they communicate 
with them; Merleau-Ponty goes on to discuss that intersubjectivity also 
involves an individual experiencing their self as something that others can 
experience in the same way that they experience them. He states that, as 
collaborators, “my thought and his are inter-woven into a single fabric... 
they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the 
creator.” (Ibid, p. 413). He goes on to discuss the “consummate 
reciprocity” (Ibid, p. 413) an individual experiences when both participants 
are actively engaged in the event of consciousness. 
In The visible and the invisible, Merleau-Ponty develops the notion of the 
reciprocal into the reversibility of the flesh. Here he extends his thesis to 
apply to an individual’s sense that others, like them, are both subjects and 
objects. “The handshake too is reversible; I can feel myself touched as 
well and at the same time as touching...” (Ibid, p. 142). This example of the 
handshake addresses an embodied intersubjectivity which enables an 
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understanding of the other and the self through the reciprocity of an 
individual’s experience of the world. 
Lecturer in Moral Education, Matthew Victor Schertz, in his article 
‘Empathy and intersubjectivity: resolving Hume and Smith’s divide’ (2007), 
applies Merleau-Ponty’s theory of intersubjectivity to the concept of 
empathy. He argues this application “has the potential to resolve the 
difficulties that have plagued the concept since its inception.” (Schertz, 
2007, p. 166). He provides an analysis of David Hume and Adam Smith’s 
theories on empathy, questioning: 
Are we beings that are structurally positioned to communicate, 
understand and share emotional states within an intersubjective 
system, or are we inherently separated subjectivities who can 
only imagine or project emotional experiences which are 
separately located in other subjectivities? 
(Schertz, 2007, p. 165) 
These two lines of thought highlight the debate surrounding empathy as 
either an affective or cognitive act and are propounded by “disparate 
philosophical movements” (Schertz, 2007, p. 165). In the next sub-section 
this debate is addressed drawing first on the conception of kinaesthetic 
empathy within dance studies in order to highlight a further dichotomy 
between emotional and bodily acts, and then drawing on the discussions 
of empathy from scholars within the field of philosophy of mind.  
6.2 Kinaesthetic empathy 
Within dance, a recent interest in empathy research has been applied in 
understanding the process of watching dance. Kinaesthetic empathy is a 
term which has quite recently been re-investigated by dance scholars 
(Foster, 2011; Reason and Reynolds, 2010; Reynolds and Reason, 2012; 
Ehrenberg, 2010), and has resulted in the research project Watching 
dance: kinaesthetic empathy undertaken by Dee Reynolds, Matthew 
Reason, Marie-Hélène Grosbras, Frank E. Pollack, Anna Kuppuswamy, 
Corinne Jola, Karen Wood, Aubrey Scully and Shantel Ehrenberg. Their 
research addresses kinaesthetic empathy as a way of understanding and 
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enjoying dance and utilises mirror neuron theory to support their 
hypotheses. (Jola, Ehrenberg and Reynolds, 2012; Jola et al., 2012). 
In relation to the experience of watching dance, an initial analysis begins 
by addressing the terms kinaesthesia and empathy, detailed below; both 
were invented in the same decade, in the 1880s. The combined 
terminology of the kinaesthetic empathy was developed through the 
discussions of twentieth century dance critic John Martin (1893-1985) who 
used a range of terms to describe this experience. However, some would 
argue, indicate other kinds of response, and his views “can be perceived 
as overly prescriptive and based on universalist assumptions.” (Reason 
and Reynolds, 2010, p. 54). 
For Martin, empathy was often interchangeably linked with sympathy: 
When we see a human body moving, we see movement which 
is potentially produced by any human body and therefore by our 
own… through kinesthetic sympathy we actually reproduce it 
vicariously in our present muscular experience and awaken 
such associational connotations as might have been ours if the 
original movement had been of our own making. 
(Martin cited in Reason and Reynolds, 2010, p. 54) 
However, many would argue that “in order to feel sympathy, in order to 
feel compassion with, say, somebody’s suffering, you first need to 
understand that the other is indeed suffering.” (Zahavi and Overgaard, 
2012, p. 6). Not only is empathy different and prior to sympathy, but it is 
therefore possible to empathise with someone without feeling any 
sympathy. It is possible to watch a human body moving without 
sympathising with their experience. 
Another related term is that of motor mimicry or emotional contagion in 
which an individual can ‘catch’ the emotion in question without necessarily 
being aware of the other. For Zahavi and Overgaard, “this is precisely 
what makes emotional contagion different from empathy. In empathy the 
experience you empathically understand remains that of the other. The 
focus is on the other, and the distance between self and other is preserved 
and upheld.” (Zahavi and Overgaard, 2012, p. 6). Emotional contagion 
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might explain why a certain experience occurs in an individual, but it does 
not explain how that individual comes to understand the other. 
In empathy therefore, the focus is on the other and announces the 
presence of the others’ experience without providing first-personal access 
to it: 
[E]mpathy, rather than being some mysterious form of 
telepathy, simply amounts to an experience of the embodied 
mind of the other, that is, simply refers to our ability to access 
the life of the mind of others in their bodily and behavioural 
expressions; it is an ability that can improve with familiarity, 
learning, and salience. 
(Ibid, p. 10) 
It is important to note, therefore, that empathy fundamentally involves the 
observance of physical bodily action. This is an important note which 
Foster addresses in her book Choreographing empathy: kinesthesia in 
performance (2011) where she writes: “[t]he fact that the experience of 
empathy needs to be qualified with the adjective “kinesthetic” belies the 
pervasive assumption that emotional and physical experiences are 
separate.” (Foster, 2011, p. 10). Foster notes that the term empathy has 
changed significantly over the course of the twentieth century, “residing 
within the domain of psychology where it has been investigated largely as 
an emotional, and not physical experience.” (Ibid, p. 10). 
Kinaesthesia, like the term empathy, has also changed over time. At the 
start of the twentieth century it was closely aligned with that of 
proprioception. Proprioception is often defined as an individual’s pre-
reflective awareness of their limb positioning, from an internal perspective. 
Whereas kinaesthesia is often considered to be the pre-reflective 
awareness an individual has of their limbs in relation to external stimuli, for 
example how an individual is able to direct their hand toward a glass 
without the need to spacially locate their limb prior to the action. However, 
inner and outer functions are not always clear cut, though both are 
supported by an individual’s body schema, as discussed in Chapter Two. 
Louise Douse Chapter Six: Identifying Flow  
115 
 
By the mid twentieth century, it was further posited that kinaesthesia 
“assisted in integrating sensory information from all other systems” and 
“[m]ore recently it has been taken up in the work of neurobiologists 
exploring how the brain senses bodily movement.” (Ibid, p. 7). This 
neurological view has been investigated by cognitive scientists as well as 
academics in the field of philosophy of mind, which addresses multiple 
disciplines such as phenomenology, psychology, cognitive science, 
artificial intelligence and neurobiology. 
6.3 Neurobiology 
Helena De Preester, lecturer in philosophy of mind, addresses the 
neurobiological concern of empathy in relation to phenomenology. 
Numerous neurobiologists are concerned with embodied cognition and 
developing understandings of how an individual empathises with another. 
Gallese (2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2011) is a key theorist, who 
developed an understanding of mirror neurons in the macaque monkey, 
discussed below. However, there are many disagreements as to how 
these mirror neurons contribute to a theory of empathy (Anderson, 2003; 
Frassinetti et al., 2011; Freedberg and Gallese, 2007; Gallese, Eagle and 
Migone, 2007; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011; Ignatow, 2007; Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1999; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2005; Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch, 1993; Zahavi and Overgaard, 2012). 
The key argument when understanding the debate surrounding empathy 
revolves around the interpretation of mirror neurons. Mirror neurons were 
discovered in the macaque monkey in the premotor cortex of the brain. 
The neurons fire when the monkey observes the actions of another, and it 
was found that the same neurons fire in the other, performing the actions 
(Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). Evidence, however, is lacking 
in human studies, though it is implicated by EEG, MEG and brain imaging 
studies (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). 
[A]n action is recognized when the observed action activates, in 
the observer’s brain, an analogous motor representation. The 
observer does not execute that action, because control 
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mechanisms prevent its overt occurrence, but the evoked motor 
representation (“motor knowledge”) allows him to understand 
the meaning of what he saw. 
(Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2005, p. 108) 
The firing of the same neurons in the observer implies these mirror 
neurons are required in understanding the actions of the other. The 
actions observed have been what are considered ‘cold actions.’ Cold 
actions are those without obvious emotional content, for example, actions 
observed in the monkeys include the grasping motion of a tool. What is 
important to note is that the “mirror neurons do not respond to object 
presentation. Similarly, they do not respond to the sight of an agent 
mimicking actions or performing non-object-directed gestures” (Ibid, p. 
109). This implies that the neurons only fire when actions are task oriented 
and directed towards the world. 
Despite the lack of actions including emotional content, for many the mirror 
mapping mechanism is used as a hypothesis. Within dance research, 
studies suggest similar findings with regards to the activation of mirror 
neurons in watching dance (Jola, Ehrenberg and Reynolds, 2012, Bläsing 
et al., 2012; Cross and Ticini, 2012; Homann, 2010; Jola et al., 2012; 
Mason and Dalman, 2009). Studies suggest that when an observer 
perceives another displaying an emotion, the same motor areas are 
activated. The process of the mirror mapping mechanism implies that 
imitation is an important factor in action understanding and therefore 
“recognition occurs because the observed emotion triggers the feeling of 
the same emotion in the observing person. It is a first-person recognition.” 
(Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2005, p. 117). This would imply that empathy is 
more closely aligned to emotional contagion than first suggested. 
However, many disagree with this view and have attempted to resolve the 
problem of empathy for a mirror neuron perspective, by employing 
phenomenological research (Gallagher, 2005; Gallese, 2005, 2011; Lakoff 
and Johnson, 1999). 
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Most of the studies draw on a Husserlian phenomenology. Husserl 
suggested that in order to understand the ‘other’ an individual must first 
understand their own body as ‘Leib’ or living body. The individual then 
perceives the other body as Leib through what he calls ‘apperceptive 
transfer’ as Helena De Preester notes, 
According to Husserl, the motivation of the apperceptive 
transfer of sense is to be found in a similarity that connects the 
body of the other with my body, and it is due to this similarity 
that the body of the other is perceived as another animate 
organism. 
(De Preester, 2008, p. 135) 
In this instance, the individual must recognise either visual or auditory 
similarity between the body of the other and their own, which Husserl calls 
‘Paaring’ or pairing. For De Preester, Husserl’s logic remains problematic 
in the presupposed identification of the other. De Preester argues that 
Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the other can complement and build on 
Husserl’s, though she argues both are required in understanding the 
structure of the mirror neuron. 
In Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the other, the mediating term 
between self and other is not bodily similarity, but the external world. For 
Merleau-Ponty, the concern is not that of the gesture but that the gesture 
is directed toward a shared object in the world: “The gesture which I 
witness outlines an intentional object. This object is genuinely present and 
fully comprehended when the powers of my body adjust themselves to it 
and overlap it.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 215). This relates to the fact that 
the mirror neurons are only activated in goal specific action. However, goal 
in this sense can include social goals, such as in the greeting of others.  
It is important to elaborate further on Merleau-Ponty’s later work regarding 
the chiasm, to address what De Preester sees as the resolve; “that visual 
and motor systems speak the same language prevents making the 
presupposition Husserl had to make; the need for a preceding 
objectification of one’s own body in order to arrive at the required 
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similarity.” (De Preester, 2008, p. 141). It could be argued that Merleau-
Ponty addresses this through his understanding of reversibility: 
We must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut 
out from the tangible, every tactile being in some manner 
promised to visibility, and that there is encroachment, 
infringement, not only between the touched and the touching, 
but also between the tangible and the visible, which is 
encrusted in it, as, conversely, the tangible itself is not a 
nothingness of visibility, is not without visual existence… every 
vision takes place somewhere in the tactile space. There is 
double and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and of 
the tangible in the visible; the two maps are complete, and yet 
they do not merge into one. The two parts are total parts and 
yet are not superposable. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 134) 
De Preester, however, still sees a minimal version of pairing necessary in 
that a “minimal set of requirements concerning the body of the other is 
necessary in order to recognize that the other has a similar body.” (De 
Preester, 2008, p. 142). This however, creates problems with regard to an 
individual’s ability to empathise with digital ‘others.’ 
6.4 The digital ‘other’ 
Research has been conducted regarding the observation of biological 
movement from point-light display animation (Johansson, 1973; Hodgins, 
O’Brien and Tumblin, 1998; Troje, 2013; Wild et al., 2009) and how this 
can be considered empathetic (Gowan et al., 2010; Gowan, Stanley, and 
Miall, 2008; Kilner, Paulignan and Blakemore, 2003; Kilner, Hamilton and 
Blakemore, 2007; Marin, Issartel and Chaminade, 2009; Press, 2011; 
Press, Gillmeister and Heyes; 2006; Press, Heyes and Kilner, 2011; 
Saygin, Cook and Blakemore, 2010; Saygin et al., 2004; Stanley, Gowan 
and Miall, 2007, 2010). 
Johansson’s research within the field of visual perception of biological 
motion (1973), utilises a technique called point-light display in which light 
emitting or reflective dots are attached to the joints of the body in a 
darkened room so that “a very good recording of the motion tracks of the 
different joints [is given] without revealing any traces of the background or 
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the body contours.” (Johansson, 1973, p. 202). More sophisticated 
techniques have been developed since this research utilising motion 
capture data. However, the results remain the same; point-light animation 
“evoke a compelling impression of human walking, running, dancing, etc.” 
(Ibid, p. 201). 
Further to the apparent action understanding of perceived ‘cold actions’ in 
biological motion, it has also been suggested that individuals “can judge 
the emotional implications of an action when viewing [point-light] 
animations of the whole body.” (Blake and Shiffrar, 2007, p. 51). They 
suggest that this ability to understand human affective motion is, however, 
only possible in fluid motion: 
With all of these techniques, [mocap included], static frames of 
the resulting animation typically appear as meaningless 
assemblages of dots, with little hint of an underlying 
configuration. But when successive [point-light] frames are 
shown in rapid succession, naïve observers experience 
compelling apparent motion depicting a human form engaged in 
a specific activity. 
(Ibid, p. 49) 
This suggests that human affective motion shares the same conditions as 
for mirror neuron activation; that it is motional and task oriented. 
Point-light animation was explored by Saygin et al. (2004) in order to 
identify whether the frontal cortex was activated in observation of point-
light animated biological motion. Results showed that “frontal cortex 
showed a robust response to point-light biological motion.” (Saygin et al., 
2004, p. 6186). Further, it was noted that “in the macaque, mirror neurons 
in premotor cortex respond only to real actions performed in front of the 
monkey and not even to videotaped actions (Ferrari et al., 2003), whereas 
human premotor cortex responds even to point-light biological motion 
representing actions.” (Ibid, p. 6187). Thus the human mirror neuron 
system may be more capable of understanding abstract incorporeal 
representations of actions.  
Louise Douse Chapter Six: Identifying Flow  
120 
 
The question remains as to the role of the body in empathy. De Preester’s 
need for recognising the body of the other as being similar to the body of 
the observer does not stand up when observing and empathising with a 
digital other. In another neurobiological study by Stanley et al. (2007), the 
effects of instructing participants that point-light stimuli were either human 
or computer generated on the motor neuron system were studied. It was 
found that belief did indeed effect the activation of the mirror neuron 
system; they suggest that “[i]nterference effects due to dot observation 
were present for both biological and non-biological velocity profiles when 
the participants were informed that they were observing pre-recorded 
human movement and were absent when the dot notion was described as 
computer generated.” (Stanley et al., 2007, p. 915) It could therefore be 
argued that empathy requires the belief that the motion of the 
representation belongs to the body of the other, but does not require 
identification with the physical body of the other. 
This therefore resolves the problem identified by De Preester in her 
example from Rizolatti et al. in which “(...) actions made using tools, even 
when very similar to those using hand, do not activate or activate very 
weakly the neurons.” (Rizzolatti et al. cited in De Preester, 2008, p. 140). 
This, subsequently, resolves the need for the use of Husserl’s pairing in 
understanding empathy. Merleau-Ponty further supports this in his 
conceptualisation of the reversibility of the other: 
What is open to us, therefore, with the reversibility of the visible 
and the tangible, is – if not yet the incorporeal – at least an 
intercorporeal being, a presumptive domain of the visible and 
the tangible, which extends further than the things I touch and 
see at present. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 142-143) 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of intersubjectivity relies on the individual’s 
directness toward a shared world, in which an understanding of the other 
arises from a reflexive reversibility and a shared narrative of the world. 
Empathy is thus possible, not only through embodied interaction with the 
other, but also in the experience of the other within the embodied objects 
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of world. This conceptualisation of the other informs the methodology for 
the research in enabling an understanding of the other through the 
artefacts of experience. In the next chapter a method for engaging with the 
other through verbal dialogic practice is presented, in order to identify a 
shared understanding of the experience of flow. 
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Chapter Seven: Dialogic Flow 
This chapter addresses the dialogic processes involved in ‘capturing flow.’ 
It begins by discussing a hermeneutic phenomenology as a method for 
accessing the flow experiences and in particular draws on the work of Dr 
Linda Finlay, and her method of ‘reflexive embodied empathy’ in 
understanding the role of the researcher in the interpretation of meaning. 
The chapter also examines the role of reflection in the ‘moment of flow’ 
and then offers an analysis of the stream-of-consciousness writing and 
semi-structured interviews conducted during the research in order to 
validate and substantiate the data collected during these dialogic 
practices. 
7.1 Hermeneutics 
In her article, ‘Hermeneutic phenomenology and phenomenology: a 
comparison of historical and methodological considerations’ Susan Laverty 
(2003) draws out the similarities and differences between phenomenology 
and hermeneutic phenomenology in terms of their historical and 
methodological perspectives. The early phenomenology of Husserl is a 
descriptive one which focuses on the structure of experience. It seeks to 
elucidate the essences of these structures as they appear in 
consciousness. Hermeneutic phenomenology on the other hand is 
interpretive and concentrated on historical meanings of experience and 
their motivating prejudices. The interpretive process relies on an 
interaction between the reader and the historical text: 
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[A] hermeneutical approach asks the researcher to engage in a 
process of self-reflection to quite a different end than that of 
phenomenology. Specifically, the biases and assumptions of 
the research are not bracketed or set aside, but rather 
embedded and essential to interpretive process. 
(Laverty, 2003, p. 28) 
Hermeneutic phenomenology is typically associated with the writings of 
Heidegger, and is concerned with language as a means of interpreting 
experience. One of the main differences between hermeneutic 
phenomenology and phenomenology exists in relation to reflection. While 
both emphasise a process of self-reflection, the aim of phenomenology is 
to bracket any bias, however, the biases encountered in hermeneutic 
phenomenology are essential to interpretation. 
Hermeneutic phenomenology references the interpretative nature of 
Being. Heidegger described his phenomenology of Dasein as hermeneutic 
“in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this 
business of interpreting.” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 62). He aimed to 
demonstrate how the whole manner of human existence is interpretative. 
In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a ‘signification’ 
over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not 
stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is 
encountered as such, the thing in question already has an 
involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the 
world, and this involvement is one in which gets laid out by the 
interpretation. 
(Ibid, p. 190-191) 
Heidegger begins by looking at the structure of the question, which he felt 
in its performative nature was a form of disclosing much like asserting. In 
order to ask a question the individual must have some kind of pre-
understanding of what they are asking about, “[e]very seeking gets guided 
beforehand by what is sought,” (Ibid, p. 24). Thus the kind of answer the 
individual gets depends on their way of posing the question. 
Heidegger believed the nature of the question is circular in that the 
individual discloses the answer in light of what they already know, however 
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this circle is not necessarily ‘vicious’, rather, it allows the individual to 
formulate new questions in order to arrive at an understanding. 
What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it 
in the right way. This circle of understanding is not an orbit in 
which any random kind of knowledge may move; it is the 
expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself. It is 
not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even a circle 
which is merely tolerated. In the circle is a hidden positive 
possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, 
we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our 
interpretation, we have understood that our first, last, and 
constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and 
fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular 
conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by 
working out these fore-structures in terms of the things 
themselves. 
(Ibid, p. 195) 
The nature of Being must therefore be understood in its historicity. The 
circular structure of Dasein is reflected in its ontico-ontological nature. 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, while not explicitly hermeneutical in the 
way that Heidegger’s was, has been termed a ‘hermeneutics of ambiguity’ 
(Busch and Gallagher, 1992) which incorporates his accounts of the 
human body, language, and temporality. Thomas Busch and Shaun 
Gallagher, discuss Merleau-Ponty in relation to hermeneutic 
phenomenology in their book Merleau-Ponty, hermeneutics and 
postmodernism (1992). They argue that while Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy 
was not explicitly hermeneutic, his theory of perception was rooted in 
interpretation. They suggest that for Merleau-Ponty the body is “both an 
interpretational constraint and an enabling condition.” (Busch and 
Gallagher, 1992, p. 4). Merleau-Ponty believed interpretation is not in the 
mind; “it is not first of all a meaning for the understanding, but a structure 
accessible to inspection by the body” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 373). 
Merleau-Ponty identified the embodied subject as the seat of 
interpretation. He developed this notion in terms of intersubjectivity, where 
the other must make the individual “surprised, disoriented” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1973, p. 142) in order to allow them to formulate new questions. 
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Numerous texts address Merleau-Ponty’s intersubjectivity in relation to 
social research, including Rupert Wegerif in his article ‘Dialogic or 
dialectic? The significance of ontological assumptions in research on 
educational dialogue’ (2008) in which he addresses the notion of 
dialogicality in relation to Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975), literary theorist and 
semiotician. He compares Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm to Bakhtin’s view: 
Thought about the world and thought in the world. Thought 
striving to embrace the world and thought experiencing itself in 
the world (as part of it). An event in the world and participation 
in it. The world as an event (and not as existence in ready-
made form). 
(Bakhtin cited in Wegerif, 2008, p. 354) 
Here he points to the reversibility of experience, and explains in a later 
article that dialogue can appear as both inside and outside; “[o]ne 
important defining feature of a dialogue is the presence of the other on the 
inside of the formation of my utterances even before I open my mouth to 
speak.” (Wegerif, 2011, p. 180). He goes on to describe the way in which 
the other is already prior to any initial interaction in the way an individual 
uses their vocabulary and considers their possible response. It is therefore 
important to acknowledge the researcher’s direct and intimate role through 
the process of collecting the data and interpreting the findings. 
Linda Finlay, a psychotherapist based in the UK, addresses a qualitative 
research method for addressing lived experience. Her numerous articles 
(2005; 2006; 2009a; 2009b) address a phenomenological approach to 
lived experience, in which she attempts to articulate a practical 
methodology based on hermeneutic phenomenological descriptive 
practices. She suggests a particular way of engaging with others called 
‘reflexive embodied empathy’, which addresses the intimate role of the 
researcher in engaging with, and understanding the participant. ‘Reflective 
embodied empathy’ addresses the researchers “need to learn to read and 
interrogate their body’s response to, and relationship with, the body of the 
research participant (the Other).” (Finlay, 2005, p. 272). 
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Finlay’s research draws on an area of research called Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) which explores the way in which 
individuals make sense of their personal and social lived experience. 
(Brocki and Wearden, 2006; Smith, 1996; Smith, Jarman and Osborn, 
1999; Smith and Osborn, 2003; Smith, 1994). It is used mainly in clinical 
psychology studies. However as Smith and Osborne note, 
IPA strongly diverges from mainstream psychology when it 
comes to deciding the appropriate methodology for such 
questions. While mainstream psychology is still strongly 
committed to quantitative and experimental methodology, IPA 
employs in-depth qualitative analysis. Thus, IPA and 
mainstream psychology converge in being interested in 
examining how people think about what is happening to them 
but diverge in deciding how this thinking can best be studied. 
(2003, p. 54) 
This divergence in thinking reflects IPA’s “commitment to the person as a 
cognitive, linguistic, affective and physical being” (Ibid, p. 54). The use of 
language, both physical and linguistic, as a tool for expressing an 
individual’s thought is drawn upon, as well as the use of interpretation in 
understanding the other. 
IPA is usually conducted through interview, and addresses an embodied 
approach to understanding the interviewee (Burns, 2003; Powney and 
Watts, 1987). This body is thus engaged by the researcher as a way of 
understanding “‘physical’ exchanges that occur in a reciprocal manner 
between the researcher and the participant,” (Burns, 2003, p. 230). This 
manner of interview therefore neglects neither the verbal or physical 
exchanges between researcher and participant. In these interviews, 
reflection is employed by the researcher, in order to acknowledge and 
critique their own embodied relation to the participant. 
Finlay’s distinct method of ‘reflexive embodied empathy’ “advocate[s] a 
research process that involves engaging, reflexively, with the participant’s 
lived body, the researcher’s own body, and the researcher’s embodied 
intersubjective relationship with the participant,” (2005, p. 272). As a 
method, it involves a process of hermeneutic reflection which “can be 
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understood as a process of continually reflecting on one’s experience as a 
researcher, alongside the phenomenon being studied, so as to move 
beyond the partiality and investments of one’s previous understandings.” 
(Ibid, p. 279). 
7.2 Reflective practice 
In this section, reflective practice is discussed, addressing the key theorist 
Donald Schön and his work; The reflective practitioner: how professionals 
think in action (1991). This work, was a major contributor to the field of 
professional practice and influenced many further researchers work, such 
as Gillie Bolton’s Reflective practice: writing and professional development 
(2005) which explores “the gaps between the known and the unknown, the 
habitual and the possible.” (Kahn, 2012, p. 20). Reflective practice has 
also become a major area of research in relation to education and 
pedagogical practices (Moon, 1999, 2006; Van Manen, 1991). 
This research compliments further research in the field of practice as 
research, discussed in Chapter One. The key notions drawn on within this 
field include tacit knowledge, and knowledge-in-action as discussed in 
Robin Nelson’s ‘Practice-as-research: knowledge and their place in the 
academy’ (2009). Here, both Nelson and Schön draw on key texts such as 
Gilbert Ryle’s The concept of mind (1949) which addressed the key terms 
‘know-how’ and ‘know-that’, as well as Michael Polanyi’s Personal 
knowledge (1958) and his later work The tacit dimension (1966) which 
addresses tacit knowing. 
Recent research in dance discusses the role of reflection in dance 
education. Leijen et al. in their article ‘Challenges to face: difficulties dance 
students encounter with reflection and how to overcome these’ (2007) 
evaluate techniques for dance students for engaging in reflective practice. 
Other research, such as Doughty et al. (2008) and Leijen et al. (2009) 
explore the role of technology in enhancing reflective practice in dance. 
They both discuss particular technologies, such as use of video within 
practice, for recording and playback as a means of self-observation; to 
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instigate reflection on their practice and, in Doughty et al., in habitual 
movement recognition. 
Donald Schön (1930-1997) graduated from Yale in 1951 as a philosophy 
student, he continued his Masters and Doctoral research in philosophy at 
Harvard. After completing his studies, he taught at several universities in 
America, however, he also worked for the industrial research firm Arthur D. 
Little, Inc. where he formed the New Product Group in the Research and 
Development Division. His first seminal work was Displacement of 
concepts (1963) which dealt with “the ways in which categories are used 
to examine “things” but are not themselves examined as ways of thinking.” 
(Parlett cited in Pakman, 2000, p. 5). However, it was not until 1983 with 
his work The reflective practitioner that his work became deeply influential 
with regards to the development and process of reflective practitioners. 
In The reflective practitioner, Schön sought to offer an approach to 
reflective practice that was based on the work of a number of practitioners. 
He began by articulating the notion of ‘knowledge-in-action;’ “in much of 
the spontaneous behaviour of skilful practice we reveal a kind of knowing 
which does not stem from a prior intellectual operation.” (Schön, 1983, p. 
51). Here he draws on Gilbert Ryle’s articulation of ‘know-how’ and ‘know-
that’ and Michael Polanyi’s research in ‘tacit knowing’, discussed earlier in 
Chapter One. He goes on to define the following properties of knowing-in-
action: 
 There are actions, recognitions, and judgements which we 
know how to carry out spontaneously; we do not have to 
think about them prior to or during their performance. 
 We are often unaware of having learned to do these things; 
we simply find ourselves doing them. 
 In some cases, we were once aware of the understandings 
which were subsequently internalized in our feelings for the 
stuff of actions. In other cases, we may never have been 
aware of them. In both cases, however, we are usually 
unable to describe the knowing which our action reveals. 
(Schön, 1983, p. 54) 
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In terms of the phenomenologist’s discussion of ‘embodied knowledge,’ 
knowledge in the body is pre-reflective (Sheets-Johnstone, 1979; Fraleigh, 
1987). This pre-reflective knowledge is what informs the habit body. The 
pre-reflective aspect of knowledge-in-action means there is no prior 
intention towards the action; thinking and action are therefore temporally 
inseparable and this can be seen in relation to action and awareness 
merging in flow, as discussed in Chapter Three. Schön’s ‘knowing-in-
action’ is bodily, tacit and pre-reflective. Both Schön and Csikszentmihalyi, 
draw on the example of a ball game in describing the players’ focus on the 
game and lack of explicit thought in their skilful action: 
[A] big pitcher’s know how is in his way of pitching to a batter’s 
weakness, changing his pace, or distributing his energies over 
the course of a game. There is nothing in common sense to 
make us say that know-how consists in rules or plans which we 
entertain in the mind prior to action. Although we sometimes 
think before acting, it is also true in much of the spontaneous 
behavior of skilful practice we reveal a kind of knowing which 
does not stem from a prior intellectual operation. 
(Schön, 1983, p. 51) 
This is similarly reiterated in Csikszentmihalyi’s research on flow: 
A person in flow has no dualistic perspective: he is aware of his 
actions but not of the awareness itself. A tennis player pays 
undivided attention to the ball and the opponent…yet for flow to 
be maintained, one cannot reflect on the act of awareness itself. 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, p. 38) 
Schön, however, then argues that an individual can think about what they 
are doing in the moment of action, which he terms ‘reflection-in-action: 
When good jazz musicians improvise together, they also 
manifest a “feel for” their material and they make on-the-spot 
adjustments to the sounds they hear. Listening to one another 
and to themselves, they feel where the music is going and 
adjust their playing accordingly. They can do this, first of all, 
because their collective effort at musical invention makes use of 
a schema – a metric, melodic, and harmonic schema familiar to 
all the participants – which gives a predictable order to the 
piece. In addition, each of the musicians has at the ready a 
repertoire of musical figures within the schema which bounds 
and gives coherence to the performance. As the musicians feel 
the direction of the music that is developing out of their 
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interwoven contributions, they make new sense of it and adjust 
their performance to the new sense they have made. They are 
reflecting-in-action on the music they are collectively making 
and on their individual contributions to it, thinking what they are 
doing and, in the process, evolving their way of doing it. Of 
course, we need not suppose that they reflect-in-action in the 
medium of words. More likely, they reflect through a “feel for the 
music” 
(Schön, 1983, pp. 55-56) 
In the above example, Schön demonstrates how reflection-in-action is the 
result of surprise. He goes on to suggest that the structure of reflection-in-
action hinges on these moments of surprise, either pleasing or unwanted, 
and focuses on “the outcomes of action, the action itself, and the intuitive 
knowing implicit in the action.” (Ibid, p. 56). Reflection-in-action, for Schön, 
is something an individual acquires as in his example of the architect tutor, 
Quist, and his student, Petra. In this example he explains that it is Petra’s 
inability to reflect-in-action that prevents her attempts to solve the 
architectural problems she faces. 
Whilst Csikszentmihalyi argues that an individual cannot reflect on their 
actions in the moment of flow, he does still see reflection as a part of the 
flow experience: “[t]ypically, a person can maintain a merged awareness 
with his or her actions for only short periods, which are broken by 
interludes when he adopts an outside perspective” (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1975, p.38). This could therefore be linked to the characteristic of 
challenge/skill balance in flow as “[t]he addition of spurious motivational 
elements to a flow activity (competition, gain, danger) makes it also more 
vulnerable to intrusions from “outside reality.”” (Ibid, p. 42). Challenges 
within the task, therefore, are not just inevitable but essential to flow. 
However, there needs to be a delicate balance between challenge and 
skill in the task. In this respect the characteristic of surprise in reflection-in-
action can be linked to flow: 
Much reflection-in-action hinges on the experience of surprise. 
When intuitive, spontaneous performance yields nothing more 
than the results expected for it, then we tend not to think about 
it. But when intuitive performance leads to surprises, pleasing 
and promising or unwanted, we may respond by reflecting-in-
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action…. In such processes, reflection tends to focus 
interactively on the outcomes of action, the action itself, and the 
intuitive knowing implicit in the action. 
(Schön, 1983, p. 56) 
 Reflection-in-action can enable an individual to reflect on the habits which 
are prohibiting flow or contributing to the challenge and develop new 
habits and practices. 
This relates to the notion of ‘ma’, or liminality, discussed in Chapter Five. It 
can be considered a transitional or ‘in-between’ state moving from the pre-
reflective to the post-reflective, a term utilised by Dr. Josie Gregory a 
psychology graduate from Surrey. In her conference paper ‘Spiritual 
presence’ (2006) she addresses the post-reflective as the state which 
“follows from a groundwork of reflective work.” (p. 6). For Gregory, 
reflection indicates a divided consciousness and a lack of presence. She 
quotes from John Welwood’s essay ‘Reflection and practice: the dialectic 
of awakening’ which addresses transformational change in a person: “This 
is not saying that we should go back to prereflective identification, but that 
we go beyond reflection to become at-one-with our experience, through 
overcoming all struggles with it” (Welwood cited in Gregory, 2006, p. 6). 
This reflects the agency of the individual in which habit is both a 
constituent of, and constituted by, action. 
Another term Schön developed was reflection-on-action, this is a 
somewhat familiar concept in writing about reflection, in which, the 
individual reflects on their actions after the event. 
Practitioners do reflect on their knowing-in-practice. Sometimes, 
in the relative tranquillity of a post-mortem, they think back on a 
project they have undertaken, a situation they have lived 
through, and they explore the understandings they have 
brought to their handling of the case. They may do this in a 
mood of idle speculation, or in a deliberate effort to prepare 
themselves for future cases. 
(Schön, 1983, p. 61) 
This mode of reflection requires a stopping of action and indeed can inhibit 
actions; “[s]omeone learning to play tennis of golf or a musical instrument 
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may be asked to change his grip (or his embouchure) with the expectation 
that he will lose spontaneity for a time before recapturing it at a higher 
level of quality.” (Ibid, p. 279). The structure of reflection-in-action and 
reflection-on-action therefore, differs; whilst reflection-on-action adapts an 
attitude toward the past, reflection-in-action, requires a presence of 
attention and a movement between past and future through action. 
There have, however, been several criticisms of Schön’s theory of 
reflection, the first, being the distinct lack of ‘anticipatory reflection’. Max 
Van Manen in his work; The tact of teaching: the meaning of pedagogical 
thoughtfulness (1991) writes: 
Anticipatory reflection enables us to deliberate about possible 
alternatives, decide on courses of action, plan the kinds of thing 
we need to do, and anticipate the experiences we and others 
may have as a result of expected events or of our planned 
actions. Anticipatory reflection helps us to approach situations 
and other people in an organised, decision-making, prepared 
way. 
(Van Manen, 1991, p. 101) 
It could be suggested however, that Schön’s lack of inclusion of 
anticipatory reflection lies in the imaginary nature of this type of activity. 
“Imagination may work with outcomes of reflection-on-action, but would 
not be considered to be part of reflection.” (Moon, 1999, pg. 49). 
Another criticism of Schön’s work is of reflection-in-action itself. Many 
scholars suggest it is not possible to reflect-in-action as Schön suggests. 
They consider that there is not enough time to reflect during action, which 
is implicated also in Schön’s architect case-study, “Quist reflects very little 
on his own reflection-in-action, and it would be easy for a student or 
observer to miss the fundamental structure of inquiry which underlies his 
virtuoso performance.” (Schön, 1983, p. 104). Lecturer in pedagogy, Peter 
Erlandson (2006) criticises Schön for reducing Quist’s virtuoso to some 
form of thinking and subsequently suggests that it is Petra, the student, 
who is more likely to ‘think’ during the sessions, for “[s]he does not have a 
system-recognition of the situation; she is not fully comfortable with the 
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artefacts of the practice and therefore has to take a roundabout way to 
solve problems.” (Erlandson, 2006, p. 121). 
Erlandson criticises Schön’s dualistic approach to the mind/body: “Schön’s 
explanation adds a controlling mind, a control-matrix that, apart from 
generating difficult problems related to the dualistic worldview, is 
unnecessary and therefore to be rejected.” (Ibid, p. 120) It could be 
considered, however, that Erlandson makes the same error he suggests of 
Schön. In the previous paragraph it is Erlandson who makes this Cartesian 
divide in his implication that thought is a solely mindful experience. The 
view this thesis takes is that reflection-in-action is constituted by reflection 
and imagination. Its structure is different to that of reflection-on-action 
where an individual steps outside of the action, and it produces this ‘in-
between’ state, one of unease which motivates an individual to imagine 
new habits directly in the body. 
One problem, however, is how an individual accesses this experience, this 
moment of liminality, and consequently the ‘moments of flow’ which may 
occur as a result. Within the workshop phase of the research, in 
exchanges with the dancers, it was considered that the moments they 
remembered were those which challenged them. The ‘moments of flow’ 
themselves were somewhat absent from conscious thought, however, they 
argued that it was not the case that they were not thinking in these 
moments, but rather, that they were experiencing action and awareness 
merging, and a loss of self-consciousness, which, as described earlier, in 
Eastern philosophy is referred to as ‘no-mind’. 
7.3 Stream-of-consciousness writing 
A common technique used in accessing lived experience in the moment of 
dance, is through ‘stream-of-consciousness writing’. Commonly, journals 
and notebooks are utilised throughout the choreographic process, in order 
to track thoughts, feelings and sensations. In Jennifer Moon’s work, 
Learning journals: a handbook for reflective practice and professional 
development (2006), Moon discusses the various types of activity an 
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individual can engage in during reflective practice. It is an authoritative 
guide for practitioners and students in learning how to engage reflectively 
in their practice. Moon provides step-by-step advice on integrating journal 
writing in professional development. 
In some studies of dance improvisation, such as Kent de Spain’s research 
(cited in Cooper Albright and Gere, 2003) a particular method is used, 
called the experience sampling method. This method was developed by 
Csikszentmihalyi in his flow studies and consists of using some form of 
alarm (pager, stopwatch, etc.) at random times during the day/experiment 
in order to get the participants to record information about their state of 
mind. In Csikszentmihalyi’s research, this was done throughout the day to 
record general experiences of flow in everyday activity. His respondents 
were required to complete an experience sampling form, a questionnaire 
which includes open questions contextualising their experience and Likert 
scales measuring the respondent’s perceived situation. 
The use of the Likert scale for analysing flow was developed further by 
sports and exercise psychologists. Jackson and March (1996) developed 
what they called the ‘flow state scale,’ a questionnaire to be completed by 
participants at the end of an event. It utilises a five-point Likert scale (1= 
strongly disagree, to 5= strongly agree), and asks thirty-six questions 
developed from Csikszentmihalyi’s characteristics of flow. The data is then 
quantified to reveal correlations among experiences of flow, in relation to 
the characteristics of flow. These scales provide a role in the collection of 
standardized and measurable data. With such a scale, comparative and 
accumulative research is possible; however, the scales also presuppose 
that the subjective experience can be reduced to a number of 
characteristics and that the meanings of those characteristics will be 
interpreted in the same way by all participants. 
In de Spain’s research, he also noted that this procedure of filling out a 
form would be too time consuming for the dancers in the moment of 
improvisation and therefore designed a system which used two tape 
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recorders: “the first played a mostly silent tape during which, at random 
times, my prerecorded voice broke in to say, “report now,” the second, 
connected to a microphone, recorded anything the improviser said.” (Cited 
in Cooper Albright and Gere, 2003, p. 28). In this example, his dancers 
improvised for forty-five minutes with nobody else present. This second 
approach requires a verbatim response from the participant, in which the 
participant is encouraged to talk about their experience using their own 
vocabulary. 
Within the research conducted for this PhD the dancers were in a motion 
capture suite with myself and the other technicians. For this reason it was 
decided that there may be a level of self-consciousness present in 
speaking one’s thought aloud. The dancers were instead asked to write in 
a personal journal for a set amount of time without stopping or pausing to 
consider what they had written; a task known as ‘stream-of-consciousness 
writing’ or ‘free writing’. Another alteration was made in the times the 
dancers were asked write; rather than stopping randomly during the tasks, 
the dancers were asked to complete the writing task immediately on the 
sound of the three minute alarm which concluded the task, or, for the last 
task, whenever they came to an end. 
The stream-of-consciousness writing task is a tool often used for breaking 
writer’s block and for journal writing. The aim of the task is to avoid 
stopping and thinking about what has been written or passing judgement 
on what is written as it is written. In Natalie Goldberg’s Writing down the 
bones: freeing the writer within (2005) she cites certain rules: 
1. Keep your hand moving. (Don’t pause to reread the line you 
have just written. That’s stalling and trying to get control of 
what you’re saying.) 
2. Don’t cross out. (That is editing as you write. Even if you 
write something you didn’t mean to write, leave it.) 
3. Don’t worry about spelling, punctuation, grammar. (Don’t 
even care about staying within the margins and lines on the 
page.) 
4. Lose control. 
5. Don’t think. Don’t get logical. 
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6. Go for the jugular. (If something comes up in your writing that 
is scary or naked, dive right into it. It probably has lots of 
energy.) 
(Goldberg, 2005, pp. 10-11) 
Whilst the stream-of consciousness writing task was utilised immediately 
after the end of a task, it could not be argued to demonstrate the dancers’ 
reflection-in-action, but rather immediate reflection-on-action. However, 
according to Cowan (2010) this type of writing produces new ways of 
thinking and is useful in reflective practice. He advocates thinking 
reflectively “no earlier than just before expressing such thoughts in writing” 
but certainly “while writing.” (p. 111). For Cowan, stream-of-consciousness 
writing is a way of progressing the writers thinking on a topic and is not in 
itself a product of this thinking but a process: “the writers thinking will 
already and almost immediately have advanced beyond the now historical 
record of the route which took them onward” (Ibid, p. 111). He sees the 
writing as something which may be reflected on afterwards by the writer, to 
“deepen their understanding, or to mop up unfinished thinking,” (Ibid, p. 
111), but not to correct or edit, and certainly not for a third party to read. 
This may seem at odds with the purpose of the stream-of-consciousness 
task in this study, but while excerpts have been discussed in Chapter 
Eleven, its main purpose was to develop the dancers understanding of 
flow. This reflects the hermeneutic task of the research, in the co-
construction of the meaning of flow, and allows for the researcher to reflect 
on the participant’s process of understanding. It is important to note, 
however, that this process of verbalising experience will inevitably change 
that experience. The translation from tacit experience into linguistic form 
can only approximate what is felt. However, the translation, and immediate 
reflection on the improvisations were conducted by the very people best 
able to know what was experienced. While no method can be ideal, this 
method was best suited to the situation and the individuals. 
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7.4 Semi-structured interview 
Drawing further on the participants’ own developed understanding of flow 
a further process of reflecting-on-action was utilised during a semi-
structured interview at the end of the session. The template interview is 
available in Appendix B; it addresses the participants’ experience and 
understanding of flow, their choice of task and its effect in facilitating flow, 
any negative factors prohibiting flow, and their understanding of the 
researcher’s role throughout the process. It also addressed the 
technological process of capturing these flow experiences and their 
experience of relating to these technological modes of capture, which will 
be discussed in further detail in Chapter Eight. 
The semi-structured interview as a method for reflecting on experience 
and gaining information on that experience is one often used in social 
research. Its advantages include its suitability for exploring values, 
opinions and subjective experiences. It also offers a validity of response 
through the non-verbal clues of the participants and can facilitate 
comparability between participants as participants are more likely to 
respond to all interview questions than questionnaire questions. Further 
advantages over a questionnaire, includes the lack of outside influence 
when responding to questions. 
Critics of the semi-structured interview often favour the structured 
interview. Their argument focuses on the standardised structure of the 
interview enabling consistency in the wording of the questions, thus 
revealing the only difference in the participant’s responses. This view 
however presumes that there is a common vocabulary in which every word 
has the same meaning for every participant and researcher involved. The 
value of the semi-structured interview is in providing equivalence of 
meaning, providing opportunities to substitute words, not meaning, and 
acknowledging that not every respondent uses the same vocabulary. 
Further problems also remain in determining the ‘true’ meaning of 
ambiguous phrases. Tacit assumptions can be made of ambiguous 
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phrases, often common to all respondents, yet different in meaning. It is 
therefore important to acknowledge that different interpretations can be 
made and to allow freedom to probe. The advantages of probing in semi-
structured interviews include the clarification of relevant issues, the 
opportunity to explore subjective and personal opinions and experience as 
well as its ability to elicit valuable and complete information from the 
participants. It can also be useful in exploring and inconsistencies from the 
respondent. 
The construction of the semi-structured interview was based on a review 
of the literature, discussed in Part Two regarding content. Initially, areas 
were broad, then broken down into more manageable groupings. Once the 
questions were formulated, the semi-structured interview was exposed to 
internal review in which colleagues discussed and corrected any 
ambiguities, leading questions and other criticisms. Finally the interview 
was conducted in a further workshop phase with participants not included 
in the study, in order to ensure participants were able to answer the 
questions and it was successful in eliciting their views, but also to highlight 
any others areas which came up during the interview which needed to be 
explicitly addressed and explored. It also provided an opportunity for the 
researcher to review their performance and gain experience in the setting. 
Drawing on the notion of intersubjectivity explored in Chapter Six, this 
chapter has expanded on the field of phenomenology in order to explore 
the hermeneutic implications of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s works. 
Through a discussion of Finlay’s method of reflexive embodied empathy, 
this chapter provides a method for understanding the experience of the 
participants while enabling an examination of the researcher’s intimate role 
in the construction of that interpretation. It identifies reflection as both an 
essential characteristic of flow experience, and as a tool for accessing that 
experience. Further, the chapter provides a rationale for the particular 
reflective methods involved within the research process, that of stream-of-
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consciousness writing and semi-structured interview, and their function to 
enable a hermeneutic cyclical process of understanding. 
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Chapter Eight: Technologically 
Embodied Flow 
This chapter discusses the various uses of technology within performance, 
and the particular embodied relation of the technology to the body. 
Performance practitioner Susan Kozel’s research is identified for its 
similarities to this PhD research, in relation to dance, technology and the 
use of phenomenology as a methodology. In unpicking the differences 
between Kozel’s and this PhD research, the area of embodied technics as 
defined by prominent philosophy of technology theorist Don Ihde is 
discussed. The particular methods for developing the technology in 
relation to the performer are then discussed identifying to what extent its 
use can be considered embodied. 
8.1 Digital technology 
Technology is an increasingly prevalent area of study for many dance and 
performance academics (Birringer, 1998, 2000; Broadhurst, 2006, 2007; 
Broadhurst and Machon, 2006; Carver and Beardon, 2004; Dixon, 2007; 
Gray, 1989, Macel, 2007; Valverde, 2002). Much of the research is from a 
performance/dance artists’ perspective and addresses technology in terms 
of aesthetic, creative practice as well as developing new theories on 
embodiment and identity in a virtual world. Much of the writing reviews the 
many practitioners and companies who work within dance/performance 
and technology. However, there are many different relationships between 
performance and technology encapsulated in the various writings. 
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A discussion of these relations includes an analysis of the varying digital 
performance practices, such as: visualization, avatar performance, 
robotics and prosthetics, and telematics, as well as digital performance 
documentation. Some examples are discussed below, however, it is not 
within the scope of the study to provide an extensive review of the 
performance practices and corresponding performance practitioners who 
involve technology within their work. For further information, refer to Steve 
Dixon’s Digital performance: a history of new media in theatre, dance, 
performance art, and installation (2007), which provides an introduction to 
the theories and practices surrounding performance and technology since 
the ancient Greek period through to the present day.  
Visualization practices are employed in works by The Builders Association 
(1996, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2012), Troika Ranch (2000, 2003, 2004, 2006, 
2009), Merce Cunningham (1999) and Carol Brown (2006a, 2006b, 2007, 
2011) among others, in which innovative visualization technologies are 
developed to compliment stage performance. A related vein of research 
delves into the virtual performances of the mediatised body, including 
works by Sita Popat and Scott Palmer (2006, 2007, 2008a). These 
researcher/practitioners create works which draw on the interrelationships 
between performers, operators and computers, and the role of technology 
as other. Their research thus aims to explicate the problems of such 
practices and develop technologies as a tool for innovation within creative 
practice. 
Popat and Palmer have also created works exploring avatars (2008b) 
among other practitioners, such as Lynn Hershman and Stelarc with 
avatar performances within SecondLife a 3D virtual world. Hershman’s 
Roberta Breitmore (1974-1978), originally a ‘real world’ constructed 
persona, was developed into a character in SecondLife (2006). The 
character was adopted by Hershman, and while insisting that the avatar 
was ‘her own woman’, they were inextricably linked. Similarly, Stelarc’s 
Prosthetic head (2003) was a human like avatar of Stelarc’s own head. 
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Stelarc, a performance artist based at Brunel University, is also interested 
in prosthetics and robotics, a small area of research, in which he “probes 
the limitations of the body and discusses ways of extending the body's 
capabilities through technology, such as his Third Hand mechanism. 
Prosthetic devices, robotic structures and body-machine are part of this 
unique performance artist's vision of our future.” (Stelarc, 1991, p. 691). 
The area of telematics addresses virtual spaces and simultaneous 
presence across numerous spaces. A key practitioner in this area is Paul 
Sermon (1992, 1993, 2009, 2010, 2011). Paul Sermon’s work Telematic 
dreaming (1992) explores human interaction, where digital technology and 
performing bodies are combined to create physically intimate spaces 
through virtuality.  
“Telematic Dreaming” deliberately plays with the ambiguous 
connotations of a bed as a telepresent projection surface. The 
psychological complexity of the object dissolves the 
geographical distance and technology involved in the complete 
ISDN installation. The ability to exist outside of the users own 
space and time is created by an alarmingly real sense of touch 
that is enhanced by the context of the bed and caused by an 
acute shift of senses in the telematic space. 
(Sermon, no date) 
Another area of research within performance looks specifically at the use 
of technologies in documenting the embodied creative process and 
understanding relations between choreographer, performer and audience, 
these include research by Helen Bailey (Bailey, 2009; Bailey et al., 2008, 
2009a, 2009b). Helen Bailey’s e-Dance Project explores the use of e-
Science tools and methods for dance and performance. Specifically, e-
Dance develops new approaches to choreographic composition and 
process. Other research in documentation includes the use of technology 
in archiving performance, and this includes the work of Sarah Whatley 
(2013a, 2013b, 2013c). 
The final area of research within dance and technology to be discussed 
also addresses phenomenology as an approach to understanding the 
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embodied being in technological practices. There are very few studies 
concerning all three areas of research: phenomenology, dance and 
technology. Sarah Rubidge touched on this area in a paper presented at 
the Laban Centre London (1998) however her paper addressed a 
phenomenology of dance and only references technology in the 
description of her works. Susan Broadhurst, Professor of Performance and 
Technology also addresses this topic in her latest article, ‘Merleau-Ponty 
and neuroaesthetics: two approaches to performance and technology,’ 
(2012). However, these ideas of interdisciplinarity are developed further by 
Susan Kozel in her key work Closer: performance, technologies, 
phenomenology (2007) where she looks at a re-working of Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy of phenomenology based on a reflection of the 
experience of designing and performing with new technologies. 
Kozel’s research addresses each area of the research identified in this 
thesis. For this reason, it is necessary to explore the similarities and 
differences between this current PhD research and Kozel’s work in order 
to provide an explanation of the approach taken in this thesis. Both this 
thesis and Kozel’s work ultimately takes the nature of practice as its 
central focus; "[e]choing the worn wisdom that art reveals life, the premise 
of this book is that the dance or performance studio is a hothouse for 
understanding wider social engagements..." (Kozel, 2007, p. xiv). Dance 
practice is a form of knowledge, embodied and tacit, as described by the 
dance phenomenologists, Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh. It is thus 
always from dance that this PhD research is situated. 
Both sets of research also incorporate artistic practice as a research 
methodology. However Kozel reveals that it is through the creative 
outcomes of her performances that new knowledge is gained; throughout 
her book, a full understanding can only be obtained with direct reference 
to the practical outcome. 
I was establishing my method for conducting phenomenological 
analyses, a method that would grow and change somewhat 
over the years but would always be indebted to the core 
Louise Douse Chapter Eight: Technologically Embodied Flow  
144 
 
observational and philosophical practices birthed on the bed 
(quite literally) of this telematic installation. 
(Ibid, p. 88). 
Within this thesis, however, whilst including practice as an integral part of 
the method, it does not require the inclusion of an artistic artefact to 
advance knowledge. The primary focus of the research is to advance 
knowledge about practice. The doctoral thesis that has emerged from this 
research does not include artefacts as part of the submission, though 
practice is an integral part of its method, as discussed in Chapter Two. 
Kozel’s understanding of the body of the dancer as the site of discovery 
reflects the stance which the PhD research takes regarding experience as 
a form of knowledge: "[t]he simple point to be made is that the body of the 
dancer is the site of discovery and what is discovered may shed light 
beyond the seemingly arcane space of the studio" (Ibid, pp. xiv-xv). Kozel 
draws on phenomenology to define a qualitative approach to the lived 
experience; "[a]s a method, phenomenology involves a return to lived 
experience, a listening to the senses and insights that arrive obliquely, 
unbidden in the midst of movement experiments or quite simply in the 
midst of life..." (Ibid, p. xvi). However, Kozel continues to say that these 
sensations emerge directly from the experience of being in computational 
systems. 
Phenomenology, in short, allows me to respect these 
sensations and inner voices, these unformed ideas, thoughts, 
or images that emerge directly from the experience of being in 
computational systems like telematics, motion capture, or 
networked wearable computing. 
(Ibid, p. xvi) 
For the focus of this thesis, phenomenology serves to describe the 
experience of flow, technology is a tool which is applied to capture this 
experience. The data gathered becomes a primary text and the 
researcher’s relationship with the technology is data driven rather than 
experientially driven. However, the following section discusses technology 
as an embodied technology, drawing on the of Kozel, in order to assess 
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the extent to which the motion capture technologies can be considered 
embodied in relation to the participants of this research. 
8.2 Embodied technology 
The phenomenological concern with technology began with Heidegger’s 
article ‘The question concerning technology’ (1954b) but has been 
developed by numerous theorists, particularly in relation to embodiment. 
Philosophy of technology theorist, Don Ihde (b. 1934), has written 
extensively on the topic of embodied relations within technology as well as 
developing a theory of post-phenomenology which addresses the plurality 
of experience defined by the post-modernists (1990, 1993, 2002, 2010a, 
2010b). His work has been critiqued and extended by theorists such as 
Philip Brey (2000) and Helena De Preester (2010) who argue for a closer 
inspection of phenomenology. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, an individual learns and understands 
because they inhabit their body; for digital technology, “this has meant a 
continued re-negotiation of the physical/ digital divide.” (Farr, Price and 
Jewitt, 2012, p. 5). In many human/ technology relations interaction 
between bodily and digital information continues to blur the boundaries, 
with ’embodied technologies’ increasing in their use and application. The 
question, therefore, regarding the necessity of the body, as discussed in 
Chapter Seven, is vital when considering the virtual other. Already implied 
in the discussion of Kozel’s research is the empathic relationship between 
self and technology; 
When I encounter my digital self I discover that it is not simply 
me. The relation between myself and the figure I animate is as 
chiasmic as the seeing-seen, the touching-touched. It is me, 
because it is animated by my movement, but it is also other 
because it is separated from me by the thickness of the space 
between us and because it moves around and looks back at me 
– I am the one wearing the motion capture markers, the 
animation is projected onto a surface next to me, we are the 
same but we are different in space and in dynamic form. 
(Kozel, 2007, p. 239) 
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The virtual body is thus encountered through a re-negotiation of 
corporeality, where a continuous interchange between bodies and 
technologies allows for interaction. 
A philosophical understanding of embodied technology can be 
approached through Don Ihde’s theory of ‘embodied technics.’ Ihde’s 
theory of embodied technics is based largely on his understanding of 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, citing many of Merleau-Ponty’s 
examples within his own writing. For Ihde, the human/ technology 
embodiment relation reflects the way in which an individual engages in the 
world by perceiving through such technologies and thus the way this 
perception transforms an individual’s perceptual and bodily sense. For 
Ihde, there are two important components to embodied technics. 
The first characteristic of “the embodiment relation can be more precisely 
described as one in which the technology becomes maximally 
“transparent.” It is, as it were, taken into my own perceptual-bodily self 
experience” (Ihde, 1990, p. 73). In this relation, the individual embodies 
the technology so that the individual experiences the world directly through 
the technology, as in Ihde’s example of the glasses: 
(I – glasses) – world 
My glasses become part of the way I ordinarily experience my 
surrounding, they “withdraw” and are barely noticed. 
(Ibid, p. 73) 
This, Ihde states, can be applied to all sense relations within the world, 
drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s examples of the blind man’s cane and the 
automobile. In order for the technology to ‘withdraw’ however, the 
technology needs to be ‘good;’ if, for example the rim of the glasses was 
too thick, it may impede on an individual’s vision and thus their experience 
of the world. 
In each of the examples, however, a second characteristic is present, that 
is the ability the technology must have in extending an individual’s bodily 
abilities. Ihde notes a “double desire;” on the one hand “a wish for total 
transparency, total embodiment, for the technology to truly “become me”” 
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(Ibid, p. 75). On the other hand, “the desire to have the power, the 
transformation that the technology makes available.” (Ibid, p. 75). He 
believes this ‘double desire’ both acknowledges the positive role 
technology has in experiencing the world, yet rejects the essential nature 
of the technology by dismissing its presence. 
Critics of Ihde’s embodied technics, however, suggest many of his 
examples do not fit his definition of embodiment relations as instruments to 
better perceive the world. Ihde, in his example of the car does not address 
the issue that while the individual’s bodily capabilities may be extended, 
their experience of the world is not tacitly embodied; “although the driver of 
the car may have a tacit understanding of the location of the car relative to 
structures in the environment, it is not normally the case that the driver can 
feel these structures through the fender of the car.” (Brey, 2000, p. 48). 
Brey’s argument is that: 
[A]n embodied technology is a technology that is incorporated 
into one’s body schema, which implies that it becomes part of 
one’s bodily space (Merleau-Ponty’s ‘space of situation’). It then 
becomes an integral part of one’s repertoire of motor or 
perceptual skills, and serves as a medium through which motor 
or perceptual functions, or both, are expressed. Perceptual 
functions that are mediated are either visual, aural, or tactile 
functions. Motor functions that are mediated are either 
navigational functions or interactive functions (or both). As an 
artefact becomes incorporated into one’s repertoire of skills, it 
often, though not invariably, enhances these skills. That is, it 
often extends the ‘potentialities’ of the body schema, and 
consequently what the body, as mediated by the artefact it 
incorporates, is able to affect or perceive in its environment. 
(Ibid, p. 55) 
Here, Brey draws on Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body and the body 
schema as capable of incorporating other artefacts into it. 
For Brey, perceptual embodiment is the only type of embodiment 
expressed by Ihde. The three senses cited above are mediated through 
the technology, and an individual’s perceptual skills are exercised through 
the technology. For example, sight can be mediated through eye glasses 
and visual perception exercised; hearing can be mediated through hearing 
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aids, and aural perception is exercised, and touch can be mediated 
through the blind man’s cane, and tactile perception is exercised. In these 
instances the experience of an individual’s world is mediated through 
some technological artefact. 
Motor embodiment, for Brey, addresses “[a]rtifacts that mediate motor 
skills [which] become part of the body schema by becoming a medium 
through which motor skills are expressed.” (Ibid, p. 53). As referenced 
above, these skills can be mediated in at least two ways; navigationally 
and interactively. Navigational skills can be mediated through the artefact 
by incorporating the artefact into the individual’s body schema and thus 
knowing tacitly where they are in relation to the environment, examples 
include the car, which enlarges an individual’s body schema. Interactive 
skills can be mediated by technology when “one performs actions on the 
environment with a tool that is embodied within one’s body schema.” (Ibid, 
p. 54). These tools, such as the hammer, the remote control and the gun, 
enable an individual to act on the world. 
Brey described the interactive artefacts as mostly hand-held, however, 
within Susan Kozel’s research, it could be argued that the motion capture 
system acts on the digital environment in which an individual’s avatar 
exists. For Kozel this was a two-way interaction in which the avatar 
entered into an affective relationship with her: 
I entered into a duet with the pile of cubes. My movement gave 
it life, but it was more than my movement. The pile of cubes had 
a spark of autonomy: it was cheeky, it experienced pain, 
indecision, and pathos. I found myself reacting to it as if it were 
a life-form. 
(Kozel, 2007, p. 227) 
This affective interaction, for Kozel, enabled an experience of self as 
‘other;’ “intercorporeal exchanges across beings of differing materiality.” 
(Ibid, p. 230). 
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8.3 Technology as ‘other’ 
This experience of technology as ‘other’ is common in digital performance 
literature. Steve Dixon in his Digital performance: a history of new media in 
theatre, dance, performance art, and installation (2007), writes about the 
‘digital double;’ a simultaneously present ‘mediated’ performer. Dixon 
distinguishes between four types of digital double; as reflection, alter-ego, 
spiritual emanation and manipulable mannequin. He does acknowledge, 
however, there may be some cross-over; “that the double is by nature, a 
mysterious and capricious figure that may sometimes challenge and 
traverse neat boundaries.” (p. 244). 
As reflection, the digital double is created where the image of the beholder 
is the central focus of the digital environment; as a technological mirror. 
Dixon draws on numerous examples, including Blast Theory’s 10 
backwards (1999) in which the central character ‘Niki’ attempts to exactly 
reflect her recorded herself; “Niki uses digital video as an instrument for 
self-analysis, but for her the technological duplicate becomes the “real” 
that she must painstakingly copy and emulate.” (Dixon, 2007, pp. 247-
248). The second category; digital double as alter-ego address the 
doubles ability to manifest the multiple “underlying personalities of the 
performing subject.” (Ibid, p. 250). Such as in Dixon’s own work 
Chameleon’s 4: the doors of serenity (2002) by The Chameleons Group. A 
performance in which Dixon plays a cyborg who enters into conversation 
with two digital doubles, each with their own personality. 
The double as spiritual emanation is addressed in works such as igloo’s 
Viking shoppers (1999) where live video recordings are converted into the 
number and letter symbols of ASCII computer code. These “[d]igital 
doubles representing spiritual emanations or incarnations of the body 
relate to notions of ghosts, astral bodies, out-of-body experiences, and 
soul projection.” (Ibid, p. 254). The final category, digital double as 
manipulable mannequin, Dixon relates to computer generated avatars that 
act as a double of the live performer, and he suggests features strongly in 
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dance performance. Here, he references motion capture technology which 
“renders a manipulable double of the dancer onto the computer screen 
where it can be further modified and represented in performance.” (Ibid, p. 
266). 
While the use of motion capture in this study is different to that of Kozel’s, 
both fit into this category of manipulable mannequin. For Dixon, as for 
Kozel, each of the categories are examples of digital artefacts which are 
present in performance. Returning to Brey’s articulation of embodiment 
relations, the use of motion capture in this study, as a means of capturing 
embodied experience, falls into both an interactive motor embodiment, and 
a further category he defined as cognitive embodiment. In terms of the 
interactive embodiment, unlike Kozel’s experience, the interaction is one 
way, for the dancers do not encounter their digital double, however, it is 
still rendered for manipulation. 
The cognitive embodiment which Brey addresses enables an extension of 
“cognitive abilities, such as abstract thought, memory, problem solving, 
and language use.” (Brey, 2000, p. 55). However, for Brey, these cognitive 
artefacts, such as the calculator, through their embodied use, transform 
the cognitive task “into a perceptual and motor task.” (Ibid, p. 55). It is only 
through interaction with the technological artefact that cognition becomes 
embodied. It could be argued however, that another cognitive embodiment 
relation could be manifested, in which “cognitive artefacts… that are able 
to represent, store, retrieve, and manipulate information” (Ibid, p. 55) 
mediate embodied cognitive skills, such as improvisation which 
demonstrates knowledge in the body, articulated through motor skills. 
While Ihde’s definition of the embodied relations has been expanded by 
Brey, with regard to motor and cognitive skills, it could be argued that the 
two characteristics of embodied technology, for Ihde, remain. As 
demonstrated above, the motion capture technologies used in this 
research enable the mediation of an individuals embodied cognitive 
abilities, which, through its ability to store and manipulate the information 
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enables interaction in the world, and in this case, with the ‘other’ mind of 
the researcher. This links to Ihde’s characteristic that the technology must 
extend an individual’s capabilities. The next section addresses the first 
characteristic Ihde identified, that of making the technology transparent. 
8.4 Motion capture 
During the improvisation workshops the dancers were asked to wear a 
motion capture suit consisting of a lycra all-in-one, close fitting garment 
with Velcro attachments for reflective markers on the joints of the body. 
Ten cameras were located in the motion capture suite in specific positions 
in order to triangulate the 3D position of the body, from the markers, using 
infra-red sensors. These motion capture workshops were conducted at 
Bournemouth University by Zhidong Xiao, however, prior to this, during a 
trial phase of the investigation, the motion capture system at the University 
of Bedfordshire was used. From this point onward, this phase will be 
referred to as the motion capture phase, with the work done at 
Bournemouth referred to as the data collection phase. During the motion 
capture phase it was essential to understand the role of the suit in both the 
capturing of the data and in its ability to affect the dancers’ movement, and 
thus chances of achieving flow. 
It was important that the suit should not restrict the dancer allowing for 
normal movement activity, however, must also be utilised to get the best 
possible data for analysis. In many trial sessions, the placement, number 
and size of markers was addressed as well as the particular ways in which 
the markers could be attached, also addressing the material of the suit. In 
the very first session in the suit, the dancers were asked to improvise 
freely exploring the feel of the suit but also to challenge the suit in its ability 
to remain comfortable and versatile and for the markers to remain 
attached. 
The first suit consisted solely of plain black, tight fitting stretch yoga pants 
and a long sleeved top. The markers, (12.5mm), were attached using 
specially designed double sided stickers, they were also placed using the 
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Helen Hayes marker set placement model in the Motion Analysis manual. 
In this template (Figure 9 below) there are twenty-seven markers attached 
to both the joints and the bones of the limbs. In this configuration the 
dancers found that certain markers caused considerable pain, particularly 
the markers on the shins and they found themselves avoiding floor based 
movement. Markers would fly off the body, or be left behind on the floor 
when moving across the floor. 
 
Figure 9: Helen Hayes marker set marker placement (Motion Analysis, 2007) 
In response, several changes were made; initially smaller markers were 
used (9.5mm) which were closer to the body with softer bases, while this 
lessened the pain, certain markers were still problematic, and also 
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continued to dis-attach themselves from the body. At that point two further 
changes were made, the number of markers was reduced to nineteen in 
order to attempt to relieve some of the more painful positions while on the 
floor, and the method of attachment was altered. Heavy duty Velcro strips 
were fixed on each marker with the complimentary soft looped side 
attached to the clothing. 
With the reduction of the markers, the outline of the body on the screen 
also became more perceptible; the reason for this is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter Nine. However, due to the smaller size of the markers the 
dots on the screen often vanished and greater ‘noise’ was created 
(additional dots often appeared as outliers to the body). Due to the 
reduction and altered position of the markers, the larger markers were 
trialled once more, and the positions of the markers refined further. The 
positioning however, was obviously dependent on the individual, this 
meant the placement of the Velcro strips attached to the suit needed to 
account for the differing bodies of the dancers, however, the more strip 
attached, the lesser the flexibility of the material. 
A process, then, of trial and error began in trying to find material which the 
hooked Velcro could attach directly onto. While these suits, utilising Velcro 
attachments, do exist for many motion capture systems, the expense, at 
that point, precluded their use. However, a more than adequate alternative 
was found in the use of an all-in-one body stocking made of the same 
material as tights and very effective for the Velcro attachments. At this 
point a final trial phase was used, which required a template range of 
motion to be captured prior to the improvisation workshop. 
This template and then subsequent data needed to be cleaned by 
ensuring that every marker in every frame, of which there were 200 per 
second, needed to be identified as the same ‘right inside knee’, for 
example. Unfortunately, due to lack of specialist skill and knowledge, the 
use of the University of Bedfordshire’s system had to be abandoned. At 
this point, given the knowledge gained thus far, a more suitable location 
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was selected, at Bournemouth University due to their specialist knowledge 
of the system and their use of lycra suit with Velcro attachments. 
Throughout the motion capture phase, the technologies were adjusted in 
order to reduce their impact on the dancers and thus render them 
‘transparent’ to the dancers. This was in dialogue with the second 
characteristic of embodied relations in regards to extending the cognitive 
embodied capabilities of the dancers. While adjustments to the markers 
size made transparency for the dancer greater, it also made the capture 
more problematic. The resolve came with adjustment of the placement of 
the markers, which rendered the size of the markers irrelevant. The motion 
capture system can thus be considered an embodied technology in its 
ability to extend the dancers embodied cognition in the act of improvising, 
while appearing transparent to the dancers in order to not impinge on their 
experience of flow. 
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PART FOUR: READING FLOW 
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Chapter Nine: Interpreting Flow 
Within this chapter a discussion of the use of the visualizations within the 
research project is provided. Drawing from the embodied motion capture 
technologies, the visualizations are argued to provide a form of evidence 
of the body, rather than a form of illustration. The visualizations are 
presentational rather than representational and are closely aligned to the 
field of visualization within science and in particular, the disciplinary subset 
of computer science. Don Ihde, is a forerunner of this field, who, extending 
his research on embodied technics, defines another human/technology 
relation called hermeneutic technics. Ihde’s theories on science’s 
visualism and hermeneutic technics are discussed in relation to three of 
his key texts on this field. While these theories were developed over two 
decades ago, they have received little critique. Rather, he has received 
wide praise from fellow colleagues particularly within the Society for 
Philosophy and Technology (STP), most notably, from Carl Mitcham, a 
philosopher of technology at the Colorado School of Mines who states: 
Ihde not only wrote the first monograph on philosophy of 
technology in English, he has also produced the most extensive 
corpus devoted to the subject and has established a book 
series devoted to philosophy of technology. 
(1994, p. 78). 
The scientific view of visualism is one developed by Don Ihde, and is 
apparent in its ability to “produce, display and reiterate what counts for 
evidence in visual form” (Ihde, 2002, p. 37). In particular, Ihde refers to the 
interpretative nature of certain technologies, regarding pattern recognition 
and discusses how such technologies can be used to interpret the 
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behaviour of a human. Ihde expands on these ideas in three of his 
volumes; Technology and the lifeworld: from garden to Earth (1990), 
Expanding hermeneutics: visualism in science (1998) and Bodies in 
technology (2002). 
The methodology for interpreting the visualizations employed in this study 
arises from a hermeneutics of technology or ‘hermeneutic technics’ as 
defined by Don Ihde (1990). Hermeneutics, as discussed in Chapter Six, 
can be described as a theory of interpretation, and therefore hermeneutic 
technics, as the interpretative relationship between humans/technology. 
This is different to the empathetic relationship revealed in embodied 
technologies, such as with a pair of glasses in which the technology 
becomes transparent in order for the wearer to experience their 
surroundings. In the hermeneutic relationship, “the technology functions as 
an immediate referent to something beyond itself.” (Introna, 2005). 
9.1 Expanding hermeneutics 
Ihde’s Expanding hermeneutics (1998) begins with a history of 
hermeneutics within Greek philosophy and theological studies, before 
moving to a discussion of a more recent expansion of hermeneutics within 
science. He claims the two key proponents of this work are Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). He refers 
to Schleiermacher, in answering the challenge of scientific criticism to 
transform the predominant theological hermeneutics into a more general 
hermeneutics, and Dilthey, as identifying hermeneutics as a possible 
foundation for science with regards to the human sciences. In both cases, 
however, the focus of their research regarded the “principles of 
“understanding” or interpretation [which] were differentiated from the 
natural sciences and principles of “explanation.”” (Ihde, 1998, p. 39). 
Ihde goes on to discuss the expansion of hermeneutics with regard to 
phenomenology before identifying a new trajectory and expansion in the 
twentieth century within the realm of science and technology. Here, Ihde 
cites the first Conference on Hermeneutics and Science in 1993, which he 
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attended, and the apparent opposing approaches which arose from that 
conference. On the one side were theorists such as Karl Otto Apel and 
Dagfinn Føllesdal who argued that “one could have a hermeneutic history 
of science, but one could not have a hermeneutics of science or scientific 
objects” (Ibid. p. 40). On the other side, Ihde, Robert Crease and others, 
argued that there was indeed a hermeneutics of science “which included 
hermeneutic analysis of scientific products and of technological artifacts.” 
(Ibid. p. 40). 
Ihde’s argument was that hermeneutics could be extended into the 
sciences through application of a phenomenological hermeneutic 
approach. In particular, Ihde draws on Heidegger’s ontology as essentially 
hermeneutic, but also draws on Merleau-Ponty with regard to “perception, 
praxis, and embodiment.” (Ibid. p. 40). He argues that the 
phenomenological hermeneutic model is a perspective which accounts for 
what is observed, but relative to the situation or position of the observer, 
and as such a phenomenological hermeneutic analysis must look at the 
realm of human-technology relations. (Ibid. p. 46). 
Ihde articulates three structural aspects to the phenomenological 
hermeneutic analysis of human-technology relations. Firstly, that “all 
technologies are non-neutral,” by that he means that with every use of 
technology, an individual’s experience of the world is altered or mediated. 
Secondly, that this mediation has a particular structure to it, which he 
terms “the magnification-reduction structure,” in which an individual’s 
experience is both extended and reduced by the technology. In his 
example of knocking an apple from a tree with a stick, the technology (the 
stick) extends his reach, but also reduces his tactile experience of picking 
the apple from the tree. Finally, thirdly, he argues that while universal for 
all technologies, “each technology displays a different pattern of 
amplification-reduction.” (Ibid. p. 47). 
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9.2 Technology and the lifeworld 
In Technology and the lifeworld, Ihde begins discussing hermeneutics in 
relation to writing. He argues interpretation is always the reading of 
something, such as the reading of something written, and that all writing 
requires technologies: “[w]riting is a technologically embedded form of 
language.” (Ihde, 1990, p. 81). Whether chalk and slate, pen and paper, or 
word processor and computer screen, writing requires technology to 
mediate language. However, this mediation is embodied; “[i]t implicates 
my body, but in certain distinctive ways.” (Ibid. p. 81). 
Ihde refers to an example of a map, or ‘chart,’ which represents the 
landscape. In this instance, the map is read from a “miniaturized bird’s-eye 
perspective” (Ibid. p. 81) where the map refers to the landscape through 
isomorphic representation. However, unlike in embodied relations where 
the technology withdraws to become transparent, the map is the visual 
terminus. Ihde therefore argues for a different kind of transparency which 
he calls ‘representational transparency’ in which the map refers beyond 
itself to what it represents. 
As discussed in Chapter Eight, Ihde describes the embodied relation thus: 
(I – Technology) – World 
where the technology becomes perceptually transparent to the individual 
in order for them to engage with the world. However, he articulates a 
different formulation within hermeneutic relations: 
I – (Technology – World) 
In this relation, the reading is dependent on the transparent connection 
between the instrument and the referent object. 
To compound this new formulation, Ihde draws on an example of a nuclear 
power plant, in which no isomorphism exists between the object (the pile) 
and the control panel. The object referred to is also not immediately 
available to perception; there is “no face-to-face, independent access to 
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the pile or to much of the machinery involved.” (Ibid, p. 85). What is 
immediately perceived is the instrument panel itself, and thus “[i]t becomes 
the object of my micro-perception, although in the special sense of a 
hermeneutic transparency, I read the pile through it.” (Ibid, p. 86). 
Ihde goes on to define a scale or ‘vertical trajectory’ of visual hermeneutic 
technics in relation to a ‘horizontal trajectory’ of visual embodied technics. 
He argues the embodied trajectory “only follows greater and greater 
degrees of magnification” (Ibid, p. 90) such as with the telescope and 
microscope, whereas the hermeneutic trajectory “rely upon quite 
deliberate hermeneutic transformations.” (Ibid, p. 90). At the origin of the 
hermeneutic/embodied axis sit spectacles, which enhance vision. Moving 
vertically along the hermeneutic trajectory Ihde identifies tinted glasses 
which transform what is seen to some degree. 
Following in this trajectory are infrared glasses which “begin to modify the 
representation into a different, non-perceived “representation.”” (Ibid, p. 
91). Included in this trajectory are heat-sensitive night scopes, enhancing 
a person’s heat radiation, which while still representative of the object, 
produce a non-ordinary form of visual representation. Ihde then references 
the spectrograph which has no resemblance to the star it represents, 
rather “the reader would have to know the language, the alphabet, that 
has coded the star.” (Ibid, p. 91). In these examples provided by Ihde, the 
structure of the hermeneutic technological relation provided in Expanding 
hermeneutics is apparent. 
9.3 Bodies in technology 
Ihde’s final work to be discussed, Bodies in technology, draws on the 
visual examples provided above in articulating ‘science’s visualism’ and 
returning to his articulation of a hermeneutics of science. Ihde argues that 
science’s preference for the visual is a cultural ‘habit’ rather than one born 
out of necessity. For example, Ihde identifies no physiological difference 
between seeing and hearing with regards to detecting duration and 
describes some of the original scientific practices which rely on whole-
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bodied perception, such as in physical anthropology where “[i]nformed 
vision is employed along with tactility, bodily motility, and the rest of the 
interaction with the immediate environmental world of this situation.” (Ihde, 
2002, p. 39). 
Ihde argues that science’s visualism is far from the ‘natural’ way in which 
an individual engages in the world. He draws on Merleau-Ponty’s writing 
on synaesthesia to articulate his view that an individual’s “experience of 
some object that is seen is simultaneously and constantly also an 
experience that is structured by all the senses.” (Ibid, p. 38). Despite this, 
“visualization lies embedded in scientific practices.” (Ibid, p. 40). Ihde goes 
on to define the history of this shift to visualism as a modern concern, one 
which “is an enhancement of the visual over and above and often to the 
detriment of either full perceptual or nonvisual perceptions.” (Ibid, p. 41). 
He begins with Leonardo Da Vinci and his reduction of anatomy to a 
structural and visual depiction of tendons, muscles and veins; these 
visualizations replaced a tactile and olfactory perception of anatomy. Ihde 
then examines Galileo and his discovery of the telescope which at the time 
were “heretofore unseen phenomena.” (Ibid, p. 42). Finally, he addresses 
the “rapid acceptance of photography” (Ibid, p. 42) which not only 
extended ordinary vision, but enabled the scientist to share and reproduce 
these visions: 
Photography, not unlike the camera obscura, automatically 
reduced the object to an isomorphic and realistic fixed image on 
the photographic plate. And it accomplished this without 
subjectivity, as it were, by means of a mechanical process. 
(Ibid, p. 43) 
These examples describe both a vertical and horizontal trajectory of 
development in terms of both embodied and hermeneutic relations. The 
developments in twentieth century imaging technologies, such as the 
infrared, and ultraviolet visualization described in his previous text, are 
what he calls ‘second sight’: “[i]t not only enhances analog vision, it 
displaces it with a type of second sight. This second sight becomes a 
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unique, instrumentally constituted scientific object.” (Ibid, p. 47). In 
summary, visualizations, rather than simply being reductive in nature are 
essential to modern science in their omnipresence and dominance and 
ability to reproduce Gestalt visible features. 
Within this study, digital visualization will be used as a representation of 
motion capture data in a non-textual form available for analysis. It could be 
argued, when viewing the digital visualizations of the captured motion, 
what an individual sees is the body it refers to, the limbs already 
suggested in the data points. This is supported by the research identified 
in Chapter Six regarding point-light display visualizations of human 
movement in which the individual is able to identify both human activity, 
such as walking, running and dancing, as well as emotional states. This in 
turn is supported by the neurological studies on empathy and action 
understanding. 
Performance and technology theory has grown out of the numerous 
theoretical undertakings in technology and culture (Feather, 2004; 
Lunenfeld, 1999; Lyon, 2001; Murphie, 2003; Pepperell, 2009). Much of 
this research addresses the social and cultural implications which new 
technologies bring. Lyon discusses surveillance studies; surveillance is the 
observing of the behaviour of another person, usually covertly. The only 
difference between surveillance technologies and motion capture 
technologies is that the monitoring is usually known about or agreed to. 
Motion capture technologies allow for a surveillance of the body in order to 
read behaviour and movement patterns. The following sections will outline 
the key texts surrounding visualization practices and movement analysis. 
9.4 Information visualization 
Information visualization is the visualization of data; however, recently the 
field of information visualization has been expanded in regards to the 
representation of that data. Authors such as Kosara (2007), Lau and 
Vande Moere (2007), and Ramirez Gaviria (2008) have articulated a 
criteria for the classification of such visualizations, and there is an 
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emerging sense that these categories sit on an opposing scale between 
those which are data driven and easily readable and those which are 
concerned with more of an artistic representation of the data. Though 
terminology appears to differ, the sense of opposing representation is 
clear. 
Kosara, for example, refers to the field of information visualization as 
scientific visualization, and defines a general criteria of such visualizations 
thus: it must be based on (non-visual) data, it should, at least, translate a 
set of data into visual form, “if the source data is an image and is used as 
an image in the result, it is not being visualized.” (Kosara, 2007); it must 
produce an image, the visualization must be the primary means of 
communication of the data; and the result must be readable and 
recognizable, the viewer must be able to understand the data represented 
through the visualization “even if that requires training and practice.” (Ibid). 
 
Figure 10: The gamut of data-based visualization (Kosara, 2007) 
Information visualization for Kosara must come under what he terms 
‘pragmatic visualization’ as opposed to ‘artistic visualization’. For Kosara, 
pragmatic visualizations are essentially utilitarian, user friendly, efficient 
and based on displaying readable information. Artistic visualizations on the 
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other hand are essentially ‘sublime’, not user friendly, and interested in 
visualizing a general ‘concern’ rather than the data. Above is an example 
of the scale of visualizations, as described by Kosara. 
Lau and Moere, however, define several models for information 
visualization, taking the term information visualization to be the over-
arching field within which these categories sit. They term information 
aesthetic visualization as the opposite of the data driven type of 
visualization. On the one hand the direct, objective and extrinsic, used as 
a tool, and on the other, the interpretative, subjective and intrinsic, used as 
art. They also define further categories within information aesthetics, such 
as ambient visualization and informative art, and a separate category, 
social visualization which perhaps sits somewhere in the middle of the 
scale between the extrinsic and intrinsic visualization forms. 
Ramirez Gaviria describes the split in terms of the functional versus the 
aesthetic describing them as functional and data driven or aesthetic, 
emotive and visceral. He also looks at the connection information 
visualization, as a field, has to art practices, and criticises how one field 
views the other, or rather their seemingly lack of consideration for the 
other. 
Only occasionally do studies make a case for the implication 
that aesthetic information visualizations may have for 
contemporary art practices, and, in such demonstrations, 
reference is mostly made to the creation of novel forms of 
visualizations, without legitimate or informed observation of the 
complexity of artistic production and discourse. 
(Ramirez Gaviria, 2008, p. 480) 
In each of the three articles referenced above a clear divide is offered in 
terms of visualization practices, some include further categorization, others 
a critique of their role within science and art. The visualizations used in this 
thesis would come under the category of the pragmatic, data driven type, 
as while representing artistic practice, the visualizations themselves are 
used as tools for analysis. Readability is therefore key. 
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9.5 Visualizing Laban 
In this section the literature will focus on those projects which aim to 
visualize human movement drawing on Laban’s work in choreology, which 
has established a need for movement analysis both in dance and in virtual 
environments, for example in the animation of gaming characters. There 
are many studies which use technology as a tool for movement analysis 
(Badler, 1989; Becheiraz and Thalmann, 1996; Badler, Chi and Chopra, 
1999; Chi et al., 2000; Zhao, Costa and Badler, 2000; Loke, Larssen and 
Robertson, 2005; Zhao and Badler, 2005; Rett and Dias, 2007; Santos, 
Prado and Dias, 2009; Bartram and Nakatani, 2010; Pietrowicz et al., 
2010; Subyen et al., 2011; Oliveira et al., 2012). 
This area of research is largely concerned with movement analysis from a 
technological perspective; the articles draw on both Laban’s effort and 
shape theories and other non-verbal communication research (Argyle, 
1988; Hall, 1973). However, the crux of the research concerns the 
technological interplay and the use of movement analysis in creating 
models for animated virtual actors or avatars. The articles focussing on 
Laban’s work can be divided into three further categories: those which 
utilise it for animating computerised forms; those which use it for 
interpreting human movement (for use in robotics, for example); and those 
which use it for artistic purposes. 
Within the first category, a collective of authors (Badler, Chi, Chopra, 
Costa, Zhao) have, over the years, developed a framework for animating 
computerised forms using Laban’s Movement Analysis. In their 1999 
article, Badler, Chi and Chopra develop a model which allows for the 
customisation of a character based on qualitative descriptors. In 2000, Chi, 
Costa, Zhao and Badler further develop the EMOTE model for generating 
3D movement, here they also explore Lamb’s work on flow in shape and 
focus their work on Laban and Lamb’s effort and shape qualities. 
In the second category, a few different authors have worked on developing 
models which allow interpretation of human movement. Rett and Dias 
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(2007) and Santos, Prado and Dias (2009) both explore Laban’s work in 
order to facilitate empathy in robotic forms. In both of these uses, however, 
only a limited use of Laban’s work is applied with regard to his work on the 
eight basic action drives. Also, while they both refer to whole body 
movement, they only track the hands and face. Loke, Larssen and 
Robertson (2005) use Laban’s work to analyse the movement of 
interactive game players in order to develop the game design, however, 
the analysis is conducted by humans. 
Finally, the last category sees some innovative uses of Laban’s Movement 
Analysis, with regard to the creation of artistic artefacts. Pietrowicz et al. 
(2010) work with dancers to create performance in which dancers 
augment reality environments in real time based on ‘full-body’ movement 
articulations and sounds. However, as in the previous projects, only the 
wrist is tracked. They have, however, developed a system to input 
multimodal gesture before using Laban’s Movement Analysis and learning 
algorithms to create visualizations. However, these visualization were not 
described. Subyen et al. (2012) also use Laban to create artistic 
visualizations. They use Laban’s basic effort actions using a computer 
program called Effort Detect, to create a ‘visaphor,’ or visual metaphor, of 
the movement. 
While this last category uses Laban’s work to create visualizations, the 
purpose of both projects is artistic in nature rather than data driven as in 
this research. They also only apply a small area of Laban’s work, largely 
addressing the eight action drives and limited effort and shape analysis, 
dismissing Lamb’s research with regards to flow in shape. Finally, neither 
project addresses full-bodied movement, but instead draws on arm 
movements only. The aims of the visualizations, in this thesis, are to 
represent the two areas of movement analysis: choreutics and eukinetics, 
discussed previously in Chapter Four. Choreutics, or shape, can be 
visualized through adding a trajectory of ‘past’ movement to each data 
point in the way Lamb describes as that of vapour trails in the sky: 
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[W]e need to put ourselves in a position similar to that of a 
commentator reporting on an aircraft giving a stunt display. He 
would report that the aircraft was looping the loop, diving, 
gaining altitude, veering to the right or left, and so on… if the 
aeroplane’s engine was leaving a vapour trail, we should see 
the shapes transcribed in the sky. 
 (Lamb, 1965, pp. 16-17) 
After the data collection phase of the PhD research, the data points were 
reduced from the initial motion capture to just fourteen markers: the head; 
both shoulders; elbows; hands; the mid-back; the back of each hip; both 
knees; and both heels (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: Visualized marker set marker placement adapted from Motion Analysis (2007) 
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The reduction of markers reflects research in the field of point-light 
animation, previously discussed in Chapter Six, with regards to belief in 
the identity of the observed stimuli. Press (2011) for example, suggests 
that “[b]elief about identity may have greater impact when there is less 
perceptual information.” (p. 1413). In this article, Press addresses two 
research projects which examined the effects of instructing participants 
that point-light stimuli were either human or computer generated on the 
motor neuron system. Stanley et al. (2007) found that belief did effect the 
activation of the mirror neuron system (see Chapter Six). However, in a 
similar study, Press et al. (2006) found no evidence of effects of belief, the 
difference between the two was the complexity of animation. 
Laban’s second area of research, eukinetics, however, has different 
considerations for visualization, in terms of focus, pressure, time and flow 
(as per Lamb’s definitions), on a continuum between two extremes; 
directing/indirecting, increasing/decreasing, decelerating/accelerating and 
freeing/binding. Based on the work of Santos, Prado and Dias (2009) a 
justification can be made for the visualization of velocity and acceleration 
only, alongside the trajectories. In their study “features were chosen by 
interpreting the parameters of Laban Movement Analysis (LMA) through 
physical measurable entities that could describe them best” (p. 4987), as 
seen in their table below: 
LMA Effort Qualities Physical entities 
Time.sudden High acceleration, High velocity 
Time.sustained Low acceleration, Low velocity 
Space.direct Small curvature, Small angular velocity 
Space.indirect High curvature, High angular velocity 
Flow.free High curvature, High angular velocity 
Flow.bound Low acceleration, low velocity 
Weight.strong Muscle tension, Medium acceleration 
Weight.light Muscle relaxed 
Figure 12: Initial hypothesis of correspondences between LMA effort qualities and physical entities 
(Santos, et al. 2009) 
The entities in bold are those which presented a strong pattern for 
distinguishing the extremes of the effort qualities, however, unfortunately, 
Louise Douse Chapter Nine: Interpreting Flow  
169 
 
weight could not easily be defined as “there is no visual cue that could 
reflect muscle tension.” (Ibid, p. 4987). Based on this, acceleration, 
velocity and curvature of movement are the only features required for 
describing the three other qualities. Curvature of movement is already 
visualized in the trajectories of the data points, so only velocity and 
acceleration remain. 
Drawing on the pragmatic approaches to visualization and the concern for 
those visualizations to be easily readable and recognizable, the 
visualizations in this thesis were projected to use a colour scale to 
represent velocity. Yellow, for example could be used to represent high 
velocity movements, moving through red to blue for low velocity 
movements. Velocity would be seen in the colour of the trajectory, and 
acceleration would be noted in the speed of the colour change from blue 
to yellow as well as the increasing length of trajectory. The finalised 
visualizations are discussed in Chapter Ten, with an analysis of the 
process of refinement. 
In conclusion, Ihde’s work in the field of visualism and his theories on 
hermeneutic technics have informed the method by which the 
visualizations are analysed. The visualizations are considered to present 
the body in order to allow for a ‘reading’ and interpretation of the body. 
The visualizations are an example of the data driven type of information 
visualization in their capacity to evidence the motion capture data of the 
body. Further to this, the visualizations have been considered for their 
‘readability’ and designed with the purpose of presenting the moments of 
flow in the body. The visualizations are both innovative in their application 
to flow and in their use of Laban for describing the movement of the whole 
body, as a tool for analysis. 
 170 
 
 
 
Chapter Ten: Clarifying Flow 
This chapter discusses the various stages of the practical method of the 
research. It details what happened, if that differed from what was planned, 
and what decisions were made through the process of doing. In this 
sense, it details not the decisions of the participants, but the decisions of 
the researcher and demonstrates the researcher’s implicit ‘know-how’ 
(Nelson, 2009). The decision to include a practical method to the research 
was fundamental to the practice-as-research methodology discussed in 
Part One, providing fundamental methodological insight. While the 
practical is not necessary to the final research output, it has facilitated the 
advance of knowledge within the field, and provides practical testing for a 
new methodological approach to dance. 
There were many stages to the practical research, which are essentially 
iterative. Beginning with the decisions for the workshops themselves, the 
various considerations made pre-workshop, including selection of dancers 
and design of workshops is considered, followed by a discussion of the 
first workshop phase and the changes made to the structure of the 
workshop. The second phase of workshops is then outlined regarding the 
use of the motion capture system, this addressed practical concerns 
regarding placement of markers, functionality of the suit and ease of data 
clean-up as well as aesthetic concerns regarding the display of markers. 
The results of these workshops are discussed before moving to the final 
data collection phase, and problems which arose on the day. This is 
followed by the visualization phase and the decisions made in clarifying 
the design. 
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10.1 Pre-workshop phase 
Prior to the workshops, decisions needed to be made on the number of 
tasks used, the type of task used and the length of time for each task, as 
well as the type of warm-up. This phase, as previously discussed in 
Chapter Five, draws on the research on imagery. The type of tasks that 
were decided on prior to the workshop reflected the research in image 
based improvisatory movement tasks as a means of facilitating flow, and a 
week of workshops was initially decided on in which a range of image 
based tasks would be used. Within a workshop, the whole task might be 
given to dancers prior to starting, or it may be broken down, with further 
instructions given during the task. Initially, there was no time limit set to the 
tasks and the dancers were asked to finish when they felt it was 
appropriate. At the start of every workshop a yoga style warm-up was 
used, led by the researcher. The choice of this style of warm-up reflects 
the research into yoga, and the parallels drawn between the yogic practice 
of Samadhi and the experience of flow both with regards to 
Csikszentmihalyi’s and Laban’s research. 
The plan for the workshop was to be open-ended allowing the dancers 
different ways to engage with the tasks, with little direction from the 
researcher. This was in order to clarify an appropriate structure for the 
workshops based on a trial and error format and in response to the 
dancers’ daily feedback. The feedback was collected by journal, in which 
the dancers were asked to record their experiences of flow as well as 
through group discussion at the end of the day in order to clarify any 
problems with the tasks or format of the workshops. The rationale for 
collecting feedback from the dancers was to ensure that the set up for the 
workshop would facilitate a flow response. As flow is an essentially 
positive phenomenon, had the dancers experienced difficulties or felt 
uncomfortable during the workshops their chance of achieving flow would 
be reduced.  
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It is important to note that the dancers used in this phase were not used in 
the final data collection phase. This was in order that problems could be 
dealt with prior to the data collection phase, and that the dancers involved 
in the data collection phase would not have prior experience of the exact 
tasks used. For this reason, it was also decided that in the data collection 
phase, within the motion capture space, that the dancers would remain 
separate as only one dancer could be captured at a time and the 
researcher felt that in observing the workshop, the other dancer may be 
influenced both on hearing the task and on watching the other dancer’s 
responses. It is the view of the researcher that prior experience of the task 
may elicit habitual responses to the task and alter the improvised nature of 
the task. Throughout this chapter, the dancers in this phase will be 
referred to as Dancer A and Dancer B. 
10.2 Workshop phase 
During the week long workshop phase, many changes were made to the 
structure, as noted in Chapter Five. After the first workshop it became 
clear that the unguided timing for the tasks was problematic, for both 
researcher and participant. The participants for example felt unsure when 
to stop dancing. At times they commented that they would continue to 
improvise past the time that they had initially lost interest in the task, either 
because the other dancer was still improvising or because they felt they 
had spent too short a time on it and persisted in the hope that it would aid 
the research. 
I didn’t like being given any amount of time as I couldn’t judge 
how long I had been doing it. I didn’t want to stop if I had only 
been going for a couple of minutes so I felt [Dancer B] and I 
were judging it from each other. 
(Dancer A, 2011) 
This notion of trying to provide the ‘correct’ response refers to the concept 
of ‘demand characteristics,’ in psychology, which involves “participants 
being aware of what the researcher is trying to investigate, or anticipates 
finding, and what this implies for how participants are expected to behave.” 
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(McCambridge, de Bruin and Witton, 2012, p. 1). In order to prevent such 
a response, or such anxiety in the participant about the ‘correct’ length of 
time for improvising, differing times were used for the tasks, moving 
between three and ten minutes, in order to work out the most appropriate 
length of time. After discussion with the dancers it became clear that, the 
shorter three minute tasks were a good length when they had lost interest: 
The 3 minute improv then the 3 min writing was a good time 
because it allowed us to get stuck into it… but didn’t keep going 
for so long that we got a bit bored of it. 
(Dancer B, 2011) 
However, the dancers would have readily continued past the three minutes 
during the tasks in which they experienced greatest flow. It was thus 
decided that the tasks would function as a short introduction to the various 
images, in order that the dancers might identify one image which they 
would like to improvise for a longer period of time. 
The exact tasks decided on out of the numerous tasks employed during 
the week long workshop phase came through discussions with the 
supervisory team. It was recognised that it was important to provide a 
variety of types of sensory image, including visual, tactile, kinaesthetic, 
and auditory, as well as different modes of engaging such as inner and 
outer imagery in which the image is located either within the body or on 
the surface of the body in addition to direct and indirect imagery, for as 
Franklin states: “[d]irect imagery is a nonverbal representation of an actual 
movement… Indirect imagery is metaphorical; an external event or object 
is projected onto and used to clarify a process or movement.” (1996, p. 
51). Six tasks were finalised which covered each of these categories, see 
Appendix A. 
The use of music within the tasks was also a consideration. The initial 
music chosen had no vocal element and was of varying pace and tempo. 
The music was not selected for each task, but rather kept playing in the 
background on some of the days. After discussions with the dancers, it 
was perceived that they were not always aware of the music and did not 
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pay it any direct attention. They felt that is neither enhanced the moments 
of flow, nor detracted from them. There were concerns however, as to 
what degree the music influenced their improvisations in terms of 
dynamics, inadvertently or otherwise. It was therefore decided, that as 
there was no perceived positive outcome for the dancers, that music was 
not to be used within the data collection phase. 
Finally, the dancers enjoyed being led through the yoga style warm-up by 
the researcher and articulated in discussions the effectiveness of the 
warm-up in both centring their attention and in warming up their bodies. 
The warm-up was perceived to enable them to bring their awareness to 
the task at hand and focus them for the workshop. This was important as, 
prior to the workshop, external concerns that engaged both the 
participants and the researcher came to the fore, and the warm-up 
enabled such distractions to dissipate. The effectiveness of the warm-up in 
terms of the warming and stretching of muscles and raising of heart rate 
was also well received. 
10.3 Motion capture phase 
The next phase began within the motion capture suite at the University of 
Bedfordshire. The motion capture phase itself lasted several months as 
each refinement required further testing and, often, further refining. There 
were also many stages to the motion capture phase, where often one 
problem needed to be resolved before the next stage could be embarked 
on. As articulated in, Chapter Eight, the results of this phase concluded in 
the data collection phase being undertaken elsewhere, as some of the 
problems encountered in this phase were beyond the capabilities of the 
researcher and the research environment and required further specialist 
input. 
The motion capture phase began by considering the motion capture suit 
and its impact on the dancers. The process of selection is detailed in 
Chapter Eight; appropriate materials were found which allowed for free 
movement but also enabled stability for the markers. This stage was 
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based on a trial and error process, in the first instance the dancers wore 
the motion capture suits provided with stick on markers and it was only 
through the process of doing, that the suit was acknowledged as 
problematic. For example, in the first session the dancers were asked to 
improvise to the six set tasks and, in so doing, encountered problems with 
markers falling off or becoming stuck to the floor. This was resolved with 
the use of Velcro attached to the markers using heavy duty adhesive, and, 
the use of a full body hosiery garment, which the Velcro attached to (see 
Figure 13). This proved very successful. 
 
Figure 13: Dancer 1 wearing hosiery suit with Velcro marker attachments 
Another problem which arose through the process of doing was connected 
with the placement of the markers. Initially, the markers were placed 
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based on the Helen Hayes marker set placement model (as in Figure 9, p. 
152). The Helen Hayes model was provided in the manual for the motion 
capture software, a program called EVaRT produced by Motion Analysis 
who developed the particular motion capture system used at the University 
of Bedfordshire. The placement model includes markers on the lower leg 
shank and upper thigh, as well as numerous markers on and around the 
joints. However, a problem arose with regards to the placement of the 
markers in relation to the movements performed by the dancers. For 
example, if a dancer chose to roll across the floor, the markers on the 
shank in particular became quite painful as they were pressed into the 
floor and the shin bone. The same applied with some of the other markers, 
such as the outer knee markers and the ankle markers. 
Initially it was thought that the size and style of the marker was 
problematic; the marker was 12.5mm on a rubber pedestal which sat away 
from the skin. After ordering some 9.5mm markers on a soft leather base 
pad, the workshop was tried once more, however, the same issues 
ensued. While there are smaller makers (as small as 4mm), the already 
small size and closeness of the marker to the body caused further 
problems with regards to the capture. For example, it meant that certain 
markers became less visible to the six cameras and there was greater 
interference with the capture. The resolution came with the adjustment of 
the marker positions. After a period of trial and error, the number of 
markers were reduced and the marker positions fine-tuned which enabled 
the dancers to move freely on the floor without pain or fear of marker loss 
or damage. The resultant placement of markers can be seen in Figure 14, 
using nineteen markers rather than the twenty-seven recommended by the 
Hayes model. As a result of the new placement, larger markers were able 
to be used, without discomfort. 
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Figure 14: Final marker set marker placement adapted from Motion Analysis (2007) 
The reduction of the markers was also a result of viewing the motion 
capture data. On viewing the initial twenty-seven markers, it became clear 
that some parts of the body were not well articulated in the EVaRT 
visualizations. As explained in Chapter Nine: Interpreting Flow, the 
reduction of markers enabled a clearer view of the body in motion. 
However, given the complexity of the movement, the markers could not be 
reduced to the final fourteen which were then visualised, as this proved 
problematic for data capture. For example, the fewer the markers the 
greater the impact of marker occlusion, thus, it was necessary to retain the 
extra markers on the back, hips and toes for the purposes of the data 
clean-up. 
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The data clean-up stage was the final stage of the motion capture phase, 
and the most problematic. Unfortunately, the task of identifying each of the 
markers in each of the 200 frames per second for each of the three minute 
tasks required specialist subject expertise beyond the scope of the project. 
Though certain techniques were developed for cleaning the data, the data 
was too problematic to be cleaned quickly, even for experienced lecturer 
and producer of motion capture, Zhidong Xiao at Bournemouth University. 
The reasons for this included the small number of cameras used, the small 
number of markers used, and problems with the calibration of the cameras 
at the University of Bedfordshire. This resulted in the motion capture work 
being undertaken at Bournemouth University by Xiao in a ten-camera suite 
with specially designed motion capture suit. 
10.4 Data collection 
It is important to note, at this point, the differences between the facilities at 
Bournemouth and those used in the motion capture phase in Bedford. 
Bournemouth’s motion capture suite consisted of a larger space, though 
similar sized area for capture. The flooring was also quite different, though 
better for dance. In Bedford, the floor was textured and meant it was 
sometimes difficult to move in the way intended, however, Bournemouth’s 
flooring was smooth and flat. The suit was also different, as commented 
on previously. It was a specially made Lycra suit for the purposes of 
motion capture with additional Velcro pads for securing the markers. It 
came in three sections, the trousers, jacket and cap (see Figure 15 below). 
The jacket of the motion capture suit came with elasticated bands which 
went around the middle finger to secure the sleeves. 
Also, with regard to my dancers, it is important to note their subjective 
health that day. Dancer 1, for example, was experiencing a mild cold and 
was slightly congested, while Dancer 2 had recently aggravated an old 
knee injury, interestingly, while in flow during a workshop the previous 
week, “I was in flow because I was really enjoying the class and I was 
really going for it and I thought, yeah, yeah, yeah, and then, and then it 
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happened.” (Dancer 2, 2013b). Both of the dancers confirmed they were in 
a fit state to participate; however, these ailments would impact on their 
dancing. For example, Dancer 1 became out of breath more frequently, 
while Dancer 2 became mindful of not putting too much strain on the 
previously injured knee. 
 
Figure 15: Dancer 2 wearing specialised motion capture suit from Bournemouth University 
On the day, the space was prepared and two cameras set up for 
recording, one to be fed into the data capture system, and the other as a 
record of the day. The warm-up began with both dancers and researcher 
as leader. As explained above, the dancers were separated during the 
tasks in order that they were not influenced by the tasks prior to their own 
workshop. Unfortunately, due to the wait for Dancer 2, the warm-up was ill-
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timed and thus the dancer continued to warm-up outside of the space prior 
to their workshop. The warm-up for Dancer 1 was also problematic as the 
preparations for the workshop were relatively lengthy as the suit needed to 
be adjusted and markers appropriately placed. 
The use of the warm-up to focus the mind was also lost and made more 
problematic by the unusual space and people involved for the dancers. 
[I]t still felt like a bit of an alien environment, it didn’t feel as 
much like a studio that you’re kind of comfortable in because 
sometimes going to different places can feel a bit different. 
(Dancer 2, 2013b) 
On reflection, it might have been more appropriate to provide two 
separate, longer, warm-ups for each of the dancers after all the 
preparations and fitting of suits had been completed. This may have 
allowed them greater time to achieve the focusing and centring of attention 
they required and then enabled them to remain focussed without further 
distractions. 
Both of the workshops then proceeded as expected; the dancer (Dancer 1 
or Dancer 2) was given the six tasks, one at a time, by the researcher. The 
dancer then responded to those in improvisation. The start of the task was 
initiated by either the researcher or the technician, and the end of three 
minutes indicated by a sound produced by the motion capture system. In 
between tasks, both the dancer and the researcher completed a journal 
entry utilising the stream-of-consciousness writing task as articulated in 
Chapter Seven. After the sixth task, the dancer was reminded of the 
previous tasks, and asked to choose one to improvise to for up to 15 
minutes or until they were ready to stop. After this final task a longer 5 
minute period of stream-of-consciousness writing followed. The only 
problems encountered in this stage of the workshop were that occasionally 
the markers fell off as they danced. This occurred twice in the last task for 
Dancer 2, and initially Dancer 2 was asked to re-start the task as the 
improvisation had not been going very long; however, the marker then 
proceeded to fall off again after about 7 minutes of capture. At this point it 
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was decided to end the capture as this both distracted the dancer and 
caused potential problems for the motion capture data clean-up. 
The dancers were then asked to try to identity any moments of flow they 
might have experienced during the last task. For Dancer 1 this was not a 
problem, and resulted in the dancer identifying two sections of movement 
from the video, where the dancer noted the approximate start and end 
time of each moment of flow. This timing corresponded with the motion 
capture data, as the video had been incorporated into the system, which 
thus enabled a clear reference for flow in the motion capture data. For 
dancer 2 however, due to the restarting of the task, a problem occurred 
with the video capture, and only a video of the short cancelled 
improvisation was available, however the motion capture data was 
available for both sessions recorded. The dancer was thus asked to try to 
locate the moments of flow directly from the motion capture data. It is 
important to note that despite this, Dancer 2 was able to locate the 
moments of flow and, indeed, this reveals the suitability for the form of the 
visualizations in their ability to visualize flow. 
10.5 Visualizations 
The final phase was the construction and analysis of the visualizations. 
This began by refining the visualizations based on the previous criteria 
demarcated in Chapter Nine, by presenting the data in an easy to read 
way. Initially, this meant removing the extra markers used for the capture: 
the upper back, the lower back, the two ASIS markers and the two toe 
markers. Immediately this made the body easier to perceive. Secondly, a 
new facing was programmed; in the initial visualization the capture was 
presented from the same angle as the video recording, however, the two 
dancers tended to use another facing as ‘front.’ While a ‘front’ was never 
established between myself and the dancers, and indeed, while the 
movement tended to change direction utilising the full 360 degrees of 
space, there was always a return or a referencing to one particular facing, 
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and in watching the movement, it was always easier to depict the 
movement of the body from this facing. 
Another alteration was made in the length of trajectory and size of the 
marker. Originally the trajectory lines were very long, which meant fast 
movement became difficult to see in the midst of the lines. This problem 
was exacerbated by the small size of the markers; these were simple fixes 
which enabled the motion of the body to be more clearly seen. A greater 
problem however existed in composing the colour scale for the trajectory 
lines and unfortunately, this was not achieved by Zhidong Xiao. Examples 
of the various phases of visualization are provided in Chapter’s Two, 
Three and Four of the DVD (Appendix D). 
Interestingly, the more basic visualization provided in the EVaRT Motion 
Analysis software, became the easiest in interpreting the movement. The 
EVaRT visualizations included marker points and trajectory lines of both 
past and future motion. While individual markers could easily be removed 
and the trajectory lines could be made present or absent, there was little 
modification available. For example, it was not possible to only have the 
trajectory lines showing for past movement. It was also not possible to 
colour these lines based on the velocity of movement. However, additional 
graphs were available visualizing various aspects of the data, for example 
the velocity, acceleration and position of the markers, as well as the 
distance between two markers. Chapter Eleven evaluates the results of 
the various visualizations as well as the results of the data collected in the 
journals and proceeding interviews. 
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Chapter Eleven: Reflecting on 
Flow 
Within this chapter there is a shift in tone. As noted in Chapter Seven, the 
use of reflective journals and semi-structured interviews was utilised in the 
collection of verbal dialogic data. The experiential data collected is 
important within this thesis in identifying the subjective experiences of both 
the researcher and participants. In traditional academic terms, dance is 
considered to give primacy to subjective experience, as a work of art, it is: 
“an expressive form created for our perception through sense or 
imagination, and what it expresses is human feeling.” (Langer, 1947, p. 
15). The evaluation of such data thus requires different analysis to that of 
the quantitative empirical data and language is considered closest to the 
subjective and experiential. The hermeneutic method employed in 
interpreting the data serves to “acknowledge that trust and truth are 
fragile… [while enabling one] to engage with the messiness and 
complexity of data interpretation in ways that…reflect the lives of 
…participants” (Savin-Baden and Fisher, 2002, p. 191). Thus not only are 
entries from both the researcher’s and the participants’ journals directly 
referred to, but the use of first-person pronouns will also be employed in 
order to indicate the researcher’s intimate role in the construction of the 
data. 
The first part of this chapter ‘My observations’ details the initial 
interpretations of the two dancers during the data collection phase. It 
Louise Douse Chapter Eleven: Reflecting on Flow  
184 
 
draws on the researcher’s perceptions during these tasks as detailed in 
the researcher’s journal and aims to clarify the subjective experience of 
the researcher in identifying the experiences of flow in both participants. In 
doing this it draws on the subjective experiences of the participants and 
develops an interrogation of the intersubjective nature of the research and 
the use of ‘reflexive embodied empathy’ as defined by Dr. Linda Finlay and 
discussed earlier in Chapter Seven: 
[Reflexive embodied empathy is] a reciprocal process where 
one seeks to find ways to allow the Other to present him- or 
herself to and through one. It involves an intersubjective 
process of imaginal self-transposition and mutual identification 
where self-understanding and Other-understanding is 
intertwined. 
(2005, pp. 289-290) 
This method draws on Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the flesh and the 
reciprocity of experience in which “[t]here is reciprocal insertion and 
intertwining of one in the other.” (Ibid, 1964, p. 138). 
The second section, ‘Remembering flow,’ addresses the participant’s own 
reflexive embodied empathy toward their digital selves, or digital ‘other’. It 
illuminates the nature of habit in the body, and the role of both habit 
memory and episodic memory in the construction of self. In watching the 
recordings of their improvisations, the dancers directly recognised their 
selves in the footage (either video or motion capture). They describe the 
identification of those moments as being recalled in memory, therefore, 
this section considers the role of conscious memory and whether it aligns 
with the experience of flow, with links to Merleau-Ponty’s habit body as 
discussed in Chapter Three. 
The final section ‘Visualizing flow’ addresses the efficacy of the digital 
visualizations in enabling a reflexive embodied empathic relationship 
between researcher and participant. It explores both the motion graphs 
available from the Motion Analysis EVaRT system, and the EVaRT motion 
capture visualizations, in order to describe the moments of flow through 
objective analysis. While the motion graphs do not display any common 
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qualities in the sections of flow, the visualizations do elicit a similar 
response from the researcher in the identification of the moments of flow. 
These moments are then further analysed to discern any significant 
motional qualities and to support the observations made in the workshop. 
11.1 My observations 
During the tasks, and, articulated within the stream-of-consciousness 
reflective writing conducted after each task, it was clear that my perception 
of the dancers in improvisation indicated when the dancers had achieved 
flow. This was in both a generalised sense, with regard to the overall 
sense of flow within a particular task, and in a more specific sense, during 
particular phrases or movements of the dancers. This perception came 
from an embodied connection I experienced to particular phrases of 
movements, in which I describe being “drawn” to them. I grappled in the 
journal with the idea that I was either “sharing” or empathising with their 
experience of flow, or else, achieving flow myself, through watching them 
dance. 
I was wondering if the moments of dancing with [sic] I connect 
with, actually reflect my own flow movement qualities? Or 
whether I am sharing in her flow experience? Or neither?? 
(Douse, 2013) 
This reflects the multiple layers in which Linda Finlay describes our ability 
to empathise with the ‘other’ (Finlay, 2005, p. 272). The first layer Finlay 
denotes as ‘connecting of,’ in which one connects with the other through 
using one’s own embodied reactions, for example; “… there was some 
really interesting moments. And I was completely involved in it and 
developed (?) some kinaesthetic empathy towards it.” (Douse, 2013). In 
this instance I am describing a physical reaction to watching Dancer 2. 
The bracketed question mark indicates my ambivalence to the term 
‘developed’ as I wrote my response, perhaps indicating the embodied 
nature of the experience and the difficulty in precisely portraying that 
experience through words. 
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The second layer Finlay calls ‘acting into’ in which “[u]nderstanding, 
therefore, comes from somehow taking up, identifying with, and then 
enacting the Other’s experience” (2005, p. 281). In Dancer 2’s sixth task I 
describe “moments when I felt connected and in flow myself,” (Douse, 
2013). In these moments, I acknowledge feeling in flow as a spectator; I 
am engaged with the dancer’s embodied experience and am able to 
capture this experience through my own sensations of being in flow. Flow 
for me was a physical response to watching them dance; I felt myself 
mimicking the movements of the dancers and enjoyed a feeling of uplift. I 
often acknowledge that this may just be a reflection of my own personal 
‘flow’, but in the moments, I feel I am resonating with the experience of the 
dancer, and mirroring her enjoyment for the task: “Liked this one a lot – 
found the idea of responding to either being touched or the sensation of 
that touch really interesting to explore.” (Dancer 2, 2013a). 
The final layer is that of ‘merging with’ in which Finlay describes an 
experience where “[Finlay], as researcher, became so thoroughly 
immersed in [her] participant’s experience that [she] (momentarily) lost 
sight of [her] own.” (2005, p. 284). One common theme in my journal 
entries is the identification of my own insecurities about the workshop, 
about the effect of the environment on the dancers, my concern for the 
dancers’ lack of flow and my concern for my own interpretation of that 
experience. However, in the tasks in which I perceived the dancers to be 
in flow, through this ‘reciprocal embodied empathy’, there is no self-doubt 
or concern; “I have not been concerned so much about [Dancer 2’s] tasks 
– despite her knee problems. It feels like she knows her body better than 
[Dancer 1]??” (Douse, 2013). 
What is interesting about these observations is that my experience and 
perception of flow relates largely to Dancer 2 and not Dancer 1. This also 
reflects the dancers’ own perceived experiences of flow. In the final task, 
for example, Dancer 2 notes six moments of flow while Dancer 1 notes 
only two. This is also acknowledged by Dancer 1 in the interview where 
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she states “I’ve kind of found it hard to imagine where [flow] is when you’re 
dancing,” (Dancer 1, 2013b) and indeed, when asked if she had ever 
experienced flow in anything else, she replied: “No I, I guess not.” (Dancer 
1, 2013b). This therefore calls in to question the relation of intersubjectivity 
to flow experiences. For example, in one of my journal entries I note: 
[The task] didn’t really seem to go anywhere, I felt quite outside 
from it – like I was just watching [Dancer 1] in a motion capture 
suit do a task – I didn’t feel compelled to watch or drawn into 
the movement, I wonder if it reflects a lack of flow for [Dancer 
1], but certainly for me. I was partly distracted, thinking about 
things, I can’t remember what now…” 
(Douse 2013) 
This distraction and lack of flow from the perspective of the spectator also 
indicates a lack of intersubjectivity. It could therefore be suggested that 
flow is itself an example of reflexive embodied empathy. Although that is to 
say that not all intersubjective relationships are positive, as in flow. On the 
other hand it could be argued that my entry above indicates a mirroring 
and ‘acting into’ the identity of the other. Dancer 1, in the same task, 
notes: 
I think the word delicate was in the description and made me 
think lots about detail & precision & articulation. Sometimes I 
thought about connection between 2 points like a puppet but 
that always broke off because it limited what I could do with my 
body. 
(Dancer 1, 2013a) 
Perhaps the broken flow of Dancer 1 was therefore mirrored in my 
distracted experience of the task. Regarding the conclusions in Chapter 
Four, Dancer 1’s lack of flow could reflect both Csikszentmihalyi’s and 
Laban’s views of the propensity one has for this type of intrinsically 
motivated experience. In Chapter Four, I relate both Laban and Lamb’s 
use of the term ‘flow’ to Csikszentmihalyi’s characterization of the Autotelic 
Personality, in which both describe the effects childhood has on retaining 
this quality. In this instance if Dancer 1 experiences less flow in general 
than Dancer 2, it could imply that she has less autotelic tendency, and 
therefore less ‘flow’ in Laban and Lamb’s sense of the word. 
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With regard to Lamb’s research this flow variation exists in effort 
(free/bound) and shape (growing/shrinking). Within my journal entries it is 
clear this could be the case. Task four ‘Planes,’ is arguably the task in 
which Dancer 2 achieved most flow; “LOVE IT” (Dancer 2, 2013a). When 
watching this task I note that “what was interesting was that the 
gestures/postures?? seemed to be opposing – like dissonant?” (Douse, 
2013). In Dancer 2’s final task I also remark on her “big/small” movement. 
On reflection, it could be considered that what I am referring to is the 
variation of flow from growing to shrinking and fast to slow, free to bound. 
Drawing further on my descriptions of the dancer movements as I perceive 
them to be in flow, there are further connections to Laban and Lamb’s idea 
of flow and posture-gesture merging. In the following reference I go on to 
describe my experience of task five, the ‘Mobile’ task, as danced by 
Dancer 2. 
This felt less interesting – I think there were less dynamic 
changes and more gestural movements rather than whole body. 
Which would reflect Laban/Lamb’s theories – unless of course 
[Dancer 2] was in complete flow – and it was just me who 
missed it. Again, I think this movement was nice, but it didn’t 
spark for me, it didn’t excite. 
(Douse, 2013) 
In the above reflection, I make two interesting inferences. I again refer to 
my felt experience of the movement; that those perceived moments of flow 
“excite,” and “spark,” and draw my attention while the non-flow moments 
are considered “less interesting,” though “nice.” The second inference, 
however, is in the describable qualities of the movement, referring to there 
being less dynamic variation and full bodied interaction. With regard to the 
first of these, it is interesting to note that Dancer 2 did not achieve flow in 
this task for the most part, if at all; 
That was really hard – I think a baby underneath that mobile 
would have nightmares and be scared for life. I felt a bit like a 
‘monster’ leching down lolling around. I did discover isolated 
twisting towards the end which was more interesting to dance – 
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but other wise [sic] was a bit like a long armed ape – swinging 
about like a – who knows what. 
(Dancer 2, 2013a) 
In relation to the second part, it is Lamb’s posture-gesture merged 
movement which I refer to more frequently in the journal. In Appendix C I 
detail all the references of posture-gesture merged movement observed 
per dancer. What is apparent is my increasing awareness of the link 
between posture-gesture merged movement and my perception of the 
dancers being in flow. It is only in the journal entries from watching Dancer 
2 that this link becomes explicit. My understanding of flow is clarified in 
response to the observations of Dancer 2, because this second 
observation firms up my understanding through the increased experience 
of flow in Dancer 2. While I acknowledge the perceived limited experience 
of flow in Dancer 1, it is not until watching Dancer 2 that my perceptions 
are reinforced and I am made aware that Dancer 1’s experience was 
indeed limited in contrast to Dancer 2. It is thus both because of a greater 
range of flow experiences in Dancer 2, and because my perceptions of 
Dancer 1 are shored up by observing difference in Dancer 2 that I am able 
to identify the physical characteristics of flow in the posture-gesture 
merged movement. 
Employing such a reflexive embodied empathic response to the dancers in 
improvisation therefore indicates that flow is an experience which can be 
shared, and more specifically can be identified in the embodied responses 
of the dancers. Flow can be considered thus both a psychological concept 
as identified in Csikszentmihalyi’s research, in which enjoyment, interest, 
and excitement are present in both the dancer and the researcher, as well 
as a physical concept, in which the variation of flow as articulated by 
Laban and the merging of postural and gestural movement as articulated 
by Lamb refer. 
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11.2 Remembering flow 
The next stage of analysis comes with the dancers’ identification of flow 
from the digitized video, for Dancer 1, and motion capture data, for Dancer 
2. Whilst both dancers inevitably did identify these moments of flow from 
their respective visual forms, and particularly, in relation to Dancer 2’s 
identification from the motion capture visualization, it is important to note 
that their experience of these forms reflects their everyday experience with 
such technologies in their immediate recognition of self. The experience of 
recognition is evident in an individual’s recognition of self in the mirror or 
photograph, and is a phenomenon humans (among other primates) 
develop by the age of two. (Amsterdam, 1972). Given this particular 
relation to the data, it was not considered that the characteristics of the 
visualisations highlighted the moments of flow, rather it was related to their 
memory of the task, and in particular their lack of memory regarding the 
specific moments of flow. 
I guess you don’t remember the flow moments, you remember 
the moments where you’ve changed out of it, and noticed 
something or did something different. 
(Dancer 1, 2013b) 
This was similarly reiterated by Dancer 2: 
At one point, I knew that I’d achieved flow when I’d gone into a 
bit that I’d done on the floor, I didn’t necessarily know what I’d 
done on the floor, but I knew that I’d gone down there and I 
had, had a clear kind of sense that, that I had achieved flow 
there, and so in some ways I was kind of pre-empting knowing. 
(Dancer 2, 2013b) 
This lack of memory relates to the idea of ‘expertise-induced amnesia,’ 
where “if a skill is supported by procedural knowledge that automates real-
time performance, then episodic memory for this performance should be 
minimized.” (Beilock and Carr, 2001, p. 703). Here a distinction is made 
between two types of memory; procedural and episodic. Procedural 
memory typically refers to the memory which instigates unreflective action, 
such as the physical memory of riding a bicycle, whereas episodic memory 
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is often considered to the recollection of a particular past experience. This 
can be seen in the writing of Edward Casey, Professor of Philosophy, and 
his work on memory within Merleau-Ponty and Henri Bergson’s work. In 
his article ‘Habitual body and memory in Merleau-Ponty’ (1984), he 
describes three types of memory rather than the usual two: spontaneous 
(episodic), habit (procedural) and custom. Here he distinguishes between 
habit and custom by describing custom memory as a passive form of 
memory and the antithesis of episodic memory as an active memory. In 
this sense, custom memory relates to Heidegger’s notion of inauthenticity 
as an ‘average everydayness,’ while habit sits between custom and 
episodic memory, described as ‘activity in passivity.’  
Casey describes habit memory as combining “repeatability with 
uniqueness… permanence with transience… perceptual with motoric 
action… self with world…” (1984, p. 287). Habit memory is therefore a 
liminal memory, which links to the notion of habit developed in this thesis. 
In relation to ‘expertise-induced amnesia’, therefore, “[habit] constitutes a 
middle layer of human being located between the body itself and reflective 
thought” (Ibid, p. 289). Habit memory is neither purely mental in the 
recollection of a specific past incident, nor purely physical, in a neuronal 
response to stimuli: 
The threat to recollection posed by habit memory is thus not 
only a threat to its uniqueness or power as a prototype for all 
remembering. It is also a threat to the very idea that memory is 
either an exclusively mental affair (i.e. a strictly ideational form 
of re-experiencing the past) or something whose proper 
preserve is the body alone (e.g, the brain as a storage place for 
engrammatic places. 
(Ibid, p. 280) 
Habit memory is thus always related to the physical and mental articulation 
of the past, but is neither a recollection of that past nor a purely physical 
response to the past. “[T]he past is not immanent there as an inert mass of 
accumulated items. The process of sedimentation is ever at work: 
intentional threads go back and forth between the body and its ever-
changing phases, which are continually reanimated by current experience” 
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(Ibid, p. 285). In this sense, flow, while often considered as ‘being-in-the-
moment’, is more of a historical accumulation. This can be reflected also in 
the dancers’ remediation of their experience of flow in the interviews. 
In listening to the recording of the interviews, it is interesting to note that 
Dancer 1’s recounting of flow is quite unvaried in pace and tone but is 
punctuated, however, by long pauses and frequent ‘umm’, ‘ahh’, and ‘err’. 
Dancer 2, while not immune from the odd ‘umm’ and ‘ahh’, did develop 
much greater fluency and variation of both tone and tempo when 
describing particular moments of flow. In this sense, it could be argued 
that the experience of flow is ever established and reanimated into current 
experience. 
11.3 Visualizing flow 
The final step was to look at the various visualizations for analysis. The 
main analysis came from the Motion Analysis EVaRT visualizations, both 
in terms of the visualisations of the markers in motion, and in terms of the 
visualization graphs that accompany the software. Beginning with the 
graphs, these included several x, y and z graphs for the position, velocity 
and acceleration of the markers, and some other options allowed analysis 
of the distance between two points. The first three could be viewed as a 
three single lines representing an individual marker in the x, y and z axis or 
numerous sets of lines representing numerous markers, with the possibility 
of presenting the whole selection of markers for example. The distance 
between two markers is presented as one single line. 
This first thing to do, therefore, was to identify the particular moments of 
flow in each instance to see if there were any significant differences 
between those moments of flow and those moments of non-flow, but also 
to see if there were any connections between the individual graphs. 
Figures 16, 17 and 18 provide an example of the position, velocity and 
acceleration graphs for Dancer 2, using all markers, and Figure 19 shows 
an analysis of the distance between the left and right hand marker. In each 
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figure the sections of flow are highlighted in white, and were constructed 
by the researcher. 
 
Figure 16: Graph of whole-body marker position 
 
Figure 17: Graph of whole-body marker velocity 
 
Figure 18: Graph of whole-body marker acceleration 
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Figure 19: Distance between left hand marker position and right hand marker position 
The analysis graphs depicting both singular markers and multiple markers 
for position, velocity and acceleration showed no significant results. With 
regard to position, it is important to note that the markers reflect the 
position within space; the x graph (top line) for example, shows movement 
which is positioned on a scale between the front and the back of the 
space. The y graph (middle line) represents movement which is positioned 
on a scale between the top and the bottom of the space, and the z graph 
(bottom line) represents movement which is positioned between the left 
and right hand sides of the space. It is therefore unlikely that movement in 
a particular area of space would have more flow than any other area. 
In relation to velocity and acceleration, the top three lines depict the same 
x, y and z values as for position; it represents the velocity or acceleration 
of the marker moving between front/back, top/bottom and left/right. The 
bottom line, however, represents the overall velocity or acceleration of the 
marker. In this respect the moments of flow do not seem to have any 
consistency; while there is some evidence of ‘phrases’ of movement in 
terms of phrases of fast or phrases of slow movement, the moments of 
flow seem to occur mid-phrase, at the beginning of the phrase and at the 
end of phrase, with no discrimination. Spikes indicating high velocity and 
acceleration are present in most of the sections of flow, but also in 
sections of non-flow, they are appear at the start of the moments of flow, 
at the end, and in the middle, with little consistency. 
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It was interesting to see if there was any correlation with Lamb’s argument 
of flow in shape as movement which moves between growing and 
shrinking in relation to the distance between two points. While there is no 
direct translation of this, it seemed suitable to address the distances 
between the right hand and left hand, head and left foot, head and right 
foot, left hand and right foot, right hand and left foot, left shoulder and right 
hip and right shoulder and left hip. It was possible that the sections of flow 
would contain greater variation of distance, for example the greater the 
distance between said markers could indicate the concept of growth, and 
the shorter the distance between the markers could indicate the concept of 
shrinking, and thus the moments of flow, would show variation between 
growing and shrinking, however, this also was not the case. 
Interestingly, the data for both Dancer 1 and Dancer 2 revealed no 
significant results regarding those moments of flow in relation to the non-
flow moments. While this suggests that the moments of flow cannot be 
quantified using such objective techniques, it is important to note that 
these graphs are only one particular way of presenting the data and are 
confined to the parameters of the Motion Analysis EVaRT software. 
However, the motion capture visualizations from the EVaRT software, on 
the other hand, (available in Chapter Five of Appendix D), does lead to 
some interesting insights. Whilst it is not always possible to perceive the 
start and end of the moments of flow, when the dancers do achieve flow, 
there is certainly evidence in the visualization. In the same ways that I 
could identify with the moments of flow in the original act of improvisation, 
the visualizations incite similar responses in terms of engagement and 
empathy, as well as further supporting the inferences made of a 
connection to posture-gesture merging. 
Firstly, this indicates and supports the research in Chapter Six which 
highlights an individual’s ability to empathise with digital forms. In my initial 
viewing of the motion capture visualizations, two months after the 
workshop, I was able to identify specific moments when I perceived the 
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dancers to be in flow. At this point, my memory of the improvisations was 
vague and therefore my response to the visualizations was based on my 
perception of the markers in that moment of viewing. For both dancers, I 
recorded an indication of the moments of flow based on the time of a 
specific moment. Often I was only able to produce a single time rather 
than a time frame, to indicate that at this point I perceived the dancer to be 
in flow. 
When comparing these times to the times the dancers had provided, there 
was evidence, that in most cases, I had correctly identified the moments of 
flow. Figure 20, below, indicates the times of flow identified by both the 
dancers and myself. The cells highlighted in green show those of my times 
which sit inside of the dancers’ time frames. The cells highlighted in yellow 
show those of my times which sit outside of the dancers’ time frames and 
in both instances with just over fifteen seconds difference, and the red cell 
highlights a moment of flow which has not been identified by me. It is clear 
that for the most part, I was able to identify with the motion capture data in 
the same way that I had identified with the dancers, and that my 
experience of flow corresponded with the dancers’ experience of flow. 
 Flow 1 Flow 2 Flow 3 Flow 4 Flow 5 Flow 6 
Dancer 1’s 
times from 
video (13 June) 
2.30-
3.00 
4.45-
5.20 
    
My times from 
Dancer 1’s 
motion capture 
visualization (8 
August) 
2.14 
4.49-
5.03 
    
Dancer 2’s 
times from 
motion capture 
(13 June) 
2.45-
3.30 
4.00-
4.20 
4.44-
5.05 
6.15-
6.40 
7.05-
7.25 
7.35-
8.00 
My times from 
Dancer 2’s 
motion capture 
visualization (8 
August) 
3.48 4.03 4.48 6.21  
7.36-
8.00 
Figure 20: Table indicating times of flow identified by both dancers and researcher 
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In relation to the identification of flow, I again make reference to the 
notions of flow and posture-gesture merged movement in Laban and 
Lamb’s work. It was, for example, possible to see in the motional qualities 
of the visualization the sequential movement of the markers in which there 
was “action involving continuous adjustment of every part of the body.” 
(Lamb, 2012, p. 21). This was most clear in Dancer 1’s spinning 
movement in the second flow moment I identified (4.49-5.03 in Section 5.1 
of DVD, Appendix D) where, within the phrase, it was possible to see the 
movement advance through the body to the ends of the limbs, “where a 
postural movement supports and is consistent with a gestural movement.” 
(Ibid, p. 21). However, the moment of flow starts part way through the 
entirety of the spinning (4.30-5.03), and so what I perceived made this 
moment of flow in the spinning different to the non-flow spinning was also 
the continuity of the movement.  
For Dancer 2, the posture-gesture merged movement was equally 
noticeable in her movements involving gestures; at times the movements 
solely involved the arms, but at others, these movements were integrated 
into the whole body, where “a gesture merges into a movement of the 
body as a whole” (Ibid, p. 21). In the second moment of flow which I 
identified at around 4.03 (Section 5.2 of DVD, Appendix D) an upper body 
arm movement enlarges to include a sequential lift of the leg. In the third 
moment of flow (4.48), there is a dropping and spiralling of the right 
shoulder which leads a swing of the upper body and a shift in the 
placement of the hips. At around 6.21 in the fourth moment of flow there 
are pockets of movements which can be seen to ripple through the upper 
body and lower body, like the movement of a caterpillar on the floor. 
Finally, in the last moment of flow (7.36-8.00) there is a sweeping motion 
of the body which seems to ebb and flow, growing and shrinking in 
sequential order. 
It is clear that while there may be no discernable qualities in the motion 
graphs, the motion capture visualizations still incite a reflexive embodied 
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empathic response and help to clarify the particular motional qualities of 
the flow experience. The use of the visualizations in this sense helps to 
clarify those moments of flow by reducing the visual stimuli and pointing to 
the motional qualities of the experience through the representation of time 
and space in the body. The particular qualities discerned also reinforce the 
observations made on the day of the workshop regarding the posture-
gesture merged movements and qualities of flow as defined by Laban and 
Lamb. 
The results of this study have therefore been threefold: firstly, it confirms 
that flow within contemporary dance improvisation is both a psychological 
and physical phenomena. Secondly, it suggests that such an experience 
of flow is perceivable by third persons, and thirdly, it proposes that these 
perceptions can be identified through the use of innovative motion capture 
technologies, through methods of reflexive embodied empathy. In the 
concluding chapter of this thesis, the researcher will draw out the larger 
implications of this study in enabling a conception of the body as 
negotiated by a technologically mediated world. 
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Conclusion 
The thesis was set out to explore the notion of ‘flow’ from both a 
psychological and dance analysis perspective in order to extend the 
meaning of flow and move beyond a partiality of understanding. The main 
aim of the thesis recognised the need to understand, identify and interpret 
an analysis of the moments of flow perceivable in a dancer’s body during 
improvisatory practice, through technologically innovative means. The 
significance of this endeavour can be seen in the reconsideration of the 
relation between mind and body, and art and science which informed the 
methodology for the research (Part One). The three main outcomes of the 
research are related to each of the three subsequent parts. The first is the 
articulation of a transdisciplinary approach to understanding flow; the 
second is with regard to the identification of the intersubjective nature of 
flow; and finally, the third research outcome is that this intersubjective 
experience can be technologically mediated. 
The first research outcome was developed within Part Two of this thesis 
by expanding on the current definitions of flow through an innovative 
transdisciplinary methodology, and in turn both developed and 
transcended such definitions to move beyond the disciplinary definitions of 
flow. Notions of flow within positive psychology and movement analysis, in 
relation to Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and Rudolf Laban respectively, were 
considered. Drawing on phenomenology as a methodology the researcher 
was able to identify a gap in the current literature concerning optimal 
experience as a state of being which can be evidenced in the body. In 
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employing a phenomenological approach to both Csikszentmihalyi and 
Laban’s research, it was concluded that an individual’s optimal experience 
is only available to them through their embodied intention toward the 
world, thus arguing for a psychophysical definition of flow. 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the habit body and Heidegger’s notion of 
authenticity were employed in relation to Csikszentmihalyi’s characteristics 
of flow to argue that the individual is both constituted by and freed from 
their habitual action in the world. Further, it is only in those liminal 
moments, which Heidegger termed ‘authentic’ which reveal an individual’s 
‘potential-to-be-whole’ and experience of flow. The research identified by 
Laban and Lamb with respect to movement analysis, was consequently 
argued to evidence these moments of optimal experience in the body. 
Laban and Lamb’s analyses have been said to represent an individual’s 
preferred patterns of movement which contribute to their motivation for 
action in the world. A new conceptualization of flow was made possible 
which enabled a description of both the physical and psychological 
characteristics of optimal experience and it was thus possible to identify 
particular improvisatory dance practices which might facilitate such an 
experience of flow. 
Research outcome two, the intersubjective nature of flow, was identified in 
Part Three through the use of reflection and dialogic processes within 
improvisation. The researcher constructed a methodology for identifying 
flow through the embodied intersubjective relation between the 
researcher-practitioner and participant-dancer, drawing on Merleau-
Ponty’s research on intersubjectivity and the burgeoning neurobiological 
studies of empathy. It was argued that intersubjectivity informs embodied 
empathic responses to the ‘other’ and arises from a reflexive reversibility 
and shared narrative of the world. Hermeneutics was addressed as a tool 
for interpreting the experience of the ‘other’, drawing on Linda Finlay’s 
term ‘reflexive embodied empathy’ in order to examine the role of the 
researcher. 
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From this two methods were constructed for the collection and 
interpretation of the experience of the dancer. Firstly, reflective practice as 
defined by Donald Schön was referred to and clarified in respect to the 
structure of flow experience. Reflective methods were utilised including 
stream-of-consciousness writing and semi-structured interviews in order to 
enable a hermeneutic cyclical process of understanding between 
researcher and participant. Secondly, an argument was provided for the 
use of motion capture as an embodied tool which extends the dancers 
embodied cognitive capabilities in the moment of improvisation.  
The final research outcome was thus theorised that such embodied 
empathic intersubjectivity does not require a direct identification of the 
other’s body but could be achieved through technologically mediated 
objects in the world. Part Four therefore sought to identify a method for 
both constructing and interpreting the visualizations from the motion 
capture data, using a hermeneutics of technology. A discussion on the 
process of refining the methods for each phase of the research enabled an 
assessment of the implications for their use. The results from the data 
collection phase of the research indicated that flow can be perceived in the 
body of the ‘other’, and further, elicited by means of subjective embodied 
response to the technological data. 
There were, however, limitations with regard to the parameters of the 
technologies in their ability to display the motional qualities of the data, 
which meant it was not possible to find objective quantifiable indications of 
the moments of flow. The theoretical implications of this outcome suggest 
that technologies are able to mediate subjective embodied experience and 
allow for an embodied interpretation of that experience. This differs from 
the typical use of the technologies within both the arts and science 
disciplines by enabling both an embodied subjective and objective 
understanding of the body. While the particular visualizations within the 
EVaRT software were not able to quantify the experience of flow, the 
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embodied response of the researcher to those moments of flow came 
directly from perceiving the motional data. 
Subsequently, the findings from the research could support further 
research within a number of fields including dance education, dance 
practice and dance therapy, psychology and neuroscience. Furthermore, 
the fields of visualism, gaming and interactive arts practices could be 
supported in their development with regard to the application of Lamb’s 
work within visualisation as tool for interpreting embodied human 
behaviour. The technological limitations of the research could be 
expanded on and resolved within these specialist technological fields. 
Consequently, the research supports a transdisciplinary approach to the 
arts and sciences. For in spite of increasingly novel approaches to 
technology within both the arts and sciences, there remain distinct 
relations between human and technology in each field. The benefits of the 
innovative transdisciplinary approach taken in this research include 
multiple applications across both the arts and the sciences.  
Whilst there are numerous directions and applications for this research, 
the researchers own goals for further research include a deeper 
investigation of the particular practices which might facilitate flow. In 
particular, with reference to the somatic practice of Shin Somatics 
developed by Sondra Fraleigh. Within the researchers training in this 
discipline as a Somatic Movement Educator, the extent to which somatic 
practices offer a methodology for understanding sensing and perception 
within the context of embodiment can be further explored. This training 
also complements the researcher’s current qualification in massage 
therapy and further interest in the reciprocity of touch and its empathetic 
nature. 
Further emergent ideas which result from the limitations of the research 
include the link between optimal experience as defined in biomechanics 
and psychology within the broader field of dance science. While it is not 
possible to make generalisations about the distinct qualities of flow in all 
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dance forms or even in all contemporary dance, the research does 
indicate that flow is apparent in posture-gesture merged movement as 
espoused by Warren Lamb. It is therefore the interest of the researcher to 
further analyse the work of Lamb with respect to these particular fields. 
The recent archive of Lamb’s work within the NRCD as well as the 
connections to current practitioners of Lamb’s practice via the Laban Guild 
offers a potential opportunity for further research. 
In conclusion, the research provides an innovative methodology for 
approaching the concept of flow in dance which transcends the fields of art 
and science through the use of the transdisciplinary application of 
technology as a tool for analysis. 
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Appendix A: Movement Tasks 
Task 1 – ‘Inner Surface’  
Watch the surface of your body from inside. See how the inner 
surface changes as you move. Initially, it may be helpful to 
imagine yourself as a large balloon in the shape of your body. 
Place your mind’s eye inside this balloon and watch it change 
shape from your inner vantage point. As you move, certain 
areas of the balloon extend outward, while other areas are 
pulled inward. Pay special attention to the changes of the inner 
contours of the balloon. 
(Franklin, 1996, p. 30) 
Task 2 – ‘Synaesthesia’ 
Begin with input from any of the senses, and transform your 
response to it via one of the other senses. What is the shape of 
soft? How fast, and with what rhythms does the colour purple 
move? 
(Blom and Chaplin, 2000, p. 213) 
Task 3 – ‘Puff of smoke’ 
Think of yourself as a puff of smoke dissipating into space.  
(Franklin, 1996, p. 33) 
Task 4 – ‘Planes’ 
Work in each of the three planes; vertical, horizontal and 
sagittal. Choose a different body part to move within the planes. 
What if your left arm moves in the sagittal plane while the rest of 
your body moves in the vertical plane? Keep shifting planes and 
body parts. 
(Blom and Chaplin, 2000, p. 192) 
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Task 5 – ‘Mobile’ 
Imagine yourself to be an elaborate mobile, a set of delicately 
balanced structures dangling from each other by strings. 
(Franklin, 1996, p. 54) 
Task 6 – ‘A Type of Touch’ 
Explore different kinds of touch: poking, scratching, stroking, 
slapping. Respond with movement. Try to split your perception 
and attend only to the sensation of being touched, or only to the 
texture of the surface you are touching. 
(Blom and Chaplin, 2000, p. 18)
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Appendix B: Template Semi-
Structured Interview 
General 
 What is your experience of flow? 
 What is your understanding of flow? 
o Challenge-skill balance 
o Action/awareness merging 
o Clear goals 
o Unambiguous feedback 
o Concentration on task at hand 
o Sense of control 
o Loss of self-consciousness 
o Transformation of time 
o Autotelic experience 
 What are the problems of achieving flow? 
o Research environment 
o Markers 
o Restricted space 
o Task 
 What are the differences between this and your usual dance 
making practices? 
 
The task 
 Which task did you choose? 
 Why did you choose the particular task? 
o And not others? 
 How did the task facilitate flow? 
o Use of imagery – type of image? 
o Dynamics? 
Louise Douse Appendix B: Template Semi-Structured Interview  
208 
 
 Where was your focus during the task? 
o Inside/outside 
o On the task/ elsewhere 
 
Relationships 
 What did you understand my/our role to be during these tasks? 
o How did you understand it? 
o Researcher? 
o Choreographer? 
o Friend? 
o Colleague? 
 How did my/our presence affect your experience of flow? 
 
Capturing flow 
 Where you able to locate the moments of flow in the video? How? 
 Was viewing the experience different to the actual experience? 
How? 
 How did viewing it make you feel? 
o Did you experience the same sensations as when you were 
dancing? 
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Appendix C: Posture-Gesture 
Quotes 
Dancer 1, Task 3: 
I felt most connected/ drawn to the spinning which involved an 
elevated chest but also during the low/ floor work when the 
thighs were engaged and powering the body across the space. 
 
Dancer 1, Task 4: 
There was some spinning again – but it felt more habitual than 
right/ fitting. I wonder if it is the case that in some instances the 
same type of movement can be habitual and in others, where 
there is perhaps more or less – like more of the body involved 
but less controlled thinking that it is liberated from habit. 
 
Dancer 1, Task 6: 
Interesting – I didn’t feel distracted but it was interesting to see 
the way she used her body there seemed to be movement that 
was just short of being full-bodied – I think in terms of 
momentum there was some full bodied movement but largely it 
seemed slightly disconnected. I am not sure is flow was 
achieved again. 
 
Dancer 2, Task 2: 
I really liked this – there were many quick quirky movements – I 
did get distracted sometimes but only when thinking about 
Laban/Lamb and the posture/gesture merged movement – 
there was much more of this in this task – little flick resonated 
throughout the body and merged. 
 
Dancer 2, Task 3: 
This task felt more like gestural movement and not much 
merging. 
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Dancer 2, Task 4: 
This was interesting – watching [Dancer 2] as a Laban analyst 
the task seemed to take on a whole different meaning there 
was much more vibrancy and full bodied movement. 
 
Dancer 2, Task 5: 
I think there were less dynamic changes and more gestural 
movements rather than whole body. 
 
Dancer 2, Task 6: 
There were moments when I felt connected and in flow myself 
such as the moments of high speed/ish – it was the little jerky 
movement where the attention seemed to be directed at one 
specific point and the moment did resonate though not always 
to the ends of the body… I’m not sure, I think that short, 
snappy, full bodied phrases seem to suit [Dancer 2] more, and 
work to engage me more anyway. 
 
Dancer 2, Task 7: 
I think the initial engager was the quick small/big whole body 
movements. 
(Douse, 2013)
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Appendix D: DVD 
Chapter One: Video files for Task 7 
1.1 Dancer 1 
Chapter Two: Bournemouth visualization phase 1 for Task 7 
2.1 Dancer 1 
2.2 Dancer 2 
Chapter Three: Bournemouth visualization phase 2 for Task 7 
3.1  Dancer 1 
3.2  Dancer 2 
Chapter Four: Bournemouth visualization phase 3 for Task 7 
1.1 Dancer 1 
1.2 Dancer 2 
Chapter Five: EVaRT visualization for Task 7 
5.1 Dancer 1 
5.2 Dancer 2 
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